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INTRODUCTION
DEMOCRACY TODAY. THIS IS THE TOPIC OF THIS BOOK, which reﬂ ects the I 
International Congress on Political Philosophy and Theory that took 
place at Universidade do Minho during the 3rd and 4th of November 
of 2010. 
This Congress was the ﬁ rst moment of a broader research, moved 
by the inquiry of Redeﬁ ning Democracy for the XXI Century.  As a whole, 
this project aims at ﬁ nding new ways of conceiving democracy for the 
future, both theoretically and practically speaking. Our goal is to bring 
into discussion several aspects of theory and practice that have domi-
nated the ‘democratic discourse’ until today. In doing so, and given the 
contemporary circumstances of globalization and the shift of forces 
from the traditional “nation-state” into other forms of social, economic 
and political organization that we are witnessing for the past two dec-
ades, we try to understand what can we do in order to get closer to the 
democratic ideal(s). From a profound and inter-disciplinary dialogue 
between philosophers, social and political scientists, and individuals 
who are engaged in enhancing the democratic spirit and democratic 
practices around the globe, we expect to contribute to the multi-task 
of (re)designing, reconﬁ guring, transforming and adapting current 
practices into constant and ever changing historical circumstances 
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in concrete local realities that can be closer to the democratic ideal of 
liberty, equality and social justice. 
This Congress, which is now translated in this volume, was the 
ﬁ rst methodological and practical step towards this magniﬁ cent task 
of conceiving ‘better’ ways of doing democracy or, in other words, it 
was the ﬁ rst step in bridging theory and practice, in bringing together 
theoretical reﬂ ections on conceptual aspects which dominate the 
‘democratic discourse’ and, on the other hand, the practical neces-
sity of ﬁ nding answers that can be applied to very concrete realities 
around the world. 
This book has three sections. The ﬁ rst one is devoted to Reﬂ ections 
on Democratic Theory, expressing many of the concerns that have 
dominated the debate for the past decades. In this section you will ﬁ nd 
Nuno Coelho’s article entitled Politics and equality in Greek invention of 
democracy. In his article, Coelho goes back to the Greek conceptuali-
zation of politics, equality and democracy, arguing that this genetic 
approach – philosophical and political – can help us understand-
ing where and who we are today, both as individuals and political 
beings. After Coelho’s article, you will ﬁ nd Demin Duan’s article 
entitled  Alexis de Tocqueville’s Notion of Political Freedom – A Vision 
of Democracy, reﬂ ecting the inﬂ uence of Tocqueville in our contem-
porary readings of ‘democracy’, and articulating the ‘liberal’ with 
the ‘republican’ traditions along their correspondent approaches 
to democracy, freedom and power. Femmy Thewissen, on the other 
hand, builds an interesting argument around governance. Her article 
entitled Governance through the lens of representation. Confrontation of 
governance and government is a journey which clariﬁ es the several 
meaning of governance and which places governance in the context 
of representative democracy. 
The second section is dedicated to Contemporary theories. Opening 
this section you will ﬁ nd David Plotke’s article on Democratic Virtues. 
Arguing that there is no such thing as ‘minimal’ democracy, only democ-
racy, Plotke shows how the relationship between different democratic 
virtues is not as easy as one initially would imagine. On the contrary, 
democratic virtues do not go easily together and the emphasis one 
gives to one or another has practical results, leading to quite different 
models of democracy. 
Democracy Today.indb   8 11-08-2012   20:05:45
9INTRODUCTION
Marta Nunes da Costa 
From Plotke’s reﬂ ection on contemporary democratic theory we 
follow to Maria João Cabrita who offers a Rawlsian approach to global 
international democracy in The designs of global international democracy 
in the rawlsian realistic utopia. 
From these reﬂ ections we follow to considerations of democracy 
and hope, reﬂ ecting Laclau and Mouffe’s work. Thomas Decreus is 
the author of Democracy, Hope and Nihilism: On the concept of hope in the 
work of Laclau and Mouffe. Marco Walter presents Designing the Public 
Realm - a Prerequisite for Democratic Innovation.
The third section of this book is concerned with Democracy in 
Context. From the theoretical analysis and conceptual reﬂ ection we now 
enter the stage where democracy is analyzed from an actual, concrete 
and local perspective. Opening this section is Lawrence Hamilton 
with a sharp article entitled Freedom, Power and Representation: Group 
Freedom and Democracy in South Africa. Heidi Matissonn continues the 
discussion of democracy in South Africa looking at the relationship 
between democracy and participation in Democratic Compromise or 
Compromising Democracy: Rethinking Participation. Gerhard Wolmarans 
offers Contrasting understandings of ‘democracy’ in South Africa. A descrip-
tive and theoretical analysis , and Roseline M. Achieng’ introduces a 
more sociological approach to the debate with Young African Women 
engage the Public Sphere: a Continued Disregarded Voice.
From South Africa we follow to another type of debate with 
Federalism, Direct Democracy and the Quality of Public Deliberation:the 
GMO Debate, by José Luis Egío. Joan Martinez presents Democracia 
Global, identidad y responsabilidad cívica de la ciudadanía. Diálogos entre 
Seyla Benhabib, el liberalismo comunitario y el federalismo integral del siglo 
XX while Iurii Mielkov and Anatoliy Tolstoukhov account for the 
Development of Today’s Democracy: People, Power, and Human Personality. 
We conclude this volume with Emanuele Bottazzi’s original reﬂ ection 
on State of Exception and Impasse Dynamics.
We hope that this book will offer to the reader a glimpse of the 
many dimensions of the democratic debate, its nuances and conceptual 
tensions, its dilemmas and practical (im)possibilities, its promises and 
actual fulﬁ llments. 
As organizer of the event I am grateful to David Plotke and Lawrence 
Hamilton for accepting the invitation and challenge to be part of this 
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project; I am also grateful to Prof. João Cardoso Rosas, for his human 
support and strategic advices and Prof. Ana Gabriela Macedo who 
gave me the necessary institutional support; to Ana Maria Pereira and 
Vera Amorim I am grateful, for all the help in bureaucratic affairs and 
practical decisions; and the last but not the least, to all participants, 
who became friends along the process, by sharing a common cause of 
taking democracy to the next level. 
MARTA NUNES DA COSTA
January 2011
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PART I 
REFLECTIONS ON DEMOCRATIC THEORY
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POLITICS AND EQUALITY IN GREEK 
INVENTION OF DEMOCRACY [1]
Nuno M. M. S. Coelho
UNIVERSIDADE OF SÃO PAULO (USP) - BRAZIL
1. Introduction
AS THE TITLE ADVERTS, this text focuses on some central terms in political 
discourse, trying to understand them from a genetic perspective. In 
spite of this, neither its method nor its scope is historical, but philo-
sophical and political. From that we expect some help to understand 
the contemporary political experience.
What do we mean for a genetic (Greek) sense of politics, equality 
and democracy? What about their relationship? And how can this be 
helpful for nowadays political experience?
Let’s start for present times. Maybe it helps us to think and prob-
lematize the limits of political discussion and choice. People can self-
impose boundaries and exclude issues from public deliberation.  This 
is a known topic to political sciences and to lawyers. Political self-
limitation can result from express techniques, as in case of rules of rigid 
Constitutions, which prohibit Amendments on certain subjects. [2]
1  This text is dedicated to Professor José Luiz Quadros de Magalhães.
2  The Portuguese Constitution states, in its 288. Article: “As leis de revisão constitucio-
nal terão de respeitar: a) A independência nacional e a unidade do Estado; b) A forma 
republicana de governo; c) A separação das Igrejas do Estado; d) Os direitos, liberdades e 
garantias dos cidadãos; e) Os direitos dos trabalhadores, das comissões de trabalhadores 
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The community itself consciously establishes limits to self-deter-
mination power, in order to protect itself from occasional majorities.
But there are non-explicit cases of political universe constriction, 
which result from choices that are not shown as choices. In a very actual 
example, the decisions on economics usually are not presented as deci-
sions, but as inevitable conducts, policies and ruling. This results from 
its naturalization and mathematization. Some questions keep “naturally” 
and “obviously” out of discussion, as the gravitational law: who could 
deliberate about it? Nobody but a mad person would discuss the competi-
tion as a natural law of economical life - or that a good place in the global 
trade system is the main task of any country’s external policy. [3]
Another question is related to this: the tendency to uniformization 
of opinion, favored by the exclusion of possibilities of communitarian 
and personal self-determination. Falsiﬁ cation ﬁ nally builds reality. 
The ideological afﬁ rmation of a certain order of coexistence as natural, 
rebuilds the world as it values for us, and then that is converted into 
nature. In consequence of the narrowing of political horizon, we are 
getting to be more and more identical, unanimous, in our fundamental 
views. This homogeneity is reﬂ ected in the insipid programs of politi-
cal parties, very hard to distinguish.
2. Philosophy as Struggling
The pursuit of a genetic sense for Politics requires a clear and relevant 
meaning for Philosophy. We would like to suggest a not academic but 
e das associações sindicais; f ) A coexistência do sector público, do sector privado e do 
sector cooperativo e social de propriedade dos meios de produção; g) A existência de 
planos económicos no âmbito de uma economia mista; h) O sufrágio universal, directo, 
secreto e periódico na designação dos titulares electivos dos órgãos de soberania, das 
regiões autónomas e do poder local, bem como o sistema de representação proporcional; i) 
O pluralismo de expressão e organização política, incluindo partidos políticos, e o direito 
de oposição democrática; j) A separação e a interdependência dos órgãos de soberania; l) 
A ﬁ scalização da constitucionalidade por acção ou por omissão de normas jurídicas; m) 
A independência dos tribunais; n) A autonomia das autarquias locais; o) A autonomia 
político-administrativa dos arquipélagos dos Açores e da Madeira.
3  Europeans can possibly think if this is the case for participating in the Union, with heavy 
political, economical and legal consequences arising from this “absolute necessity”.
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cultural conception of it, very close to that one suggested by Edmund 
Husserl in Viena, 1935, in his conference on the crisis of European 
humanity and the Philosophy: Philosophy as a new spiritual attitude, 
remarked by the inﬁ nitude of truth as a task. This means a whole 
perspective from which one sees the world, from which no knowledge 
can be considered deﬁ nitive. In stead of this, every thing we know is 
precarious: truth becomes an idea, and this means that it is always to 
be reached.
Husserl’s perspective is coherent with the last and most convincing 
version for “from mythos to logos” description of Philosophy’s birth, 
which shows how the new mentality comes with an arising brand 
new technology: the alphabetic written. According to this theory, 
literacy allows recording modiﬁ cation processes in community and 
in nature, and so comparing the way things are in the present and 
were in the past. Philosophy shows up, then, with/how/from a kind 
of historical perspective that allows the criticism that would remark 
the rising culture.
In the world founded in Philosophy, human beings must perma-
nently rebuild the foundations of the world view. The narrative foun-
dation of Myth, within which gods used to play so important role, has 
been broken. Life is not safe and stable anymore. Its unity must always 
be reached, because its foundations are permanently in discussion.  As 
now any conquer in the context of knowledge is provisory, the task to 
establish the world basis is permanent. In this horizon human beings 
must now understand themselves.
With Philosophy Greeks also discovered that human beings are 
self-made, as persons and as communities. This can be a description 
of the birth of Ethics and Politics, both representing the discovery of 
self-construction human power. Human beings assume an important 
part of god’s job.
In the lack of the narrative-traditional foundations, the task to say 
what the world is became a struggle. Polemos remarks the relationship 
between Philosophy and Myth. [4]
4  Diogenes Laertius tells the story about the fall of Tales in a hole while searching the 
sky - the slave woman laughed at him: you can’t even mind your step! Laughing would 
be a weapon against Philosophy since its beginning. And it still is; I’m sure every one 
among the presents has been at least once mocked for his/her a little bit incomprehensible 
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But we must specially stress: there is tension among the large 
range of cultural manifestations of Philosophy as new perspective 
themselves: Science, Lyric Poetry, Tragedy, History, Rhetoric, Ethics, 
Politics etc. They all face the new need for foundation, but it is particu-
larly important to observe how they ﬁ ght! Among the pre-socratics - the 
ﬁ rst scientists to represent the new perspective - there were not two 
concordant theories to describe the archai of physis.
The examples multiply. Comedians argue against Politicians (see 
Aristophanes in Horsemen) and against Philosophers (see Aristophanes 
in Clouds); Scientists argue against Scientists (see Heraclito in Frag. 
81 [5], and so many other examples [6]); Philosophers argue against 
Tragedy and Comedy (see Plato in Republic, Book 3), Politicians and 
Rectors argue against Philosophers (Plato in  Apology to Socrates), 
Philosophers argue against Rhetoric (see the whole platonic work!). 
Regardless their participation in the same broad perspective we call 
interests. But humor wouldn’t be the only nor the worse reaction to Philosophy. Athenians 
convicted Philosophers as Socrates and Protagoras to death.
In the other hand, Philosophy’s criticism against mythological world is not charming. Let 
us recall these two fragments of Xenophanes (from Diels & Kranz, Fragmenta):
(11.) SEXT. adv. math. IX 193
panta theois’ anethêkan Homêros th’ Hêsiodos te,
hossa par’ anthrôpoisin oneidea kai psogos estin, 
kleptein moicheuein te kai allêlous apateuein. 
(15.)  CLEM. Str. v 110 [II 400, 1 St.] nach B 14 
all‘ ei cheiras echon boes <hippoi t’> êe leontes 
ê grapsai cheiressi kai erga telein haper andres, 
hippoi men th’ hippoisi boes de te bousin homoias
kai <ke> theôn ideas egraphon kai sômat’ epoioun 
toiauth’ hoion per k’autoi demas eichon <hekastoi>.
I’m sorry for my careless translation:
Fragment 11.: Homer and Hesiod have attributed everything to Gods, everything which 
deserves rejection and disapproval, robbery, adulterous, and mutual fraud.
Fragment 15.: If bulls,  horses and lions had hands and could use them to draw and to 
create as human beings can, horses similar to horses, bulls similar do bulls, they would 
draw the shape of gods and their bodies just as they own have.
5  Frag. 81.: “ ancestral of the charlatans (Pythagoras)”.
6  Remember the Aristotelian reference to Plato in Nicomachean Ethics (ﬁ rst Book) accord-
ing to which it is more pious to stand with truth rather than with friends. 
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here Philosophy! Philosophy is polemos, everything is always under 
discussion.
Struggling would be stressed in the ﬁ fth Century, with the soph-
ists. The antilogic perspective (according to which there’s always an 
argument to oppose to any argument [7]) would be assumed as rhetoric, 
epistemological and even as an ontological perspective. Protagoras is 
the main reference for Antilogic theory, as he is considered the father 
of this discovery. But this becomes a widely disseminated perspective, 
used even in education strategies. From this ﬁ eld, two important docu-
ments of the 5th Century last to show how learning to think successfully 
was acquiring expertise in handling with antilogical challenges: the 
Dissoi Logoi (whose Author is unknown) and the Tetralogies, written 
by Antiphon.
Everything, every statement, values just as a throw in the endless 
game of stating. 
What comes to support the world, in the place of the narrative 
magical explanation - is discussion. Discussion about what nature is, 
as about the gods, society and human being.
Antilogical perspective is quite compatible to the 5th century 
Athenian Democracy. Everybody’s right to stating in Assembly (isego-
ria), expressing one’s own point of view, is supported by a concep-
tion according to which any perspective is in some way valuable. In 
Democracy, citizens are equal in the right to participating in the strug-
gle for the world (for the polis and for the human being, which were 
always implied in the constant discussion on laws and education). This 
polemos rests in the root of the Greek understanding of Polis, as the 
coexistence of different people under the law. According to Aristotle, 
in Politics, difference among citizens is the basis of Polis considered 
as a system of exchanges.
In this view, we can see how difference in constitutive of political 
experience. 
Ethics also shows how nothing is so far from Classic Greece than 
some contemporary descriptions of Polis as an uniformed way of life. 
Let’s recall Aristotle again. Nicomachean Ethics, in stead of being an 
7  According to Diogenes Laertius (Lifes, IX, 50. Diels & Rranz 80 A 1), Protagoras stated 
that “on any thing there are two possible and contrary speeches”.
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Ethics for a homogeneous community, has its departure point exactly 
in the diversity of conceptions of life, among which there are quite dif-
ferent positions about what life is for, and about the meaning of living. 
There is no agreement on the meaning of the word eudaimonia.  That’s 
exactly why Aristotle needed to write the Ethics!
Diversely, Greeks were always explicitly and soundly aware of the 
constitutional role of difference in the Polis, always discussing about 
and struggling for what living as a Polis is.
The conscience of difference as something that requires Politics 
and Ethics is also clear in the description of human soul. This is present 
in the whole Greek philosophical tradition: psyche is composed by 
different dimensions, whose good relationship (order) resumes the 
ethical challenge.
3. Philosophy and Politics (Politics as Philosophy)
From the birth of Greek ancient culture, we ca brieﬂ y point out a 
hermeneutical framework to understand philosophy, politics, equality 
and democracy. Philosophy is the new world view provided by Greek 
culture from the literacy revolution - remarked by an universal criticism 
in knowing. The crash of narrative foundation of nature and society 
gives place and requires the research for new foundations. We, in this 
Congress, are not doing anything else but participating in this same 
inﬁ nitive process of explicit reconstruction of world view.
Philosophy is a contra-dogmatic and always unsatisﬁ ed thought, 
which inﬁ nitively submits any discovery or opinion to veriﬁ cation - 
recall Socrates, who exercised Confutation until the very end of his 
life. Its criticism cannot accept any criteria for truth which cannot be 
submitted to discussion. The openness that characterizes the philo-
sophical culture is the framework where Politics can be born. The very 
question of Politics - how is living in community as equals? - remains 
an open question. It is endless, as Philosophy.
The limits of this power have always been under discussion as 
well. In this sense we can read the speeches on the binomial “physis 
and nomos”. Under this topic, Philosophy (in all of its dimensions: 
Science, Tragedy, Lyric, Rhetoric etc.) discusses the boundaries of 
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human capacity to self-determination. [8] This was, anyway, an explicit 
and open discussion, a highlight topic of the political controversial at 
those times, where everything was to be questioned, even the limits 
of what can be questioned.
In this process of communitarian self-determination, every person 
capable of logos could participate [9] - having logos is to be able to make 
speeches. The Aristotelian deﬁ nitions of human being as Political 
Animal and as Rational Animal can be in this sense interrelated: 
rationality makes human being capable of Politics, of self-determination. 
Rationality inaugurates Politics as pursuit and struggle for the order 
of coexistence - all rational beings participating in this search, mak-
ing speeches…
Politics cannot be understood without this. It is a contest for the 
Polis, by people who know this is in their hands to decide - and who 
know that they decide themselves by the same process.
This search for the city, as a political task, is a polemos involving 
different people. And this also speciﬁ es Politics among Greeks. What 
is absolutely new in Politics is the invention of an order of coexistence 
within which not only one can achieve eudaimonia as self-realization. 
That distinguishes political regimes from family or barbarian des-
potisms, systems of coexistence where eudaimonia is possible to only 
one.  Political orders face a new task: how to make possible, to many 
citizens, achieving self-realization at the time?  In this sense, equality 
remarks a regime as political. Monarchy can still be considered a politi-
cal regime while this is orientated to common good. But if it doesn’t, it 
stops being a political regime, and becomes despotism. The relations 
among people under such regime are not political - for same reasons 
according to which the relations among people in the horizon of the 
family are not political.
Viewed from this point, Politics shows its compromise to common 
good. Please note that common good is not considered as a dogmatic 
8  Participating in this discussion, Antiphon stated that we are all equally accomplished 
by nature to be Greeks or Barbarians.
9  At that time, a lot less people than we nowadays admit for this discussion - women, 
children, slaves, foreigners were excluded. But this does not invalidate the incommen-
surable importance of Greek invention of Democracy. In certain sense, contemporary 
Democracy also excludes many people.
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nor ahistorical meaning of justice. It is a sign of the kind of task Politics 
involves, relating to equal participation of citizens in the inﬁ nitive 
process of communitarian self-construction.
4. Conclusions
From this, we can focus the contemporary political problem we pro-
posed at the beginning - the non explicit restriction of political horizon, 
by the exclusion of certain subjects as questions to decide, from its 
presentation as natural or mathematical truths. As examples, we could 
remind some questions relative to economical national organization, 
and its integration in global economical order, “naturally” and “obvi-
ously” founded in competition and private property. The naturaliza-
tion of these questions decreases the space of Policits. That means, it 
decreases the power of self-determination of human beings as equals. 
This is not a political strategy to obtain success for certain interests; 
this is a contra-political strategy, and in this sense it is against the 
philosophical proﬁ le of our civilization (as a civilization where people 
keep the right to participating in the struggle for the world).
Homogeneity, another trait of contemporary political experience, 
is linked to this. In spite of the always recited description of present 
times as a spectacle of diversity and hospitality, we progressively show 
standardized opinions and ways of life - for example: we become less 
and less interested in Politics. We seem to think mostly the same, wish-
ing and fearing the same, living in progressively identical towns. 
These ideologies strangle political horizon. By excluding delibera-
tion about alleged natural questions, they deny to people the power 
of self-determination.
They contradict human beings as equals, although they make 
people more and more similar, from the constriction of the ﬁ eld of self-
determination. This has not been made through sound and coactive 
strategies, but the results are the same or even worse.
These strategies can be said contra-political, attempting against 
human equality in a very deep sense - the sense that gives to Politics its 
particular meaning, and that made it so quickly develop to democracy, the 
regime to which Athens was historically led by Philosophy culture.
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OF POLITICAL FREEDOM
A VISION OF DEMOCRACY 
Demin Duan
KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN, BELGIUM 
THERE HAS BEEN A BOOM OF INTEREST IN TOCQUEVILLE IN RECENT DECADES, 
which largely focuses on his idea of freedom and democracy. Many 
scholars have pointed out that Tocqueville has a rather different notion 
of freedom than traditional liberalism. In a way, Tocqueville seems 
to be an early criticism of the classical liberal theory. Perhaps largely 
because of this, Tocqueville’s works – though they were written more 
than two hundred years ago – appear familiar to many contemporary 
critics. Marcel Gauchet, for instance, remarks that, “Tocqueville’s 
great work on America […] continues to be an incomparably wise 
and living source, always surprisingly relevant upon examination.” 
(Gauchet 1994, 91) 
In this light, it seems useful to engage Tocqueville’s thought on free-
dom and democracy and pit it against the traditional liberal discourse, 
as a way of intervening in our contemporary debate on what kind of 
democracy we need. Indeed, if there is a model of democracy based on 
the teachings of classical liberalism (Cunningham 2002), Tocqueville 
proves to be a detachment from that model. It is important in this regard 
to single out some crucial points on which Tocqueville deviates from 
that model and illustrate his inﬂ uence upon our contemporary reﬂ ec-
tions on democracy. This should be the primary aim of this text. 
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As to the traditional liberal-democratic model, it is not easy to give 
a full deﬁ nition for it since it draws too a long line, but it may be useful 
to keep in mind John Stuart Mill’s theory. As Cunningham says in his 
textbook-like Theories of Democracy, in On Liberty and Considerations 
on Representative Government, “John Stuart Mill set out what is often 
considered the ﬁ rst systematic explication and defense of liberal democ-
racy.” (Cunningham 2002, 27) This model puts emphasis on individuals’ 
rights and freedom – though Mill himself is not fond of an “abstract” 
idea of right. For this model the guiding principle could be found in 
Mill’s words: “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, 
is to prevent harm to others.” (Mill 1997, 48) Under this principle, there 
is the conventional distinction between public and private spheres. 
Citizen participation is valued more for its moral and pedagogical 
results than as a distinct way of ruling. (See, i.e. Mill 1961 418-420) 
Moreover, since direct participation on a large scale is not feasible, 
representative government is the ideal type. 
Generally speaking, traditional liberal theory is centered upon 
the protection of individual freedom and rights and largely consid-
ers politics as a means to realize these ends. Against this backdrop, 
Tocqueville’s theory distinguished itself as a special way to philo-
sophically consider the “political” condition of human freedom. In 
the following, I will ﬁ rst discuss the notion of freedom in Tocqueville, 
which is remarkably different from the classical notion of it. Secondly, 
to further clarify this speciﬁ c notion of freedom, the constitutive role of 
power in politics in Tocqueville’s theory will be talked about. Thirdly, 
as a way of “contemporizing” Tocqueville, I will give an overview of 
Tocqueville’s inﬂ uence on Lefort’s theory of democracy. The conclusive 
note I want to strike is: the freedom Tocqueville wants to realize is a 
political freedom which does not rely on a discourse of private and 
individual rights. 
Freedom in Tocqueville 
Tocqueville’s notion of freedom informs an important deviation 
from the traditional liberal-democratic model in conceiving political 
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relationships. In order to understand this, it is worthwhile to dwell 
for a second on a remark by Quentin Skinner in order to become 
aware of what is at stake while shifting between different paradigms 
of freedom. Skinner reminds us in his famous pamphlet Liberty before 
Liberalism that there was a shift between two different paradigms of 
freedom before the liberal doctrine claims the overwhelming status in 
our contemporary world. The shift, however, amounts to a loss, since 
we may miss “a repository of values we no longer endorse, of questions 
we no longer ask.” (Skinner 1998, 112) According to Skinner, it is the 
eclipse of the “neo-roman theory of free states” that has faded in our 
way of looking at politics. Skinners states: 
With the rise of the liberal theory to a position of hegemony in contempo-
rary political philosophy, the neo-roman theory has been so much lost to 
sight that the liberal analysis has come to be widely regarded as the only 
coherent way of thinking about the concept involved. (Skinner 1998, 113) 
For the clariﬁ cation of the “neo-roman theory of free states,” 
Skinner claims:
What the neo-roman writers repudiate avant la lettre is the key assump-
tion of classical liberalism to the effect that force or the coercive threat of 
it constitute the only forms of constraint that interfere with individual 
liberty. The neo-roman writers insist, by contrast, that to live in condi-
tion of dependence is in itself a source and a form of constraint. (Skinner 
1998, 84) 
In this regard, Tocqueville may not be properly characterized as 
a “neo-roman theorist” as such, but what he proposes for the notion 
of freedom is akin to their claims. More importantly, Tocqueville and 
the “neo-romans” share a similar distance from the liberal-democratic 
discourse on freedom and similar penchant for the “political” condi-
tion of freedom. From here we turn to Tocqueville’s view on freedom 
in modern democracy. 
Concerning the notion of freedom in Tocqueville, there has been a 
lot of speculation on what it exactly means. For instance, some classify 
him as a liberal thinker, together with theorists like John Locke and 
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John Stuart Mill. [1] Others consider him as a liberal conservative. [2] Still 
others discover republican traits in his work. [3] But roughly speaking, 
there are two major views of Tocqueville’s notion of freedom. One is 
that all in all Tocqueville belongs to the liberal family which regards 
individual (natural) rights and liberties both as the foundation of soci-
ety and as the source of political legitimacy. In this view, conservatism 
and some communitarian concerns may be seen as complements to 
this general liberal discourse. The other view is more radical. It con-
siders Tocqueville as not being liberal at all – or at least, not liberal in 
the speciﬁ c modern sense. [4] Rather, to use Skinner’s expression, the 
“freedom” Tocqueville constantly refers to relates more to a “free state” 
than to “free individuals.” [5] It is “political freedom” that Tocqueville 
dwells upon in his work most of the time. 
However, it has become relatively clear through recent studies on 
Tocqueville’s writings – i.e. on his writings about empire and coloni-
alism – that he could safely be characterized as a thinker much more 
“republican” than “liberal.” Taking into account Tocqueville’s support 
of France’s empire-building policies and his famous writings on these 
issues, we have come to understand that, e.g., the discourse on universal 
human rights is absolutely not at the core of his political thought. It 
is even clearer, moreover, that he never based his political views on a 
natural rights doctrine although it already existed and was even popular 
at the time of his writing. The reason he gives for his support of France’s 
1  See, for instance, Jack Lively, The Social and Political Philosophy of Tocqueville. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1962. Roger Boesche, Tocqueville’s Road Map: Methodology, 
Liberalism, Revolution, and Despotism. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006.
2  See, for instance, Bruce Frohnen, Virtue and the Promise of Conservatism: The Legacy of 
Burke and Tocqueville. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1993. 
3  See, for instance, Sheldon Wolin, Tocqueville between two Worlds: The Making of a Political 
and Theoretical Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. Bruce James Smith, 
Politics and Remembrance: Republican Themes in Machiavelli, Burke and Tocqueville. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985.
4  Tocqueville himself once said that he is a “liberal of the new kind.” However, it should 
be noted that here the term “liberal” refers more to the “liberal” party that existed in 
French at the time. 
5  It’s worth mentioning here that Tocqueville does not oppose the idea of “free individu-
als” and equal rights at all. The rhetoric is used here to make the point that Tocqueville’s 
notion of freedom is in a sense “larger” than the “natural” or “private” freedom that is 
entertained by classical liberal theory.
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empire building bears the mark of a Machiavellian raison d’état. It is 
a cause which engages the political nation as a whole, with the aim to 
prevent the political community, viz. France, from being dominated by 
other major (colonial) powers. [6] Most importantly, this position is not 
even in contradiction with Tocqueville’s overall theory of freedom. On 
the contrary, his support of the French empire building is actually in 
line with his general political thought. And again, the essence of that 
political thought is republican to the extent that is stresses more the 
importance of the absence of arbitrary power rather than the preven-
tion of interference into the individual’s private sphere. 
Tocqueville’s theory of freedom starts with a basic appreciation 
of Democratic society, which he deﬁ nes by a simple expression – “the 
equality of conditions.” Indeed, in Tocqueville, Democracy and soci-
etal equality of conditions largely coincide. They basically indicate a 
fundamental openness of society as opposed to the closed hierarchy 
in feudal societies. Yet along with these social changes come new 
important challenges to freedom. The crucial stake here, according to 
Tocqueville, is that people within Democracy instinctively “love equality 
more than freedom.” (Tocqueville 2000, 52) The subtext is more clear 
than this expression: Democratic society sees as much, or even more, 
opportunity for instituting despotism than realizing freedom. 
The love of equality in Democracy goes hand in hand with the fact 
that society consists of individuals rather than of organic social bodies 
that once exist in feudal times. The political ramiﬁ cation of this new social 
fact is that, given the dismissal of the former, feudal intermediary bod-
ies, state power faces but little resistance from the atomized individuals. 
What is ensuing, Tocqueville observes, is the compelling and dangerous 
tendency in Democracy of state centralization. In Tocqueville’s view, 
here lie the germs of a new state of slavery, since the entire populace 
now becomes dependent upon a powerful, centralized state apparatus. 
Tocqueville depicts vividly the consequences of this over-centralization, 
which happens, at the time, to occur more in Europe than America: 
6  About the issue of empire and colonialism in Tocqueville, see Cheryl B. Welch, “Colonial 
Violence and the Rhetoric of Evasion: Tocqueville on Algeria.” Political Theory. 2003, 
Vol. 31, Nr. 2, April: 235-264. Jennifer Pitts, “Empire and Democracy: Tocqueville and the 
Algeria Question.” The Journal of Political Philosophy. 2000, Vol. 8, Nr. 3: 295-318. Demin 
Duan, “Reconsidering Tocqueville’s Imperialism.” Ethical Perspectives. 2010, Vol. 17. 
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There are nations of Europe where an inhabitant considers himself a kind 
of colonist, indifferent to the destiny of the place that he inhabits. The great-
est changes come about in his country without his concurrence; he does 
not even know precisely what has taken place; he suspects; he has heard 
the event recounted by chance. Even more, the fortune of his village, the 
policing of his street, the fate of his church and of his presbytery do not 
touch him; he thinks that all these things do not concern him in any fashion 
and that they belong to a powerful foreigner called the government. For 
himself, he enjoys these goods as a tenant, without a spirit of ownership 
and without ideas of any improvement whatsoever. This disinterest in 
himself goes so far that if his own security or that of his children is ﬁ nally 
compromised, instead of occupying himself with removing the danger, he 
crosses his arms to wait for the nation as a whole to come to his aid. Yet this 
man, although he has made such a complete sacriﬁ ce of his free will, likes 
obedience no more than any other. He submits, it is true, at the pleasure 
of a clerk; but it pleases him to defy the law like a defeated enemy, as soon 
as force is withdrawn. Thus one sees him swinging constantly between 
servitude and license. (2000, 88-89)
The major point here, it should be clear, is that the lack of politi-
cal engagement – instead of personal safety – symbolizes the state of 
slavery. It is the passivity of individuals in the face of their common 
affairs and the monopoly of political decision in the hand of administra-
tive bureaus that render the political situation degraded and unstable. 
Tocqueville explicitly points out that this is a state of “servitude,” a 
term carrying special meanings with regard to its opposite – the state 
of freedom. For Tocqueville, indeed, freedom for modern Democratic 
society is ﬁ rst and foremost political freedom, the freedom to engage in 
politics actively. Besides, as Tocqueville points out, personal safety and 
afﬂ uence would not last long in a society in which everyone anticipates 
the state to take care of their own affairs. “Despotism all alone by itself 
can maintain nothing lasting.” (Tocqueville 2000, 89) 
While Tocqueville sees the dangerous tendencies of Democracy, 
there are certainly ways to bypass them. One ought to “instruct 
Democracy,” Tocqueville claims. And what he sees in America gives 
hope for the prospect of Democratic society. There, Tocqueville com-
ments, an extreme “equality of conditions” is fairly combined with 
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the “taste” for freedom, or the habit of governing themselves. To put 
it simply, there is a counterbalance to the Democratic tendency of 
centralization. At the head of this, Tocqueville observes, is the system 
of decentralization that the Americans manage to maintain. The US 
political system is designed to such an effect that the governmental 
power is properly centralized in the upper strata of governmental 
agency – ﬁ rst of all the federal government – while the administrative 
details are left to local governments – or more precisely, to the citizens 
themselves. Simple as it may seem from outside, it is actually a delicate 
and fragile thing, especially when comparing it to the political situation 
of the European countries. In Democracy in America Tocqueville refers 
to the French state in order to indicate how difﬁ cult it is to maintain a 
system of decentralization in the face of Democracy, and how fortunate 
and brilliant the Americans are in achieving this. 
While decentralization basically means share of power, it cannot 
stand by itself without signiﬁ cant citizen participation. Tocqueville 
understands democratic rule very well. He discerns that a rule by many 
people – despite the various types it takes – may not be as efﬁ cient 
and persistent as the rule by one or a small group of people. But the 
signiﬁ cance of participation does not lie there. The mere fact of their 
having a say in affairs that concern them leads to a boost in people’s 
spirit in looking after the common good. More importantly, participa-
tion is to make people realize that their own freedom and prosperity 
are actually bound with other people’s. Tocqueville states: “it is not 
the elected magistrate who makes American democracy prosper; but 
it prospers because the magistrate is elective.” (2000, 488) This is why 
Tocqueville is so fond of the American township which, Tocqueville 
says, functions like a school for democracy. And the federal system 
of America is so designed that it guarantees people a signiﬁ cant and 
reasonable share in all public affairs. In the end, the share of power 
is a share among citizens. A free state is a state in which citizens can 
freely participate in overseeing their own affairs.
In this respect, Tocqueville is close to Rousseau’s idea of freedom. 
Both of them agree that freedom is only possible in a political com-
munity. Both deﬁ ne freedom as opposed to the state of slavery. And 
for both of them, citizen participation is crucial in maintaining a free 
state. But Tocqueville is decisively different from Rousseau in that he 
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believes that power should and could be divided and shared. He rejects 
the idea that power should reside in a single hand, be it the sovereign 
Monarchy or the “people’s will.” 
From here we may proceed to the constitutive role of power in 
society as analyzed by Tocqueville and how this fulﬁ lls his overall 
theory of freedom. 
The Role of Power in Tocqueville’s Theory of Freedom
Another crucial aspect of Tocqueville’s notion of freedom is its relation-
ship with power. This connection is consistent with the “neo-roman” 
notion of freedom in that the “neo-romans” also indicate freedom as 
“non-arbitrariness” of political power. Freedom exists in the power 
relationships that hold the whole society in unity. 
This could preliminarily be seen in a remark Tocqueville makes 
regarding the power of the majority in Democracy. Tocqueville shows in 
Democracy in America that the principle of the sovereignty of the people 
inevitably comes down to the majority rule. It is the number that actu-
ally prevails, while the “pure will” of the people is only a mirage and a 
dangerous pretension. More than an observation, this conclusion leads 
to the political consideration that the dominance of the majority should 
be counter-balanced in order for there to be freedom. But on the other 
hand, Tocqueville points out that the representation of the people as a 
whole by the majority is also inevitable. Otherwise, the unity or the even 
the existence of the Democratic society is put in question. Tocqueville 
states: “I think, therefore, that one must always place somewhere one 
social power superior to all the others, but I believe freedom to be in 
peril when that power ﬁ nds no obstacle before it that can restrain its 
advance and give it time to moderate itself.” (2000, 241) 
The “bigger” notion of this power relationship lies in the connec-
tion between power and the representation of “the people.” Tocqueville 
makes the famous distinction between aristocratic to democratic society, 
respectively being principled by “inequality of conditions” and “equality 
of conditions.” The former type of society is characterized by organic 
social relationships, whereas in Democratic society individuals are 
conceived as independent of their social relationships. In other words, 
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all individuals are considered as equal and independent. However, as 
Tocqueville observes, this apparent “individualization” of society does 
not mean anarchy for Democratic society. On the contrary, a societal 
power inevitably rises out of the atomic conditions of individuals. In 
the place of the King or the Lord, “the people” as a whole claims the 
supremacy. Individuals are powerless and nameless in this abstract 
mass of “the people.” Regarding this, Tocqueville remarks: “what I 
most reproach in Democratic government, as it has been organized in 
the United States, is not, as many people in Europe claim, its weakness, 
but on the contrary, its irresistible force.” (2000, 241) 
Indeed, as some commentators have pointed out (Bendix 1964; 
Aron 1965) the transition from aristocratic and Democratic society in 
Tocqueville could be considered as a transition of different types of 
authority. While the ﬁ rst indicates the domination by a power based 
upon inequality of conditions, the latter is conditioned by equality 
among individuals. The critical difference between the two kinds of 
power, then, is: the ﬁ rst is usually checked by various kinds of powers 
and constrained by long-standing customs and religion; whereas in 
the Democratic society, power tends to be extreme and unstoppable, as 
it only faces weak individuals and ﬁ nds its new name in “the people.” 
Tocqueville calls this extremeness of Democratic power “Democratic 
despotism.” 
As Tocqueville analyzes, despotism in Democratic society would 
be a totally new kind of despotism. Different from despotism in ancient 
times, it can no longer be grasped in the “arbitrariness” of power. 
Power in Democracy usually has a law; only the law ﬁ nds no limits in 
regulating peoples’ lives. It tries to eliminate voluntary initiatives and 
individuality among people and to make all subjects uniform. In this 
way, the new despotism is absolutely more formidable than any form of 
despotism that we know. Tocqueville depicts the state of “Democratic 
despotism” as follows: 
I want to imagine with what new features despotism could be produced in 
the world: I see an innumerable crowd of like and equal men who revolve 
on themselves without repose, procuring the small and vulgar pleasures 
with which they ﬁ ll their souls. Each of them, withdrawn and apart, is like 
a stranger to the destiny of all the others: his children and his particular 
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friends form the whole human species for him; as for dwelling with his 
fellow citizens, he is beside them, but he does not see them; he touches 
them and does not feel them; he exists only in himself and for himself 
alone, and if a family still remains for him, one can at least say that he no 
longer has a native country. […] Above these an immense tutelary power 
is elevated, which alone takes charge of assuring their enjoyments and 
watching over their fate. It is absolute, detailed, regular, far-seeing, and 
mild. It would resemble paternal power if, like that, it had for its object 
to prepare men for manhood; but on the contrary, it seeks only to keep 
them ﬁ xed irrevocably in childhood; it likes citizens to enjoy themselves 
provided that they think only of enjoying themselves. It willingly works 
for their happiness; but it wants to be the unique agent and sole arbiter 
of that; it provides for their security, foresees and secures their needs, 
facilitates their pleasures, conducts their principal affairs, directs their 
industry, regulates their estates, divides their inheritances; can it not take 
away from them entirely the trouble of thinking and the pain of living? 
(2000, 663)
In Tocqueville’s theory, the power of “the people” is constitutive 
of Democratic society as such. Tocqueville calls it “the political laws” 
or “law of laws” in Democracy. (Tocqueville 2000, 53, 54) “It was no 
longer permissible to struggle against it.” (Tocqueville 2000, 54) The 
challenge, then, is to tame it or bring it in check; or to be more precise, 
to constrain any power that tries to speak in the name of the people. 
For this reason, Tocqueville brings the conﬂ ict and struggles of differ-
ent power in society to light: the desire for equality is checked by the 
taste for freedom; the tendency for centralization is balanced by the 
momentum of local self-government; the uniform rule of the state is 
diffused by the voluntary associations of the people; and the dominat-
ing power of the majority is tamed by the right of the minority to speak 
and act. For there to be freedom, Tocqueville believes, power that has 
a claim on the whole society should be counterbalanced. 
In this regard, “moderation” seems to be the ﬁ nal word for freedom 
in Tocqueville. Power needs to be moderated and be prevented from 
being absolute. Under moderation of power, society retains its open-
ness, where all kinds of possibilities and changes can erupt. And in 
this openness, Tocqueville ﬁ nds the possibility of freedom. 
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Tocqueville’s Inﬂ uence on Lefort
Lefort’s primary use of Tocqueville’s theory concerns the latter’s idea 
of Democratic revolution. In Lefort’s vision, Tocqueville’s theory of 
Democratic revolution provides the perfect perception of what is called 
the “forms” of society. Lefort considers democracy not only in terms 
of political institutions, but also as a “form” of society. Democracy is 
the only kind of political regime that openly acknowledges the political 
nature of society. According to him, the political nature of society is 
the truth that any society could not coincide with the representation 
of its own meaning. There is an ever-present symbolic dividedness 
in society and its representation. In this regard, there is a distinction 
between democracy as a form of society and pre-modern societies in 
that the latter conceals this “dividedness” in the unity of the repre-
sentation of the society and a transcendental God, whereas in modern 
democracy, this dividedness is acknowledged. It is symbolized in 
the “empty place of power,” meaning power in democracy can never 
claim total representation of society and thus is subject to periodical 
transference. In this regard, as Lefort says in his “The Question of 
Democracy,” “the thing that marks him [Tocqueville] out from his 
contemporaries is in fact his realization that democracy is a form 
of society.” (Lefort 1988, 14) To a large extent, Tocqueville’s contrast 
between Democracy and the ancien régime helps Lefort forge the 
idea that “the birth of democracy signals a mutation of the symbolic 
order.” (Lefort 1988, 16) 
Besides this, Tocqueville’s notion of political freedom ﬁ nds expres-
sion in Lefort’s thought as well. In “Political Freedom and the Freedom 
of the Individual,” Lefort ﬁ nds in Tocqueville’s “political freedom” 
inspiring hints of what a democratic regime should be. As democ-
racy acknowledges the intrinsic “dividedness” of society, it peacefully 
takes in the social conﬂ icts within society, with “conﬂ icts” here being 
interpreted as the antagonism among different representations of the 
meaning of society. In a sense, democracy is “an institutionalization 
of conﬂ ict.” (Lefort 1988, 17) All of these ideas – conﬂ ict and antago-
nism – ﬁ nd their meaning in Tocqueville’s notion of political freedom. 
For instance, Lefort writes, “in his [Tocqueville’s] view, democracy’s 
prime virtue is its characteristic agitation, and not its potential ability 
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to facilitate the selection of the best and to improve the government’s 
ability to conduct public affairs.” (1988, 168) And also: 
The acuity of his [Tocqueville’s] vision of democracy is, moreover, such that 
it allows him to grasp […] the complicity between the resolute supporters of 
order, who are prepared to increase the government’s power because of their 
fear of anarchy, and its adversaries, who, in order to further the cause of the 
people, either call for a new revolution or construct models of a society in 
which all antagonisms disappear.” (Lefort 1988, 168) [Italics mine]
Along this vein, Tocqueville’s contrast between political freedom 
and “democratic despotism” could be compared with the opposition 
between democracy and totalitarianism in Lefort’s theory. As we have 
already discussed, Tocqueville sees the biggest danger of Democratic 
society in its tendency to centralize everything in the name of the 
sovereignty of the people. It not only demands obedience from its 
subject citizens, but also tries to mold them in this culture of con-
trol. Tocqueville distinguishes it from ancient despotism and calls it 
“democratic despotism.” Regarding this, Lefort remarks: “there can be 
no doubt about it: Tocqueville has pinpointed an event which marks 
the irruption of an unprecedented domination.” (1988, 167) It closely 
resembles Lefort’s characterization of totalitarian society: 
When society no longer recognizes the existence of anything external 
to it, social power knows no bounds. It is a product of society, but at the 
same time it has a vocation to produce society; the boundaries of personal 
existences mean nothing to it because it purports to be the agent of all. 
(Lefort 1988, 167) 
Totalitarian regime – and democratic despotism – is the denial of 
the dividedness of society and it ignores the necessity of power being 
counterbalanced. As a result, it denies the openness of society, which 
both Tocqueville and Lefort aspire to preserve in modern society. In 
this sense, Lefort states: “political freedom […] reveals the essence of 
the political.” (1988, 170) 
However, there are some differences between the two thinkers 
as well. A crucial one is on the issue of human rights. In “Droits de 
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l’homme et politique” (Lefort 1986) Lefort undertakes the task of defus-
ing the idea that human rights are either purely a-political or mere 
tools of bourgeois domination. Instead, Lefort argues that human 
rights have signiﬁ cant political meanings, as they signify speciﬁ c 
political relations among individuals. Democracy and human rights 
are inter-dependent in that each of them exists in the political process 
conditioned by the other, whereas, in Tocqueville rights are mostly 
“political” rights. Tocqueville seldom refers to rights as “natural” in his 
writings. For him, rights always exist in a political relationship; thus 
they are by “nature” political rights. Needless to say, the liberal rights 
that have been “declared” as “natural” by traditional liberalism are 
ﬁ rst and foremost instituted by “the political.” Yet still, as we can see, 
despite the slight differences, both thinkers draw signiﬁ cant distance 
with the liberal discourse of rights in their insistence on the political 
meanings of rights. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, the difference between liberal freedom and Tocqueville’s 
notion of political freedom mainly lies in the fact that the latter indicates 
a speciﬁ c political relationship among people while the former largely 
depends on an a-political idea of individual independence. This basic 
distinction could inform different models of democracy, with their 
varying promise on the openness of society. Fortunately, Tocqueville’s 
idea of political freedom survives time and reaches to our contemporary 
thinking on politics. In this respect, an ingenious comment by Lefort 
on Tocqueville could be used as our conclusive words:
Tocqueville is addressing himself primarily to men who thought they were 
liberals and who, like him, belonged to an enlightened elite, who regarded 
the upheaval in property ownership that had been brought about by the 
French Revolution and the Rights of Man as a fait accompli; but who were 
haunted by the threat of the extension of political freedoms and individual 
freedoms, by the fear that the social body would break up, by a fear of 
anarchy; who believed that a strong government would protect tranquility, 
but who failed to foresee the rise of despotism. (Lefort 1988, 168) 
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KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN
WE ARE WITNESSING TODAY A GRADUAL SHIFT TOWARDS GOVERNANCE-DECI-
SION-MAKING., ‘Governance’ is seen as an answer to the complexities 
of contemporary decision-making. Its consensual, cooperative and 
horizontal style, characteristic of public-private co-operations, differs 
from ‘government’ which we can associate with hierarchy and with 
top-down and centralized decision-making. Not only do we see that the 
term is increasingly used in policy-making, from the local to the inter- 
and transnational level, but also that the use of the term governance is 
proliferating in the academic literature of the social sciences.
Since the emergence of the concept scholarly attention has broad-
ened from a narrow focus on effectiveness to the broader question of 
legitimacy. The answers to the legitimacy question have been plural and 
diverse. By focusing on representation, as that which is presupposed 
by legitimacy, I try to take a different approach that is inspired by con-
temporary philosophical research on the value of representation. In its 
traditional use representation is connected with elections. But it can be 
used in non-electoral contexts, such as governance decision-making, as 
well. I will look into what characterizes representation in general and 
what differentiates electoral and non-electoral representation. 
The article will be structured as follows. First, I will give a brief 
outline of the theorizing about governance. This will offer us a deﬁ nition 
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and key characteristics of this new mode of decision-making. As the 
main interest of this article is to explore the potential legitimacy of 
governance-decision-making, a subsection will be devoted to ways 
in which the legitimacy question has been addressed in the past. The 
second section will be devoted to philosophical research on repre-
sentation, in order to introduce a new perspective into the legitimacy 
debate. I contrast here a formalistic and a more substantive view on 
representation and argue that the last one reveals a crucial aspect of 
representation that is often obscured. Michael Saward’s theory of 
‘the representative claim’ will be presented here as it does comprise 
this substantive view on representation and can be read as a theory 
applicable to the empirical situation of governance-decision-making. 
In the third section the characteristics of representative government 
will be explored. By drawing on the reading of Nadia Urbinati, I will 
state that the institutional framework of a representative government 
reveals two aspects that are crucial in turning representation into rep-
resentative democracy: the spatial division (between state and society) 
and the temporal narrative (generated by the sequence of elections 
and intra-election time). This leads me in a concluding section to the 
implications of the sketched confrontation between governance and 
government.
Governance
Deﬁ nition and characteristics
The particular meaning we currently attribute to governance only 
arose after the cold war. Before, the term governance was used as a 
synonym for governing, in the sense of the deliberate “attempt to shape 
socio-economic structures and processes” (Mayntz 2003, 27). We have 
to situate this understanding in the historical situation in which the 
welfare-state was predominant. It implied that the state occupied the 
most powerful position in the classical threefold between state, society 
and market. After the Cold War, the interdependence, that started per-
vading the whole world, was perceived as a completely new challenge. 
Globalization processes started to occur and gradually challenged the 
predominant position of the (welfare-)state. In reaction to these changes, 
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authors started focusing on how chaos could be prevented at the global 
level and effective decision-making could be promoted by revisiting 
cooperation at the global scale. In this regard we can understand the 
origin of the concept of ‘global governance’, which Rosenau framed as 
“a modicum of order” (2002,72). 
Since then the term governance is used in the most different con-
texts – ranging from a new attempt to deﬁ ne international relations over 
good governance to new public management and corporate manage-
ment [1] – and has been applied to the different levels of decision-making 
ranging from the local to the international level. Hence, Offe’s statement 
that it can be “employed for the communication of diverse and contra-
dictory semantic contents and associations” (Offe 2009, 551). He makes 
this statement by referring to the semantics of the concept. The concept 
is subject- and object-less, as there exists no verb that expresses the 
act of governance or the addressee of governance [2]. Furthermore, it is 
an untranslatable concept, that has no synonyms, nor clear opposites 
(unless maybe government?). The conceptual confusion is related to 
the complexity of the content of the concept. Governance is a “bridge 
concept” that blurs several theoretical distinctions “that conventionally 
structure thought in the social sciences” (Ibid., 553). [3]
Crucial for the thesis of this paper is the blurring of the theoretical 
distinctions between “state and society spheres”, on the one hand, and 
“political and economic action”, on the other hand (Ibid.). These two 
‘blurrings’ are the result of the state’s incapability of maintaining its 
central authority. The state starts cooperating with other societal spheres, 
namely society and the market. Hence, power gradually shifts to the 
border zones where the different societal spheres overlap (Figure 1). The 
following deﬁ nition of Mayntz captures this given: “‘Governance’ is now 
1  In the book chapter ‘Democracy and governance’ Paul Hirst (2000) distinguishes 5 main 
areas in which the term is used.
2  “Something happens, but nobody has done it” (Offe, 550).
3  The following seven distinctions are blurred in the use of the governance-concept accord-
ing to Offe: (1) State and society spheres (private-public partnerships), (2) Political and 
economic action (corporate governance), (3) Structures and processes, (4) Observable facts 
and social norms regarding desirable modes of action (governance vs. good governance), 
(5) Subject and object (the addressees of rules participate in their making), (6) Domestic 
and foreign/international issues (global governance), (7) Political strategies in developing 
countries as well as in OECD states (Offe, 2009, 553).
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often used to indicate a new mode of governing that is distinct from the 
hierarchical control model, a more cooperative mode where state and 
non-state actors participate in mixed public/private networks” (Ibid.). 
Whereas ‘government’ supposes a differentiation between the three 
societal spheres, in ‘governance’ the state incorporates market- and 
society-actors. This is the case insofar as private actors regulate “publicly 
relevant issues” or whenever “state policy depends [on their cooperation] 
without being able to mandate and sanction such cooperation” (Ibid., 
552). We will not understand this ‘blurring of borders’ as the prediction of 
the end of demonstrable societal spheres. Overlaps between the different 
societal spheres have always existed, but today these border zones, where 
the different societal spheres overlap, are becoming ever more crucial 
in political decision-making. This implies a holistic restructuring of the 
complex of state, society and market. The question of how we should read 
this restructuring can be answered in two possible ways. Some see it as 
an extension of the state, some as a substitution of the state (Offe 2009, 
555). I will focus here on the ﬁ rst meaning, which states that the state is 
looking beyond its ‘borders’ in search of helping hands. 
The catchphrase of this doctrine is that the state should limit itself to 
steering and leave the rowing to other actors. One could also speak of 
auxiliary forces within civil society who, through appropriate means and 
according to their speciﬁ c competences and resources are being recruited 
for cooperation in the fulﬁ llment of public tasks, become subject to regula-
tory oversight and economic incentives, and are thus licensed to privately 
exercise (previously exclusively) public functions (Ibid.).
Figure 1
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Actors in the other societal spheres (market and society) start lend-
ing their help to the state. It is perceived as an opportunity to empower 
themselves in relation to the other spheres. The cooperation, quite 
contradictory, is thus a means to achieve one’s own goals. 
Governance in search of legitimacy
As the decision-making center no longer resides solely with the state, 
the electoral process linking state and society looses importance as 
well, as an instrument of legitimacy. It brings us to the question of how 
to theorize legitimacy of the new public-private decision-making units 
that arise. Initially, the main concern of global governance theorists 
was the creation of order at the global level. The effectiveness of the 
outcome that governance could bring about was hence the primary 
focus of theorists such as Rosenau. At the end of the 90’s Scharpf 
included outcome-effectiveness in the legitimacy-discourse. In order 
to give insight into the process of European integration he made the 
interesting distinction between input and output legitimacy. Input 
legitimacy must be understood as ‘government by the people’. It means 
that the voice of the people gets articulated in decision-making. It is the 
fairness of the process, such as legal equality guaranteed by elections, 
that functions as the criterion of judging input legitimacy. ‘Government 
for the people’ than is translated by Scharpf as output legitimacy. The 
success of the outcome is the legitimating variable. Scharpf stated that 
the EU  only has output legitimacy and no input legitimacy because 
there is no pre-existing collective identity. Other authors have argued 
that governance is perfectly capable of realizing input legitimacy, not 
in terms of legally equal input of the citizens a people, but in terms of 
participation of excluded groups. The deﬁ nition of input-legitimacy 
by Thomas Risse for example refers to “the participatory quality of the 
decision-making process leading to laws and rules” (2006,185) [italics 
mine]. That is why authors often state that governance “may indeed 
contain germs of ideas that may permit greater openness, inclusion 
and empowerment of hitherto excluded or marginalized social groups” 
(Swyngedouw 2005, 1993). The question is what the implications are of 
substituting legally equal input for participatory input. Will it result in 
an empowerment of excluded groups or will it increase inequalities?
Democracy Today.indb   41 11-08-2012   20:05:47
42
DEMOCRACY TODAY
 
Apart from output and the possibility of participation (input) one also 
needs a way to organize control over the different modes of governance. It 
is the question for an alternative answer to what we know as the classical 
checks and balances between the different state powers (Van Kersbergen 
& Van Waarden 2004, 161). For example public-private cooperations are 
controlled by the judiciary. In this way informal relations are increasingly 
formalized, and mutual expectations and agreements over reciprocal 
rights and duties are ﬁ xed in more or less ofﬁ cial ‘contracts’ (Ibid., 153). 
Another example are “[independent] ‘sectoral’ and ‘sectoral-unspeciﬁ c’ 
regulators who have to protect a minimum level of economic competition 
and set the rules of the game in the competition between large players”. 
(Ibid., 161) No less important are the ways in which knowledge-based 
policy-making is managed by measures such as benchmarking, cost-
beneﬁ t analysis, policy evaluation, etc. These are “parameters against 
which (self-)assessment can take place and which require the conduct 
of a particular set of performances” (Swyngedouw 2005, 1998).
Representation
Scrutinizing how input is organized and judging the output is a way 
of looking at the legitimacy of a system. This perspective on legitimacy 
presupposes that there exists a representational relationship between 
individuals, societal groups, etc., on the one hand, and an authority-
bearing body, on the other hand. In other words, the representational 
relationship seems an important presupposition of different forms of 
decision-making, ranging from government tot governance decision-
making. Whether it are citizens, clients, stakeholders or shareholders, 
they are the ones delegating power to an authority that represents their 
interests. Representation thus crucially consists in the delegation of 
power of one pole to the other and checking whether this power is 
adequately used. Focusing ﬁ rst on the representational relationship 
enables a more qualiﬁ ed way of looking at the legitimacy-issue [4]. There 
4  It should be noted however that representation and legitimacy can not be clearly sepa-
rated. Representation seems to appeal by deﬁ nition (delegating power and controlling 
the use of power) to some form of legitimacy. 
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are two aspects that need to be speciﬁ ed in order to come up with 
a criterion for legitimacy that starts from the given of the represen-
tational relation. First, in democratic theory authors have defended 
opposing views on the room of manoeuvre that the representative 
should have at its disposal in order to use the power that is delegated 
to him. Some have argued that the representative is better informed 
than the represented and should be given the freedom to exercise his 
power, i.e. an elitist rendition of representation, while the opposing 
view defends the need for close scrutiny of the representative. In the 
following I will try to show that an intermediary position is possible 
as well. Secondly, one should specify the ones partaking in the rep-
resentational relationship, because it is the answer to ‘legitimacy of 
what?’. For example, while representation in a ‘government-system’ 
consists in a relation between state and society, representation in a 
‘governance-system’ does not consist in this unique relationship but 
consists in a plurality of representation-relationships arising in the 
overlapping zones between state, society and market. By making 
explicit the underlying representational relationship, and hence ‘who’ 
the representative and represented are, one can offer a more speciﬁ c 
account of one’s view on legitimacy. To illustrate this: The examples 
in the subsection on Governance in search of legitimacy show that there 
exist contrasting views on who should be the ones offering input: 
Scharpf is thinking of a pre-existing demos (which is more in line with 
the ‘government-model’), while others, like Risse, talk about participa-
tory input of speciﬁ c groups in speciﬁ c policy-making issues (which 
is more in line with the ‘governance-model’). 
Below I will deal with these two aspects of legitimacy in repre-
sentation. First I will present two different models of representation, 
which have implications for the normative question of the scope of 
manoeuvre that should be attributed to the representative. Secondly, 
on the basis of the most appropriate descriptive term I will look into a 
comprehensive theory of representation (the representative claim) that 
offers an untraditional answer to the ‘legitimacy of what’-question.
A rather formalistic way of formulating representation is the 
principal-agent relationship. It consists in authorization of the agent 
by the principal and accountability of the agent to the principal. The 
use of the terms authorization and accountability suggest that the agent 
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should act as accurate as possible in accordance with the wishes of the 
principal, as this is the only way the agent can continue his task. I will 
argue here that this formalistic view is too limited and accordingly blind 
to a core that is the same for all representational relations. The “etymol-
ogy” of the word re-presentation tells us that something/-one that is 
not here is presented again through something/-one else (Ankersmit 
2002, 108). The one(s) functioning as substitute or as replacement will 
never be a perfect copy of the one(s) represented. Ankersmit tries to 
elucidate this given by referring to the way in which a portrait repre-
sents the one portrayed. “Portraits will differ dramatically from the 
persons portrayed, yet this fact alone will not make us say that the 
portrait is a distortion of reality, or a misrepresentation” (Ibid., 113). 
That representation would be capable of mimicking the represented is 
an illusion. The reason for this is that the one who represents cannot 
‘read off’ the transparent and authentic characteristics and interests 
of the represented, simply because they are not transparently given 
(Saward 2010, 77). This should not be seen as a deviation. It is a func-
tional and creative freedom at the side of the representative to give a 
particular interpretation of the identity of the represented. In the words 
of Ankersmit there is an “aesthetic gap” between the represented and its 
representatives. What happens in representation is that the represented 
are depicted as such and such. Their (collective) identity is created, 
by making something visible that was only there before implicitly. 
The aesthetic gap thus creates the opportunity for the representative 
to “partly determine the nature of what they represent” (Ankersmit 
2002, 114).  This is in contrast with the framing of representation as 
a principal-agent relationship, as the focus is there explicitly on the 
correct transmission of information from the principal to the agent 
and on mechanisms that prevent the agent from deviating from the 
preferences of the principal. Both the principal-agent and the aesthetic 
model have different implications for the ﬁ rst legitimacy-question. 
While the principal-agent view wants to constrain the freedom of the 
representative as much as possible, the aesthetic view acknowledges 
that the representative should possess an adequate scope for manoeu-
vre. This last view lies between the elitist and the principal-agent view 
and differs from both as it accentuates the role of representation as 
constituting the identity of the represented. 
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In the rest of this paper I will take the aesthetic understanding of 
representation as the one that is best able to inform our understanding 
of political representation. Saward’s theory of the representative claim 
also draws on this understanding. What he calls the representative 
claim is the ‘basic currency of political representation’ (Saward 2006, 
299). It is a detailed analysis of what I called before the core that is char-
acteristic of all forms of representation. The deﬁ nition is as follows:
A maker of representations (‘M’) puts forward a subject (‘S’) which stands 
for an object (‘O’) that is related to a referent (‘R’) and is offered to an audi-
ence (‘A’) (Saward 2010, 36). [5]
Here, Saward captures the aesthetic understanding of represen-
tation in a clear deﬁ nition. As we saw, the etymology of the concept 
designates only two instances literally: something that is absent (the 
represented) is made present by something else (the representative). 
Saward however states that represented and representative can both 
be split up in respectively a referent and an object, and a maker and 
a subject. By inserting these divisions Saward makes explicit in what 
the aesthetic gap between the representative and represented exists. 
On the side of the represented, we should differentiate between the 
image that is created of the represented (the object) and the represented 
itself (referent). On the side of the representative: the one who stands 
for the object, who presents him/herself as the representative (the 
subject) is not always the same as the maker of the claim. The maker 
of the claim to represent can for example be a spin doctor who creates 
an image of how the subject should present the object. This complex 
interrelationship of presentations is seen, perceived by the audience, 
which than rejects, accepts or ignores the claim. As Saward’s deﬁ nition 
takes into account that the ‘objectively given referent’ is always depicted 
in a speciﬁ c way (O) and the one who represents is an actor taking on 
5  Schematically it would look like this:   
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a particular role or character (S), it recognizes the constitutive role of 
representational relationships.
This deﬁ nition not only gives insight to the aesthetic capacity of 
representation, but also tries to capture the instance that is similar for 
all representation-relations. Decoupled from any speciﬁ c context or 
institutional set-up it is applicable to an extensive possibility of cases 
which can vary along the lines of formality, explicitness, externality, 
generalness, and multiplicity (Saward 2010, 57-66). This broad appli-
cability is necessary in today’s context as “constituencies are no longer 
only singular, territorial, ﬁ xed and possessed of transparent interests. 
Rather ‘constituency’ is ﬂ uid, functional and cultural, permanent or 
temporary, within or across borders, evoked as well as given” (Ibid., 
109). It is the contemporary situation that induces Saward to point to 
the fact that much more cases than elections, can be seen as political 
representation. In our analysis of democracy we should add non-
electoral representative claims emanating “across societies, taking in 
a range of ‘public’ and ‘private’ actors and organizations” (Ibid., 141) 
to the classic representative model of elections. A popular example in 
this regard is Bono’s representative claim in the Make Poverty History 
campaign in 2004. “I represent a lot of people [in Africa] who have 
no voice at all… They haven’t asked me to represent them. It’s cheeky 
but I hope they are glad I do” (Saward 2008, 1). As constituencies are 
more ﬂ uid and variable, Saward sees governance as a potential way of 
complementing the shortcomings of electoral representation. 
New modes of non-electoral citizen engagement and interaction with 
policymakers and managers […] challenge received notions of public and 
private in terms of who the makers and recipients of policy are. This opens 
up new domains in which representation happens, or is claimed, by actors 
and groups which seek legitimacy and access in these new governance 
arrangements (Saward 2005, 182).
Furthermore, Saward also sees governance practices as possible 
opportunities for empowerment. The importance of Saward’s view is 
that he recognizes the representational relation that is behind any politi-
cal request for recognition of interests, identity, opinion, etc. Moreover, 
we saw that he distances himself from the principal-agent view, of the 
Democracy Today.indb   46 11-08-2012   20:05:47
47
GOVERNANCE 
THROUGH THE LENS OF 
REPRESENTATION
Femmy Thewissen
managerial sciences, that is most commonly used in policy analyses 
and practices. As we accept here the constitutive capacity of repre-
sentative practices, the ‘representative claim-model’ is much more apt 
to gain insight and theorize contemporary governance practices, than 
the principal-agent model. However much this theory seems to offer 
a new and inspiring perspective on representation in the governance-
era, it should be noted that it might be overrated to assume that it is 
applicable to all governance practices.  While it seems appropriate to 
call the claims arising in the border zone between state and society 
‘political representative claims’, this might be less the case for the 
claims arising in the border zone between state and market (Figure 
1). I will come back to this issue in the conclusion.
Up till now I have presented the characteristics of ‘the representative 
claim’ and pointed to the fact that its aesthetic understanding implies 
that the representative has enough scope of manouevre at its disposal to 
determine partly the identity of the represented. This does not answer 
yet the ‘legitimacy of what’-question.  By opening up ‘political repre-
sentation’ to non-electoral representation, Saward has to attribute the 
assessment of legitimacy to the judgment of the actual constituency, i.e. 
the constituency that is intended by the claim plus the ones who “rec-
ognize their interests as being implicated in the claim” (2010,148). The 
ones partaking in the representational relationship is any self-claimed 
representative on the one hand and his supporting constituency on 
the other hand. This differs from electoral representation where the 
constituency encompasses every citizen in society and legitimacy is per 
deﬁ nition coupled to the judgment of all citizens. By elaborating on the 
way representation functions and legitimacy is brought about in the 
government-model, I will argue that this difference gives us important 
insight into the legitimacy ‘deﬁ cit’ of governance practices. 
Representative democracy: state and society coupled in spatial 
and temporal sense
In the previous section I have pointed to the fact that representation is 
presupposed in decision-making processes. The scrutiny of the char-
acteristics of representation and Saward’s model of the representative 
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claim, made it possible to give a different characterization of govern-
ance: one that takes into account the (constitutive) representational 
aspect of the separate units of governance decision-making. However 
inspiring the representative claim-model is in this regard, I want to 
contrast it here with representative democracy that characterizes the 
‘classical’ government-model. In order to get a better insight in to that 
which we admire in ‘representative democracy’ and to know what it is 
exactly that we will miss when switching to the governance-model, it 
is necessary to uncover the elements that make representative democ-
racy so valuable.
Spatial division
Nadia Urbinati differentiates between three theories of representation 
which can be traced back to the history of representation that started 
with liberal parliamentarism. She speaks about a juridical, institutional 
and political theory of representation. The separation between state 
and society is the basic trait of the three theories. Without this divi-
sion there is no representative ‘democracy’. The chronologically two 
ﬁ rst systems, juridical and institutional representation, are essentially 
and almost exclusively about this relationship. Urbinati associates 
these theories amongst others with Hobbes, one of the ﬁ rst to install 
this clear division between state and society on the basis of a contract. 
The contract-relationship is a relation of authorization. In such a rela-
tion, when the representative has to be appointed, the focus is on the 
individual and his/her personal qualities and not on a political issue 
itself. The content of decision-making is in a contract-relation only of 
concern to the one who is authorized [6]. “It makes representation into 
a rigorously state-centered institution whose relation to society is left 
to the judgment of the representative (trustee); and it restricts popular 
participation to a procedural minimum (election as magistracy desig-
nation)” (Urbinati 2006, 23). This is why these forms of representation 
6  “[…] The juridical conﬁ gures the relationship between represented and representative 
along the lines of an individualistic and nonpolitical logic insofar as it presumes that 
electors pass judgment on candidates’ personal qualities, rather than their political ideas 
and projects” (Urbinati 2006, 22).
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are better suited by the name ‘representative government’ than by the 
name ‘representative democracy’ [7]. 
In the transition from the represented to the representative some-
thing absent is made present. We refer here to the absence in reality of 
the abstract idea of the pre-existing unity of the community which is 
made present by installing the sovereign as possessing state power 
(Ibid., 22). Urbinati herself states that in this framework we can’t 
really speak of a representing of the people, but rather about a “system 
of organization of the people and the will of the nation” (Ibid., 23). 
This organization comes about by transcending the social realities 
proper to society. 
These ﬁ rst two models of representation generated both in its 
own terms isonomia, which can be translated as legal equality (Ibid., 
40). In its most basal form this is guaranteed by the rule of law and 
the state of right. Gradually this was translated into universal suf-
frage, generating an equal right to vote, i.e. an equal right to voice for 
everyone. It must be clear that such legal equality can only be realized 
on a territorial basis.
Temporal narrative
However, those two theories of representation (juridical, institutional) 
are incomplete. They miss a ‘political’ element which adds to the rep-
resentational relationship a broader narrative. Besides the guarantee 
of legal equality, the necessary complement of another form of equality 
is needed in order to create justice. 
What is different in the political conception of representation 
is the circularity between state and society. In order for the state to 
represent it must constantly be re-inspired by society. This is guar-
anteed by a communicative link between state and society, instead of 
conﬁ ning deliberation to the sphere of the assembly. Both the formal 
mechanisms of the system (such as elections) as well as multiple forms 
of participation as part of a rich political life (e.g. social movements) 
7  “[…] eighteenth-century American and French revolutionaries used two distinct terms 
to denote their innovative enterprises: representative government  and representative 
democracy” (Urbinati 2006, 27).
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provide citizens with the means to protest against the direction taken 
by the state-apparatus. 
Elections in political representation are not about the aggregation 
of individual preferences but about the opinions and beliefs of citizens. 
Aggregating individual preferences is what happens in direct voting, 
whereby every vote means a new beginning. Electing a person on 
the basis of his/her ideas, however, creates a narrative. “[…] opinions 
create a narrative that links voters through time and makes ideologi-
cal accounts a representation of the entire society, its aspirations and 
problems” (Urbinati 2006, 31). The moment of elections are just a sequel 
to what happened before. The ‘losers’ of one election know that they 
have a chance to rephrase their claims in view of the following elec-
tions. The full realization of a political narrative where citizens can 
assume the role of counter-power is only possible when elections are 
preceded and followed by “a rich political life that promotes compet-
ing political agendas and conditions the will of the lawmakers on an 
ongoing basis” (Ibid., 26).  The citizens hold their right to “negative 
power that allows them to investigate, judge, inﬂ uence and censure 
their lawmakers” (Ibid., 28). 
We can understand now how representative democracy is a peace-
ful means to accommodate discord in society. The right to discord can 
be seen as another aspect of the ideal of equality that is characteristic 
of representative democracy. This is what Urbinati calls, with the other 
Greek term, isegoria. It is the equal “right [of the citizen] to support 
or oppose laws or government policies” (Ibid., 42). It is thus the right 
to participate in the political process that takes place at all time and 
not just at the very instant of casting a vote. This right is crucial as 
not every citizen is equal in practice although everyone formally pos-
sesses legal equality. Practicing the right to be heard when one feels 
that the promise of equality (for example through discrimination) is 
injured is the basis of politics. In contrast to legal equality, which is 
blind to differences, political equality takes differences in to account 
because only by doing this there is a chance for “proportional equal-
ity (all ideas should have a chance to be represented, not only those 
that get the majority of the votes)” (Ibid., 40). Introducing the time 
dimension in the representational relation changes representation 
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from something that is an instant of delegation into a political process 
of representation.
This theory brings with it the second surplus. Representation is 
coupled with a temporal framework, or a temporal narrative. In this 
way representation itself becomes the telling of a story, the process 
of history, as the circular relationship between state and society is a 
never-ending play taking place from election to election.
 
Power and Politics
After having pointed to the two surpluses that are characteristic of 
representative democracy, I will now look at what it means for the role 
of power and for our understanding of politics.   The characterization 
of representation as having constitutive capacities makes us aware of 
the “dark side” of political representation (Saward 2006, 314). Giving 
decision-making capacities to a representative is the basic trait of the 
creation of power. For Ankersmit power ﬁ nds its origin in the aesthetic 
gap between the ruler and the ruled (1996, 105). [8] As representation 
is suited with the power to create and possibly transform the identity 
of the represented it also disposes of the power to misrepresent and 
to commit a coup on the identity of the represented. It is a thin line 
between using and abusing the power to represent. 
It is clear that the juridical and institutional theories of repre-
sentation leave too much space to the representative to (ab)use the 
delegated power. The contract-relation we there described can be 
read in light of what we know as trusteeship. It is an elitist rendition 
of representation, as the representative is entrusted to judge about its 
relation to society. There can be good reasons to give extensive room 
of manoeuvre to the representative, for example because “no citizen 
can participate in all decisions that affect them”, but as Castiglione 
and Warren correctly remark, “as pure trustees, no democratic ele-
ment remains, and representatives are little more than paternalistic 
aristocrats” (2006, 8-9).  
8  I want to remark that he contests the vision of “Lefort [who] situates its origin in a sphere 
beyond both the ruler and the ruled” (Ankersmit 1996, 108). The topic of the origin and 
localization of power needs further investigation.
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The democratic element is brought in by the theory of political 
representation as it sets the context for the permanent possibility of 
feedback, i.e. the continuous circularity between state and society. 
Representative democracy is thus incomplete without the process-ele-
ment (the temporal narrative). To sum up: the (spatial) division between 
ruler and ruled installs power, and the division of time in different 
legislatures creates the possibility of control to power. Periodic rule 
and the implied opportunities for contestation form the conditions for 
a system in which the representative can appropriately and creatively 
‘use’ the (originated) power. The temporal sequence thus prevents the 
embodiment or possession of power and ascertains that the place of 
power remains empty.  
Representation becomes a democratic instrument once the repre-
sentational relationship becomes  political. [9] I am alluding here to the 
way in which a partisan, and thus particular, viewpoint can temporarily 
fulﬁ ll the role of representing the whole of society and thus represent 
the general. The plurality of social and cultural identities that exist in 
society gets translated into political “alliances and programs” (Urbinati 
2006, 37). These alliances try to provide an answer to the fragmentation 
of society, by “articulat[ing] the ‘universal interest’ from peripheral 
viewpoints” (Ibid.). Although partisanship is concerned with the 
interests of its followers, the fact that their aspirations are “to repre-
sent the general” makes that they translate their partial interests “in a 
language that is general” (Ibid.). Laclau gives the same characterisation 
of “the only truly political society”. “Universality only exists incarnat-
ing – and subverting – particularity, but, conversely, no particularity 
can become political without being the locus of universalizing effects” 
(Laclau 2001, 10). 
9  Urbinati states this clearly in the following citation. “This temporal perspective transforms 
representation into a political resource, a way to perfect democracy by emancipating it 
from the destabilizing force of presentism and the one-dimensional character of the will” 
(Urbinati 2006, 225). But we could phrase the sentence also the other way around. Politics 
would not be politics without the role of representation as it fulﬁ lls the role of mediation 
through “voice and gesture, spacing and temporality” (Ibid., 37).
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Conclusion
Recognizing the strengths of the model of representative democracy 
and at the same time realizing that this model belongs more and more 
to the past, it is necessary to see which valuable characteristics will be 
lost when moving from government to governance. I will try to elucidate 
this by referring to two problems that we might get confronted with in 
Saward’s model related to the two aspects of legitimacy in representa-
tion: the ‘legitimacy of what’-question and the scope of manoeuvre of 
the representative.
Urbinati offers an interesting reading of the value of the institu-
tional constellation of representative democracy by argumenting that 
the spatial and temporal characteristics of the government-model 
enable democratic politics. The interplay between the struggle for 
power and the continuity of this struggle form together the condi-
tions for the ongoing attempt of contesting groups to represent the 
general. The attempt to represent the general at state-level is a crucial 
characteristic of ‘political representation’ in the ‘government’-model 
and can be explained by referring to the ‘legitimacy of what’-question. 
Because the relationship between state and society is the central one 
in a representative democracy it follows that legitimacy is depend-
ent on the judgment of all citizens who may hold different partisan 
viewpoints. Hence, the candidate-representatives are prompted to 
come up with a general story in order to apply for a representative 
function at the state-level. With the transition from government to 
governance, the centrality and unicity of the relationship between 
state and society gradually evaporates and makes place for a plurality 
of decision-making units relating to speciﬁ c constituencies. Saward 
recognizes this trend in contemporary politics and wants the reader 
to acknowledge the representational nature that characterizes every 
single claim for identity- or interest-recognition. For Saward electoral 
representation should no longer retain its unique status. In his view it 
is just one of the many areas in which representational claims are made, 
and therefore he argues that representation is primarily a dynamic 
quality of political life spread unevenly across societies. For him “civil 
society contains the state and […] civil society is where representa-
tion – unevenly, diversely – happens”. The answer to the ‘legitimacy 
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of what’-question is here opposed to that of the ‘government’-model. 
It boils down to a system with a multiplicity of representative claims 
creating little decision-making units which gain their legitimacy by 
way of the approval of the ones partaking in the unit. There seem to 
arise two potential problems here. Firstly, the strength and visibility 
of political claims of citizens (the negative power of citizens) might get 
lost when they are not formulated against a public decision-making 
centre, but only against the decision-making unit of which they form 
the constituency. In Urbinati’s description of representative democ-
racy negative power only arose in the ‘second phase’ with the birth 
of the temporal narrative. In this second phase the spatial division, 
that creates a visible centre, is presupposed. Hence, when the state 
no longer functions as the central representative institution how than 
should we conceive of the negative power of citizens? Related to this 
is the second problem. When losing sight of the centre (the state) the 
attempt to represent the general is lost and so the contest among differ-
ent ideologies or partisan viewpoints is lost. And exactly this is what 
turns representation into politics, as was said above.
Saward’s theory also confronts us with another problem that relates 
to the room of manoeuvre for the representative. Saward clearly focuses 
on the role of (civil) society and in this regard his theory attempts to 
create opportunities for the empowerment of the sphere of societal 
actors and the therein excluded groups in the new governance-context. 
Yet, we should realize that in practice governance not only takes place 
at the border between state and society, but also (and maybe more) at 
the border between state and market. In this latter border zone effec-
tiveness and output of decisions are the main preoccupations. That 
is why it should not surprise us that the principal/agent relationship 
is used to measure the legitimacy of these kind of governance-acts. If 
the principal asks the agent to realize some particular output, than 
the principal wants to prevent as much as possible that during the 
realization (the representation) any transformation of the original 
request arises. In other words, by constantly controlling the agent, 
the principal tries to prevent that an (aesthetic) gap comes in to being. 
Again this should not surprise us, as the governance-decisions we are 
here referring to comprise market-actors. Traditionally they are not 
part of political representation, and thus the contemporary attempt 
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to keep ‘politics’ out of economic governance is very natural. Whereas 
representative democracy used to take place between state and society, 
today market actors start inﬁ ltrating ‘political’ decision-making. One 
of the challenges for further research thus lies in studying the ‘politi-
cal’ role of decision-making that by its very nature (i.e. the market) 
is hesitant towards politics (in the sense of recognizing the creative 
and transformative nature of representation). The role of society in 
governance-cooperations is often categorized in a more positive light. 
It is assumed that in the border zone between state and society the 
political aspect (formulating representative claims about one’s iden-
tity) remains prominent. This is the idea that Saward tries to defend 
by way of the ‘representative claim’. But Swyngedouw states that not 
only ‘economic governance’ but also governance emanating from civil 
society seems to be drawn in to the logic of managerialism [10]. Thus 
also here we will have to question what the ‘political’ role can be of 
decision-making that by its practices (‘managerial civil society’) is 
hesitant towards politics.
It is clear that we have no univocal answer yet to how we should 
conceive of legitimacy in governance-practices. The ‘legitimacy of what’-
question pointed to the fact that the role of a centre that functions as 
an anchor point has always been crucial for politics. As governance 
practices are used more and more, the visibility of the political centre 
declines. That is why it might be useful when analyzing an act of gov-
ernance to at least try to denominate the societal spheres partaking 
in the governance cooperation. Denominating decision-makers is a 
different way to pursue visibility in politics. Hence, in order to get a 
better grasp on the plurality of governance-forms an important role 
is waiting for us to conceive appropriate categories for different sorts 
of decision-making bodies that match the existing complexities we 
are facing in reality.
10  His statement draws on Foucault’s notion of governmentality and leads him to say 
that newly created technologies of government are nicely internalized by citizens, cor-
porations and NGOs alike. “Ironically, while these technologies are often advocated 
[…] by civil organizations speaking for the disempowered […], these actors often fail to 
see how these instruments are an integral part of the consolidation of an imposed and 
authoritarian neo-liberalism, celebrating the virtues of self-managed risk, prudence and 
self-responsibility” (Swyngedouw, 2005, 1998).
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I
THE PROJECT FROM WHICH I DRAW THIS PAPER MAKES THREE MAIN ARGUMENTS 
ABOUT CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY.  
First, there is probably no such thing as the ‘minimal democracy’ 
that some authors recommend and others criticize vigorously.  There 
is just democracy.  
Second, in democracies all good democratic virtues do not go eas-
ily together.  Tensions and conﬂ icts make choices among these virtues 
unavoidable in developing distinctive forms of democracy.
Third, different forms of representation relate closely to different 
models of democracy in which one or more virtues gain a central place. 
In making these choices, interest representation should play a basic 
role in contemporary democratic politics.
This paper presents brief versions of the ﬁ rst two arguments.  I 
start with a discussion of minimal democracy.  Then I consider tensions 
among democratic virtues and forms of democracy.  In the larger project, 
I assess different forms of representation.  I am interested in assessing 
the advantages and problems of different kinds of representation.  This 
question is important per se and a good way to move further beyond 
debates about whether democracy requires representation.  (It does.) 
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To assess forms of representation, one needs criteria.  These can be 
provided by looking at how modes of representation enact different 
democratic virtues.  To have that discussion in a useful way requires 
dispensing with views of democracy in which all good democratic 
things happily go together.  
1.   Minimal democracy and democracy
There can certainly be bad and unfair democracies, but it is hard to 
imagine an actual ‘minimal’ democracy in the sense that this concept 
has often been used in the last sixty years.  
Proponents of a ‘minimal’ deﬁ nition of democracy, from Schumpeter 
on, have achieved large political effects and limited analytical results.  
Minimal deﬁ nitions of democracy do notable work in rejecting 
the democratic claims of many regimes and political forces.  This is 
valuable work in a world where no licensing procedure prevents a 
tyranny from declaring itself democratic.  
Yet analytically these efforts have not been so successful.  They 
narrow the meaning of their own concepts so severely as to leave them 
with little substance.  An election, to take the key term, cannot be nearly 
as limited an event as most deﬁ nitions of minimal democracy claim or 
imply, or else the term is simply misapplied.  We do not recognize a 
contest with one candidate as an election.  Nor do we regard an election 
without real competition and uncertainty as an election.  Nor do we 
accept an election under conditions in which citizens cannot express 
their views of candidates openly and actively.  In these ways and many 
more, elections contain a robust range of political and cultural elements. 
There is not much minimal about this complex of conditions.
Usually the debate goes like this.  Someone – famously Joseph 
Schumpeter or more recently Adam Przeworski – tries to provide 
a narrow and limited deﬁ nition of democracy: democracies choose 
rulers via elections.
Here is Schumpeter’s deﬁ nition:
“[…W]e now take the view that the role of the people is to produce a 
government, or else an intermediate body which in turn will produce a 
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national executive or government. And we deﬁ ne: the democratic method 
is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle 
for the people’s vote.” [1]
Here is Przeworski’s statement:
“Yet suppose this is all there is to democracy: that rulers are elected. Is it 
little? That depends on the point of departure…Yet if the point of departure 
is that in any society there are conﬂ icts, of values and of interests, electing 
rulers appears nothing short of miraculous.” [2] (44)
These deﬁ nitions focus on choosing a government via elections 
– ‘electing rulers’ in Przeworski’s terms or a ‘competitive struggle for 
the peoples’ vote’ in Schumpeter’s.  
Taking the bait, critics then claim that this deﬁ nition is too narrow, 
often that it is only electoral or formal rather than substantive.  
The argument goes on and on, for at least six or seven decades now. 
While critics of minimal deﬁ nitions are guilty of simpliﬁ cation and ana-
lytical sloppiness, their arguments get life from the basic wrong move 
of those who propose minimal deﬁ nitions.  The minimal deﬁ nitions are 
either wrong or not really minimal.  Unless we are playing with words, 
election means an open competition with real choices.  It is a rich and 
expansive concept, and it contains a number of important political and 
cultural elements.  We can recognize the polemical aims of efforts to 
establish a minimal deﬁ nition, but not accept them as plausible ways 
to deﬁ ne the concept or as an adequate analytical framework.
Proponents of allegedly minimal deﬁ nitions have been wrong 
about what they have produced.  Their core statements are either 
not valid deﬁ nitions of something we would recognize as democracy, 
or more often, these statements are not at all minimal in what they 
require and strongly imply.  Again, there may well be something called 
1  Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 
1950): 269.
2  Adam Przeworski, “Minimalist conception of democracy: a defense,” in Ian Shapiro 
and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, editors, Democracy’s Value: 44.
Democracy Today.indb   63 11-08-2012   20:05:48
64
DEMOCRACY TODAY
 
bad democracy, but I doubt whether there is such a thing as minimal 
democracy in the contemporary world.
Minimal deﬁ nitions are effective in one crucial respect, in dis-
tinguishing between democratic and nondemocratic political forms. 
That is a core purpose of any deﬁ nition – it can separate a hat from a 
glove, almost always with practical aims in mind.  Because democracy 
occupies the normative high ground in international politics, rather 
than simply naming one category of rule among others in the political 
science literature, any scheme that identiﬁ es democratic regimes also 
ascribes virtues and defects.  This is bound to be controversial, and 
the stakes are high.  They reach the question of regime legitimacy, via 
the interpretation of international law and agreements.
Since I don’t think that minimal deﬁ nitions are really minimal, I 
don’t accept what critics are doing at face value.  I think that they have 
three kinds of objections to what they call minimal, formal, or purely 
procedural democracy.  Two of these have merit but none is acceptable. 
I will call these the apologetic critique, the perfectionist critique, and 
the unitarian critique.
The apologetic critique 
The apologetic critique is often transparent in its effort to save a gov-
ernment from condemnation by rejecting a deﬁ nition that would deny 
it any serious claim to being democratic.  Thus supporters of Castro 
or Mugabe or perhaps the regime in Kazakhstan want to emphasize 
that medical services are widely available in Cuba, that Mugabe’s 
party fought colonialism, and that Kazakhstan is a decently prosper-
ous country for much of the population.  All true (and Kazakhstan is 
relatively liberal compared to the others).  
Should we say that because such regimes can have positive 
attributes, they must also be democratic?  If democracy is the only 
virtue of a government, then by logic this must be so – if medical 
care is okay in Cuba, then Cuba must be some kind of democracy.  If 
democracy is the basic and in some sense the only political and social 
good, then anything good must be democratic.
Given the weakness of this logic, those who make versions of this 
apologetic critique usually end up rejecting a deﬁ nition of democracy 
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that includes open elections.  They are almost compelled to call any such 
conception purely formal as against a substantive notion of democracy 
as welfarist, anticolonial, or developmental.  
Allegedly minimal deﬁ nitions of democracy are useful in ruling 
out the use of that term to describe authoritarian regimes with social 
or cultural purposes that someone wants to afﬁ rm – good health care, 
safe streets, religious virtue.  
The perfectionist critique
The perfectionist critique is more analytically interesting.  In this 
critique, the problem with the minimal deﬁ nition is that it does not 
recognize the central value of one or another democratic virtue – say 
participation.  Sometimes a similar claim is made about a policy – 
extensive redistribution or strengthening communal ties.  
Perfectionist critics aim to make a double move.  First, they attach 
their program – for redistribution, or heightened participation – to 
the general positive valuation of democracy and claim that democracy 
really must mean this speciﬁ c course.  Instead of arguing for the pro-
gram they can then make it true by deﬁ nition for those who approve 
of democracy.  This is not a bad rhetorical move but it is transparent, 
which makes it vulnerable – why does democracy require this amount 
of participation rather than some other?
In the other key move the term perfectionist applies most strongly.  The 
idea is that real democracy means the maximal achievement of a particular 
virtue such as participation or deliberation.  As with most perfectionist 
schemes, the ﬁ rst casualties of this line of argument are complexity and 
realism in a world where virtues collide and tradeoffs have to be weighed. 
Simply maximizing deliberation, say, is not a recipe for a wonderful 
democracy, but past a certain point it would mean a deeply ﬂ awed regime 
in which many other democratic virtues were diminished.
Rather than rejecting an allegedly minimal democracy, perfection-
ists should justify their own normative and policy choices as a valid 
interpretation of how democracy should look.  This is hard work and 
opens the way for serious objections.  Understandably many perfection-
ist critics of minimal democracy prefer to make it simple by claiming 
that only their view deserves to be called genuinely democratic.
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Unitarian critiques 
Unitarian critiques target the alleged formalism and proceduralism of 
basic concepts of democracy.  When they reject formalism they really 
mean to reject politics.
They argue for a substantive democracy.  This often goes beyond 
the moves of the perfectionist critique, which aim to establish a par-
ticular virtue as central and decisive.  It usually heads toward rejecting 
politics per se as a separate area of social life with its own dynamics 
and demands.  
Unitarian critics would like to merge democratic politics with some 
other process (economic self-management, communal self-organization, 
religious and cultural expression).  Democracy then means the result 
of this merging, in which political and social elements fuse, or politics 
and culture unite.  
From this perspective it makes sense to oppose any concept of 
democracy that underlines the autonomy and distinctiveness of poli-
tics.  This line of criticism of democracy as autonomous politics has 
a long history on both left and right in political and social thought in 
the last several centuries.  
Instead we should insist on the value of a speciﬁ cally democratic 
politics, which means a politics at some distance from other social rela-
tions.  Within that politics, deliberation, participation, agenda control, 
and all the rest have independent standing as virtues that might be 
achieved in varying degrees and in different combinations.  That is 
what it means to assess democracy as a political project.  
2.   Democratic virtues and forms of democracy
Accounts of democracy often propose a happily positive view of a 
number of distinct elements of politics, such as participation and 
deliberation, without thinking much about their possible tensions. 
At relatively low levels, these attributes do tend to go together.  Yet 
at higher values there are conﬂ icts among these democratic virtues 
(e.g., between participation and inclusion; or between deliberation 
and agenda control).  
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Given these tensions, enhancing democracy could not mean simul-
taneously maximizing all of its main elements.  Beyond a basic level that 
distinguishes between democratic and undemocratic politics, citizens 
and polities need to choose which attributes to make a priority and how 
to do so.  These choices produce different forms of democracy, with 
distinct strengths and weaknesses.  And different forms of democ-
racy imply preferred forms of representation.  (I mean to reach judg-
ments such as: “If we want democracy to maximize [x] then the most 
appropriate form of representation is probably [y].”  Thus answering 
questions about good representation depends to a signiﬁ cant extent 
on answering questions about what democratic virtue(s) we mean to 
emphasize.)
With democracy we always have to start at the beginning with a 
deﬁ nition.  To identify the main elements of democracy, I begin with 
Robert Dahl’s criteria of a democratic political process in Democracy 
and its Critics. [3]  These are similar to the attributes speciﬁ ed by many 
authors – Dahl spells them out clearly:
– Effective participation
– Voting equality 
– Enlightened understanding 
– Control of the agenda 
– Inclusion 
The ﬁ rst two attributes establish a polity as democratic in its proce-
dures.  The third expands democracy to include key processes within 
the terms of a given political agenda.  The fourth feature, control of 
the agenda, means that a polity is egalitarian with respect to a demos. 
Adding inclusion, the ﬁ fth element, makes the polity fully democratic 
within a society.   All these virtues entail multiple political elements, 
well beyond what we would normally call procedural.
One big set of questions is about the extent to which democracy 
means an equal distribution of these attributes among individuals – 
equality of voting, or of agenda control.  Another group of questions 
3  Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics: 109-113.
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concerns the level at which these attributes need to be present for a 
polity to be democratic at all – how much participation is required, or 
how much deliberation? – and relations among these virtues. 
Here I am mainly concerned with the levels at which these attributes 
are present, rather than their distribution. [4]  Dahl’s main concern is with 
determining what equality should mean with respect to the attributes 
of democracy that he identiﬁ es.  He focuses on assessing the extent to 
which equality is or should be achieved along one or another dimension 
4  I will comment brieﬂ y on the distributive issue, to follow Dahl and the most frequent 
discussions of what democracy means.  What distribution of these attributes is sufﬁ cient 
to warrant the term democratic?  Does equality refer to ﬂ oors, opportunities, or maxi-
mal values?  Equal participation could mean that everyone engages in at least a modest 
amount of political action, and this is sufﬁ cient to deﬁ ne them as an actively participat-
ing member of the polity.  Or it could mean that there should be no formal obstacles to 
participation, and everyone should have a decent practical ability to participate.  Equality 
could also mean that all members of the polity actually participate to the same extent 
in a speciﬁ ed period.  
Dahl at ﬁ rst seems to prefer the most explicitly egalitarian interpretation according to 
which democracy would mean fully equal participation, agenda control, and so forth.  On 
this view, democracy means radical political equality among citizens and a thoroughly 
egalitarian set of institutions and norms.  Yet he does not sustain this stance.  For the 
most part he interprets democracy as requiring “substantial opportunities” along these 
dimensions.   
Voting equality is probably distinctive among the attributes that Dahl lists in varying 
least from minimal to maximal interpretations of equality.  This is so if one holds to the 
narrowest reading of voting equality – everyone’s vote counts as 1.  Beyond that, however, 
voting equality is complicated because it refers to forms of representation and election 
procedures in which everyone’s vote is counted as 1 but inequality of effects is common.  (In 
the United States, a vote for the Senate in Rhode Island and a vote for the Senate in Texas 
do not count the same, although both count as one vote.)  For Dahl there is at least one 
clear result, but it is not sufﬁ cient to decide all the issues that are involved.  Majority rule 
is the least unacceptable way of interpreting voting equality, because other formulations 
count some individuals’ votes as worth more than those of members of a majority.  
With the other features, such as control of the agenda, the distance between a thin and 
a maximal interpretation of equality seems larger.  And the maximal interpretation 
is sometimes difﬁ cult to spell out in any very clear way.  To take agenda control as an 
example - how could everyone share equally in controlling the political agenda?  How 
would we know when this had occurred?  Any practical scheme aimed at maximal equality 
of agenda control would certainly involve not only a radical dispersal of political power 
but an even more difﬁ cult to imagine equality of interest in and commitment to politics 
as against other forms of life.  As he proceeds, Dahl tends to interpret the requirement 
that these attributes be equally present across individuals as meaning that individuals 
should have substantial capacities in each area (equality of opportunity), along with the 
stipulation that large barriers to action not exist (equality as a ﬂ oor).  
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of democracy (such as participation or inclusion).  Dahl does not give 
much attention to whether these attributes of democracy are compatible 
at all and if so at what values or levels.  He intends that participation 
should be equal among citizens, and is not much interested in how 
participation relates to, say, deliberation.  
Here I am concerned less with the question of how equal the dis-
tribution of these goods among individuals should be than with rela-
tions among the goods.  Participation, agenda control, and inclusion 
are crucial democratic goods.  But democracy would be extraordinary 
and even unique among political and social forms if all good things 
went together at all levels.   
I have never been a member of a ﬁ rm, university, political organiza-
tion, or family where this was so – or where people expected it to be 
so.  With democracy, however, this extraordinary expectation seems 
almost routine among political theorists, even if it is rarely spelled 
out fully.
By democracy I mean that equal citizens choose a government through 
open elections.  For analytical purposes this means starting with a rela-
tively robust interpretation of all ﬁ ve elements – effective participation, 
voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, 
and inclusion.  
 Participation, for example, means that it is plausible for an 
individual to embark on a course of activity that would be relevant for 
a political process or issue.  Participation means a practical capacity 
for such action.  Thus it goes well beyond the idea that formal barriers 
to action are not impassable.
 Dahl’s account of the core features of democracy provides a good 
point of reference for surveying many of the main models of democracy 
on offer in contemporary discussions about its meaning and dynamics. 
We can identify these different models of democracy based on which 
of Dahl’s requirements they emphasize.
The requirement of effective participation is a core theme for 
accounts of participatory democracy.
The insistence on voting equality is central for accounts of what I 
will call basic democracy or simply democracy.
The emphasis on understanding of alternative choices is a major 
feature of deliberative democracy.
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A focus on control of the agenda identiﬁ es a strong egalitarian 
strain in concepts of radical democracy.
Inclusion is a key theme for accounts of democracy as generalized 
recognition.
Linking Dahl’s requirements of democracy to major contending 
views of democracy means a good deal of simpliﬁ cation.  Yet these con-
tending views are each closely linked to central features of democracy. 
Linking Dahl’s requirements to contending accounts of democracy 
directs attention to this question: Does democracy mean that we seek 
to maximize all of these attributes at the same time?  Thus advocates 
of participatory democracy stress the need to enhance participation. 
Proponents of one view rarely disparage the other attributes per se. 
Instead they argue or imply that increasing or maximizing one attribute 
will also cause the values of the others to increase appropriately.  With 
more deliberation, inclusion is apt to follow.
Yet it is hard to imagine that positive relations prevail among 
these relations at all levels.  One might think so if the only reference 
were levels near the threshold at which the polity can be regarded as 
democratic.  At low levels of these goods, relations among them are usu-
ally positive and sometimes strongly reinforcing.  Absent voting equality, 
agenda control would be very difﬁ cult – how would actors ensure 
that their preferences about the agenda were taken seriously?  Absent 
deliberation, participation would be very difﬁ cult to initiate and sus-
tain – how would actors be able to deﬁ ne the aims and forms of their 
participation?  Given that positive relations among these goods do exist 
at some levels, it is tempting to infer that maximizing one dimension 
of democracy – as in deliberative or participatory democracy - would 
also achieve maximum or nearly maximum values as regards inclu-
sion or agenda control.
If these democratic virtues tend to go together at lower levels, 
positive relations cannot be presumed at all levels.  Could we increase 
all levels of these attributes to their maximum points?  It seems not 
to be possible to maximize the levels of all of these democratic goods at the 
same time. [5]
5  A full analysis of relations among attributes of democracy, or democratic virtues, 
could be attempted in one of two ways.  One approach would hold all but one attribute 
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3.   Deliberation and democracy – an example
 
What Dahl terms enlightened understanding is close to what is meant 
by a robust level of deliberation in one strand of democratic theory.  
Deliberation is clearly a democratic virtue - it is better that citizens 
discuss and understand the meanings and consequences of the choices 
they need to make.  It is also desirable that citizens understand each 
other more fully than is needed in pure bargaining relations, and that 
they try to reach a substantial agreement.  Yet if we increase delibera-
tion to very high levels, growing tensions with other basic features of 
democracy seem likely.
Deliberation and participation compete for time and resources. 
One can try to erase this tension by declaring them to be versions of 
the same thing, but this makes little sense if one thinks about any actual 
political context.  Deliberating about a program or an issue takes time. 
Participating in a sustained way in an effort to inﬂ uence relevant views 
and decisions also takes time.  And it is not the same activity, or the same 
kind of time.  There is also a tension between the relatively more reﬂ ective 
stance entailed in deliberation and the more partisan stance that is usually 
part of participation.  Unless time is unlimited, then, more deliberation 
does not mean more participation, and it may well mean less.
Deliberation and equality of voting have no particularly strong 
relation.  Increasing deliberation should not cause voting equality to 
diminish – the likely relation is neutral.
constant at a relatively low level, above but near the threshold of democracy.  Then we 
would consider what happens as the level of the remaining attribute was increased (e.g., 
rising levels of participation).  We could then make judgments about how this increase 
inﬂ uences the other attributes.  
The second approach would focus on pair wise analyses of the ﬁ ve main attributes of 
democracy indicated by Dahl.  We would start by examining each of the ten pairs (such 
as inclusion and agenda control).  What happens to one of the two attributes in each 
set as we increase the level of the other – what happens to deliberation as participation 
increases, for example?  Does increasing one attribute produce a positive or negative result 
with the other?  The next step would be to see whether there are some properties of the 
relations that allow us to group them in a theoretically interesting way.
The second route might be more rigorous, although it would risk becoming impossibly 
complex.  The ﬁ rst route risks oversimpliﬁ cation, but the advantages in clarity and direct-
ness are large.  I will not undertake either procedure here – my purpose in discussing 
them is to suggest the size of this relatively unexplored theoretical territory.  
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Deliberation and equal control of the agenda are in tension.  The 
practical logic of deliberation will tend to empower those with the best 
arguments, who will then have a greater capacity to shape the agenda. 
This logic is strong unless one redeﬁ nes deliberation to mean something 
other than discourse among equals aimed at reaching agreement about 
choices.  If deliberation is redeﬁ ned as bargaining in which arguments 
are proxies for blunt statements of preferences, then the tension with 
agenda control diminishes.  But most proponents of deliberation mean 
the concept to refer to open and serious discussion in which partici-
pants are not entirely bound by their prior views.  Deliberation should 
produce not only a decision about a given issue but an agenda about 
what needs attention when.  This result is apt to conﬂ ict with an equal 
distribution among agents of inﬂ uence over the agenda.  
Deliberation and inclusion have a complicated relationship.  At 
low levels, just above a democratic threshold, they are strongly linked. 
More deliberation means increased information, and it may encourage 
the appearance of new arguments in politics, both of which are apt to 
beneﬁ t inclusion.  Thus relations between deliberation and inclusion 
may be positive as deliberation expands.  
Deliberation and inclusion will be in tension as deliberation con-
tinues to increase.  With rising levels of deliberation, time costs grow, 
and inclusion (now meaning full engagement in deliberative processes) 
becomes harder for a growing number of citizens.    If deliberation 
implies an eventual preference for the best argument, there may be 
a further tension, as the effort to identify and reach agreement about 
that argument may not encourage full inclusion of all citizens.  
One can try to avoid this tension by redeﬁ ning deliberation – rather 
than designating reasonable arguments, consistency, or a systematic 
use of evidence, deliberation means any form of sincere expression 
relevant to the subject.  This makes deliberation more or less equiva-
lent to expressing preferences in whatever form actors wish.  Without 
such a change in meaning, it appears that positive relations between 
deliberation and inclusion will become less positive and probably 
negative as deliberation increases to high levels.
It would be hard to conceive of democracy without substantial 
deliberative elements.  Yet increasing deliberation to high levels will at 
some point diminish participation, agenda control, and even inclusion. 
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That does not mean we should reject “deliberative democracy” – it 
means we should recognize that this model places limits on what can 
be achieved regarding other attributes of democracy.  Such conﬂ icts are 
not peculiar to deliberation as distinct from other core democratic virtues. 
Costs and tensions cannot be disqualifying, or else there would be no 
acceptable model of democracy.  Instead we consider the advantages 
and problems of different models, and this means normative debate 
about which attributes of democracy we should emphasize and why.
There are many tensions among the main democratic virtues.  For 
example, the commitment to agenda control, as an egalitarian project, 
means that the choice of subjects for more extensive political attention 
will be closely tied to the expressed preferences of individuals.  This 
commitment, if put into practice at high levels, is apt to constrain 
deliberation.  People want to shape the agenda to advance their own 
issues and claims – this may limit their willingness to engage in an 
open-ended process of deliberation with uncertain results.  This ten-
sion can be banished if it is stipulated that people want to control 
the agenda simply in order to advance what they see as in the public 
interest.  But this is an implausible account of any actual polity.  Thus 
a strong commitment to agenda control is apt to limit the space for 
deliberation.  
If inclusion is taken as a central democratic virtue and it is inter-
preted as requiring measures that recognize political and cultural diver-
sity, we have the basis for a distinctive model of democracy focused on 
recognition and on identities.  Here conﬂ icts will arise between the drive 
for recognition and the commitment to voting equality.  An emphasis 
on inclusion is likely to mean that minorities will demand electoral 
and legal provisions that protect their practices and preferences.  Such 
provisions usually give more weight to the votes of individuals in the 
protected groups than to others, at least on certain issues.  
The value of participation deﬁ nes participatory models of democ-
racy.  At high levels, participation is likely to be in considerable tension 
with voting equality.  This happens when participatory forms are 
given decision making power at the local or regional level.  The votes 
of those citizens who are heavily engaged in the participatory schemes 
will count more than the votes of those citizens who are not similarly 
engaged.  The most ambitious participatory budgeting schemes, for 
Democracy Today.indb   73 11-08-2012   20:05:49
74
DEMOCRACY TODAY
 
example, involve a real devolution of power to nonparliamentary 
organizations and groups.  When this happens, those who vote in the 
normal elections but are not involved in the participatory projects 
will be right to judge that their votes in regular elections have been 
diminished in value.  
4.   Choosing among democratic virtues?
Theories of democracy gain little by targeting allegedly minimal mod-
els.  This approach radically understates the political and cultural 
requirements of basic democratic practices.  It allows proponents of 
various kinds of allegedly richer democracy to avoid analyzing rela-
tions among democratic virtues.  They can simply praise the ones 
they prefer.  Rather than contrasting minimal and full democracy we 
need to appreciate the challenging problems that appear as soon as we 
presume that democratic virtues collide and often conﬂ ict.  We do not 
really understand many of these relations.  Relations among democratic 
virtues vary widely at higher levels, and we should presume that many 
of the relations are complex and not necessarily linear.  This creates 
many opportunities for research and for practical efforts.
How should we think about choosing among forms of democracy 
and among different levels of the main democratic virtues?  I conclude 
with four points, based on the idea that sustaining democracy is a 
valid aim.
First, we should recognize a strong constraint.  In normative terms 
it is undesirable to go below a basic level as regards any of the main 
democratic virtues.  Models that propose to give up one or more in 
order to maximize another allegedly essential virtue should be regarded 
with great skepticism.
Second, we should resist choices about relations among virtues that 
seem likely to generate grave political instability which could plausibly 
jeopardize the maintenance of democratic institutions.
Third, choices are contextual.  Democracy is always somewhere. 
Choosing forms of democracy and relations among democratic virtues 
should consider how different paths will be more or less workable 
given the political and social history and main features of the country 
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in question.  It might well be that inclusion should be given a primary 
role in one country due to its distinctive history while participation is 
similarly crucial somewhere else.
Finally, as democracy is about self-government and the develop-
ment and expression of political preferences, we should expect a widen-
ing range of democratic political trajectories.  There can be convergence 
on the idea that democracy requires a certain basic level of each of the 
main democratic virtues.  Beyond that, a democratic logic will increase 
the range of choices actually made by different polities (and across 
jurisdictions within them).  Perhaps at some points almost everyone 
will agree on the appropriate choices for shaping the best democracy, 
but such agreements will be relatively brief.  Everyone might favor a 
kind of deliberative democracy – but not for long.  
The main democratic virtues as actually practiced will interact to 
create new possibilities and problems.  New political forces (political 
movements and other forms) will take shape.  They will often make 
claims about expanding the presence of one or another democratic 
virtue, as a core theme.  These efforts amount to probes that challenge 
current settlements and raise new possibilities.  Thus a democratic 
horizon contains a plural and expanding set of practical choices about 
relations among democratic virtues, and a growing range of theoretical 
problems that arise under unexpected circumstances.
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NA ÚLTIMA DÉCADA TÊM EMERGIDO NO SEIO DA TEORIA POLÍTICA E DAS RELAÇÕES 
INTERNACIONAIS APOLOGIAS DA “DEMOCRACIA GLOBAL”, (Richard Falk, Daniele 
Archibugi, Tony McGrew e David Held, entre outros), em paralelo às 
apologias da “justiça global” (Barry, Beitz, Onorra O’Neil, Pogge, Shue e 
Peter Singer, entre outros). Se neste âmbito é visível o inﬂ uxo da teoria 
abrangente da justiça como equidade, como desenvolvida por John 
Rawls em A Theory of Justice (1971), aquele ressente-se especialmente 
da viragem rawlsiana para o domínio meramente político, em Political 
Liberalism (1993), e das suas reﬂ exões sobre a sociedade internacional, 
condensadas na utopia realista de The Law of Peoples (1999). 
Conquanto não tenha desenvolvido uma teoria da democracia, 
Rawls contribuiu para o pensamento democrático [1]: primeiramente, 
através de uma concepção de justiça cujas ideias e ﬁ ns substanciam a 
concepção ﬁ losóﬁ ca mais razoável para uma democracia constitucio-
nal [2]; depois, através das suas reﬂ exões sobre a razão pública e o ideal 
1  Remetemos para Cohen, 2003.
2  No prefácio à edição revista de ATJ, Rawls escreve:”The central ideas and aims of this 
conception [justice as fairness] I see as those of a philosophical conception for a constitu-
tional democracy. My hope is that justice as fairness will seem reasonable and useful, even 
if not fully convincing, to a wide range of thoughtful political opinions and thereby express 
an essential part of the common core of the democratic tradition”, in Rawls, 1999b: xi. 
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de cidadania democrática (1993), a democracia deliberativa (1997), a paz 
democrática e os direitos humanos (1999). Especialmente concorreu 
para a compreensão da democracia num sentido mais amplo do de 
“mero escrutínio e eleições”, como “exercício da razão pública”, para 
uma visão que, como sublinhado por Amartya Sen, permite apreender 
as suas raízes para lá das suas instituições tradicionais [3]. 
No âmbito da sociedade internacional, Rawls questiona-se sobre 
a exequibilidade de uma utopia realista e as condições que a expres-
sam, sobre o alargamento dos limites possíveis da prática política que 
reconcilia o indivíduo com o mundo social. A ideia de utopia realista 
apoia-se em duas concepções, a saber : 1) os grande males da huma-
nidade derivam da injusta política; e 2) uma vez suprimida a injustiça 
política, seguindo-se políticas sociais justas (ou no mínimo decentes) e 
estabelecendo-se instituições básicas justas (ou no mínimo decentes), 
esse tipo de males extinguir-se-á [4]. A utopia realista substancia, deste 
modo, “um mundo em que esses grandes males tenham desapare-
cido e tenham sido estabelecidas instituições básicas justas (ou pelo 
menos decentes) quer pelos povos liberais quer pelos povos decentes 
que honrem a Lei dos Povos” [5]. E em última instância, demonstra a 
possibilidade de uma democracia constitucional razoavelmente justa 
no contexto de uma sociedade de povos bem ordenada.
A utopia realista rawlsiana referencia, deste modo, dois níveis de 
democracia: a democracia das sociedades domésticas e a democracia 
global internacional. No primeiro, sublinhando que “as bases de uma 
democracia constitucional e as bases dos seus direitos e deveres preci-
sam de ser continuamente discutidas em todas as muitas associações da 
Posição reaﬁ rmada pelo ﬁ lósofo no âmbito do liberalismo politico - “(…) the aim of justice 
as fairness as a political conception is to resolve the impasse in the democratic tradition 
as to the way in which social institutions are to be arranged if they are to conform to the 
freedom and equality of citizens as moral persons” , in Rawls, 1993a: 338.
3  “La vision beaucoup plus large de la démocratie en termes de débat public nous permet 
(…) de comprendre pourquoi les racines de la démocratie vont bien au-delà des limites 
étroites de certains récits et chroniques rapportant des pratiques déﬁ nies et considérées 
maintenant comme des institutions spéciﬁ quement démocratiques», in Sen, 2003: 15.
4  Remetemos para Rawls, 1999: 6s.
5  “(...) a world in which these great evils have been eliminated and just (or at least decent) 
basic institutions established by both liberal and decent peoples who honor the Law of 
Peoples”, in Rawls, 1999: 126.
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sociedade civil como parte da compreensão e da educação dos cidadãos 
antes de tomarem parte na vida política” [6], reconhece a democracia 
constitucional como uma democracia deliberativa; no segundo, esbar-
rando contra as fronteiras da realidade avança com a proposta de uma 
“democracia global” que, distintamente da cosmopolita, assenta na 
tendência expansiva da sociedade dos povos bem ordenados, numa 
cooperação internacional que integra valores e práticas distintas das 
ocidentais e que fomenta o respeito pelos direitos humanos básicos. 
Comecemos por analisar a noção rawlsiana de “democracia deli-
berativa”. Caracteriza-se, tal como esclarece em “The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited”, por três elementos essenciais - uma ideia de razão 
pública; um enquadramento institucional que determina a concretiza-
ção dos corpos legislativos deliberativos; e pelo conhecimento e desejo 
dos cidadãos em prosseguirem a razão pública e concretizarem o seu 
ideal na sua conduta política (Rawls, 1997: 139) - que têm por implica-
ções imediatas o ﬁ nanciamento público das eleições e o proporcionar 
de eventos públicos onde se debate seriamente sobre questões políti-
cas fundamentais. A democracia deliberativa é exequível porque os 
cidadãos possuem as capacidades necessárias à sua participação no 
debate político, são pessoas racionais e razoáveis, e estão informados 
sobre os problemas mais prementes da sua sociedade. Por outro lado, é 
importante que a deliberação pública se imiscua dos interesses econó-
micos e corporativistas, pois só assim se constitui como característica 
básica da democracia. 
Focalizemo-nos na ideia de razão pública, crucial à noção de que 
o debate público estimula a revisão da opinião política. Como assi-
nalado em Political Liberalism: “numa sociedade democrática a razão 
pública é a razão de iguais cidadãos que, como corpo colectivo, exer-
cem um poder político e coercivo decisivo uns sobre os outros por 
intermédio da produção de legislação corrente e das emendas à sua 
constituição” [7]. Consequentemente, os seus limites coincidem com o 
6  “(...) the grounds of constitutional democracy and the basis of its rights and duties need 
to be continually discussed in all the many associations of civil society as part of citizens’ 
understanding and education prior to taking part in political life”, in Idem: 102.
7  “ (…) in a democratic society public reason is the reason of equal citizens who, as a col-
lective body, exercise ﬁ nal political and coercive power over one another in enacting law 
and in amending their constitution”, in Rawls, 1993a: 214. 
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conjunto de questões políticas que abarcam elementos constitucionais 
essenciais e matérias de justiça básica à governação. Isto signiﬁ ca que 
nem sempre as questões políticas são resolvidas pela invocação dos 
valores da razão pública - quando ocorram, por exemplo, nos contextos 
meramente pessoal e familiar ou associativista. Num regime consti-
tucional o domínio político não é afectivo, como é no domínio pessoal 
e familiar, nem voluntário é no domínio associativo. A ideia de razão 
pública aplica-se apenas à discussão de questões políticas do fórum 
público – aos discursos dos juízes, dos funcionários governamentais, 
dos candidatos a cargos públicos e dos directores de campanha [8]. 
Diferentemente, quando os cidadãos se envolvem no debate político do 
fórum público - quer seja pelo seu voto eleitoral, pela sua participação 
partidária, ou ainda pela sua candidatura - o que prevalece é o ideal 
de razão pública. 
O princípio da legitimidade liberal alumia a razão pela qual os 
cidadãos devem respeitar os limites da razão pública no decurso do 
debate e da votação sobre questões políticas fundamentais. O exercí-
cio do poder político é legítimo quando praticado de acordo com uma 
constituição, cujos elementos essenciais são subscritos pelos cidadãos 
em face de princípios e ideais aceites como razoáveis e racionais. E 
porque o poder político deve ser legítimo, o ideal de cidadania impõe 
como dever moral que os cidadãos sejam capazes de explicar uns aos 
Os elementos constitucionais essenciais são de dois tipos: os que descrevem a estrutura 
geral do sistema de governo e do processo político; e os que especiﬁ cam os iguais direitos 
e liberdades básicas dos cidadãos. No primeiro caso concernem aos poderes legislativo, 
executivo e judicial, ao espectro de aplicação da regra da maioria; no segundo dizem 
respeito ao direito de voto e de participação na vida política, às liberdades de consciência, 
de pensamento e de associação, ou às protecções resultantes do princípio do domínio da 
lei. Neste segundo grupo não cabem quer a igualdade equitativa de oportunidades, quer o 
princípio da diferença, princípios da justiça como equidade que cobrem as desigualdades 
económicas e sociais. Mas isto não signiﬁ ca que estes princípios não expressem valores 
políticos, tanto assim que estão na origem do estabelecimento de instituições de fundo 
da justiça social e económica apropriadas a cidadãos livres e iguais.
8  «It is imperative to realize that the idea of public reason does not apply to all political 
discussions of fundamental questions, but only to discussions of those questions in what 
I refer to as the public political forum. This forum may be divided into three parts: the 
discourse of judges in their decisions, and especially of the judges of a supreme court; the 
discourse of government ofﬁ cials, especially chief executives and legislators; and ﬁ nally, 
the discourse of candidates for public ofﬁ ce and their campaign managers, especially in 
their public oratory, party platforms, and political statements», in Rawls,1997: 133s.
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outros o modo como os princípios e as políticas que advogam e votam 
se fundamentam nos valores políticos da razão pública – trata-se aqui 
do dever de civilidade. Este dever inclui, igualmente, a predisposição 
para se ouvir a argumentação dos outros e um espírito de lealdade 
e equidade na deliberação sobre os ajustamentos a fazer de modo a 
acolher as suas perspectivas [9]. No contexto da sociedade doméstica, 
os cidadãos cumprem o dever de civilidade caso façam o possível para 
que os detentores do poder se guiem pela razão pública. 
A fusão do dever de civilidade com os valores políticos produz o 
ideal de cidadania democrática - trata-se, como assinalado por Rawls, 
«[d]o ideal de cidadãos que se orientam e governam a si próprios 
segundo preceitos que cada um acredita que os outros podem razoa-
velmente aceitar; e, por sua vez, este ideal é favorecido pelas doutrinas 
abrangentes que as pessoas razoáveis defendem» [10]. O liberalismo 
político apoia-se no suposto de que os direitos e os deveres básicos e 
os valores em questão são suﬁ cientemente determinantes para que os 
limites da razão pública sejam justiﬁ cados pelas avaliações globais das 
doutrinas abrangentes razoáveis, quando estas tenham perﬁ lhado a 
concepção política da justiça como equidade. 
Sucintamente, os limites da razão pública são os limites que hon-
ramos quando respeitamos o ideal de cidadãos democráticos. A razão 
pública pede-nos que acreditemos que a ponderação dos valores políti-
cos que assumimos como razoável o seja igualmente para os outros; ou, 
caso isso não seja possível, que não seja tida como irrazoável. Segundo 
Rawls, esta partilha de sentido preserva os laços de solidariedade cívica 
e é consistente com o dever de civilidade. 
No âmbito da Sociedade dos Povos, a razão pública desempenha um 
papel entre povos livres e iguais análogo ao exercido numa democracia 
constitucional entre cidadãos livres e iguais. Nas palavras do ﬁ lósofo, 
9  «(...) Since the exercise of the political power itself must be legitimate, the ideal of citizen-
ship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty - the duty of civility – to be able to explain to one 
another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and 
vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason. This duty also involves 
a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in deciding when accommodations 
to their views should reasonably be made», Rawls, 1993a: 217.
10  «(...) The ideal of citizens governing themselves in ways that each thinks the others 
might reasonably be expected to accept; and this ideal in turn is supported by the com-
prehensive doctrines reasonable persons afﬁ rm», Idem, p. 218.
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trata-se “da razão pública de povos liberais livres e iguais debatendo 
as suas relações mútuas como povos” [11], cujo conteúdo se revê nos oito 
princípios da Lei dos Povos [12] e não na família de princípios liberais de 
justiça de um regime democrática constitucional. Por outro lado, do 
mesmo modo que o ideal de razão pública leva o cidadão a questionar as 
práticas políticas da sua sociedade doméstica, leva-o a indignar-se ante 
qualquer prática que viole a razão pública dos povos livres e iguais.
Uma vez elucidadas as noções de democracia constitucional como 
democracia deliberativa e de razão pública, centralizemo-nos na noção 
de “democracia global internacional”. Sob este intuito, recorrerei à 
autoridade de um dos seus mais acérrimos defensores, Kok-Chor Tan. 
Ao questionar-se sobre a possibilidade de rectiﬁ cação do déﬁ ce demo-
crático - este constitui, a par das disparidades e assimetrias, um dos 
efeitos adversos da globalização sobre a democracia - Tan argumenta 
que a solução passa pela reconceptualização da democracia não tanto 
como ideal nacional quanto como um ideal global (Tan, 2008). Neste 
âmbito, emergem duas concepções: a cosmopolita e a internacional. 
Os democratas cosmopolitas propõem que a democracia seja tida 
primordialmente como ideal transnacional, aplicado directamente aos 
indivíduos do mundo, tomado como um esquema social simples. Esta 
via assenta na ideia de que os indivíduos são cidadãos do mundo e não 
apenas cidadãos do seu país, de que devem ser tidos como membros 
participativos da comunidade global. Todavia, ao enjeitar a defesa 
de um “estado mundial” restringe a ideia de “cidadão do mundo” ao 
domínio moral, incorrendo numa linguagem política excessivamente 
metafórica.
À contraluz desta perspectiva, a via internacional concebe a 
democracia global como uma democracia entre os representantes 
das nações democráticas. Distintamente da democracia cosmopolita, 
pressupõe duas etapas - a primeira consiste na democratização das 
nações; a segunda, na democratização das instituições internacionais 
11  “I distinguish between the public reason of liberal peoples and the public reason of liberal 
peoples and the public reason of the Society of the Peoples. The ﬁ rst is the public reason 
of equal citizens of domestic society debating the constitutional essentials and matters of 
basic justice concerning their own government; the second is the public reason of free and 
equal liberal peoples debating their mutual relations as peoples”, in Rawls, 1999: 55.
12  Idem: 37.
Democracy Today.indb   82 11-08-2012   20:05:50
83
OS DESÍGNIOS DA 
DEMOCRACIA GLOBAL 
INTERNACIONAL NA UTOPIA 
REALISTA RAWLSIANA
Maria João Cabrita
existentes - e mostra como a cidadania global se inicia com a educação 
dos cidadãos democratas [13]. Esta perspectiva coaduna-se com a adop-
ção rawlsiana do contrato internacional, cuja aplicação conﬁ gura um 
processo ascendente a dois níveis - iniciado com os princípios da justiça 
da estrutura básica da sociedade doméstica e, só depois, progredindo 
a uma sociedade de povos bem ordenados.
Na utopia realista rawlsiana os desígnios da democracia global 
internacional assentam nas ideias de “paz democrática” e de “direitos 
humanos” - conquanto estas sejam normalmente associadas à visão 
cosmopolita [14]. Antes de analisar estas duas ideias, gostaria de relem-
brar duas questões fundamentais. Em primeiro lugar, que na Lei dos 
Povos Rawls atribui protagonismo aos povos e não aos Estados - os 
povos justos estão preparados para garantir o mesmo respeito e reco-
nhecer os outros como seus iguais no seio da sociedade internacional. 
O conceito de “povo” substancia um dispositivo de representação no 
âmbito do contrato internacional rawlsiano, conferindo aos indivíduos 
o estatuto de “membros dos povos” e não de “cidadãos do mundo” - 
acepção que revela o afastamento de Rawls da visão cosmopolita quer 
sobre a justiça, quer sobre a democracia, e que confere protagonismo 
às pessoas individuais no mundo global.
Em segundo lugar, que conquanto a Lei dos Povos se constitua 
a partir de uma concepção liberal de justiça política, não é etnocên-
trica e puramente ocidental. Não se trata de aplicar um modelo ideal 
de sociedade doméstica - a democracia constitucional - no contexto 
internacional, mas antes de exigir de qualquer sociedade decente que 
imponha deveres e obrigações morais a todas as pessoas que se encon-
tram no seu território, através de um sistema jurídico guiado por uma 
concepção de justiça que visa o bem comum e que respeite as regras da 
paz e os direitos humanos básicos. Ao estabelecer a distinção entre dois 
tipos de sociedade bem ordenada, as democracias constitucionais e as 
13  “We must take education for democratic citizenship at the national level seriously if this 
is necessary for greater global democracy, and if the nation is the place where individuals 
can best act effectively to promote justice both at home and abroad. With respect to the last 
point, Gutmann writes: ‘Democratic citizens have institutional means at their disposal that 
solidarity individuals, or citizens of the world only, do not’ (1996: 71). Global democracy, 
in short, begins with the education of democratic citizens” in Tan, 2008: 175.
14  Sobre a relação entre direitos humanos e democracia global remetemos para Goodhart 
(2008).
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hierarquias de consulta, Rawls acaba por reforçar a visão internacional 
da democracia global. 
É no contexto da teoria ideal da Lei dos Povos que o ﬁ lósofo analisa 
a ideia de “paz democrática” [15], ou o debate sobre a ausência de conﬂ itos 
bélicos entre estados democráticos. Encetado por Kant no opúsculo 
“Paz Perpétua” (1795) e estimulado na actualidade por teóricos como 
Michael Doyle, esta perspectiva sobre a democratização do sistema 
internacional sustenta que a estabilidade nacional leva à estabilidade 
internacional. Rawls subscreve esta consideração e, à contraluz da 
“estabilidade por equilíbrio de forças” ou como um modus vivendi, dilu-
cida a noção de “estabilidade por razões correctas” - numa sociedade 
doméstica liberal esta descreve a situação na qual, ao longo do tempo, 
os cidadãos adquirem um sentido de justiça que os leva a aceitarem os 
princípios de justiça política e a actuarem em sua conformidade [16]. 
A sociedade dos povos deve integrar um processo similar ao da 
sociedade doméstica, que leve os povos liberais e decentes a aceitarem 
a Lei dos Povos e a actuarem em sua conformidade; que, com o tempo, 
crie laços de conﬁ ança entre eles e os leve a adoptar aquela lei como 
um ideal de conduta [17]. Neste sentido, uma vez estabelecido o conteúdo 
da Lei dos Povos, os princípios que deﬁ nem a igualdade básica entre 
povos, estabelecem-se três tipos de organizações cooperativas - uma 
comercial, tendo em vista assegurar o comércio justo entre povos; uma 
ﬁ nanceira, que permite a um povo pedir empréstimos; e uma confede-
ração de povos, com um papel similar ao das Nações Unidas, que exerça 
uma espécie de vigília sobre o mundo, «denunciando publicamente as 
instituições injustas e cruéis dos regimes opressores e expansionistas, 
assim como as suas violações dos direitos humanos» [18].
15  Remetemos para Rawls, 1999: 44-54.
16  “Stability for the right reasons means stability brought about by citizens acting correctly 
according to the appropriate principles of their sense of justice, which they have acquired 
by growing up under and participating in just institutions”, Idem: 13, n.2.
17  “The hypothesis of democratic peace plays a central role in explaining why the defense 
and extension of the society of liberal and decent peoples should be the fundamental goal 
of liberal foreign policy” in Beitz, 2000: 671.
18  «This federative center may be used both to formulate and to express the opinion of the 
well-ordered societies. There they may expose to express the opinion of the well-ordered 
societies. There they may expose to public view the unjust and cruel institutions of oppres-
sive and expansionist regimes and their violations of human rights», Rawls, 1993b: 557.
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A estabilidade da sociedade internacional carece, tanto quanto a 
estabilidade da sociedade doméstica, duma progressiva aprendizagem 
moral dos indivíduos - este processo psicológico constitui um aspecto 
fundamental à ideia de utopia realista para a Lei dos Povos. Os povos, 
distintamente dos estados, têm uma natureza moral - incorporada no 
seu orgulho próprio e no seu sentido de honra - e são movidos por 
interesses racionais, guiados em consonância à igualdade e respeito 
entre eles, interesses que tornam possível a paz democrática. Todavia, 
esta suposição exige a conﬁ rmação histórica - o sucesso da sociedade 
dos povos liberais concerne, como sublinha o ﬁ lósofo, à “realização de 
justiça política e social para todos os seus cidadãos, assegurando as 
suas liberdades básicas, à completa expressão cultural da sociedade 
civil, assim como a um decente bem-estar económico para todo o seu 
povo” [19]. 
A “paz democrática”, conquanto a ausência de guerra entre as 
democracias estabelecidas a comprove empiricamente, não constitui 
um dado adquirido. Na perspectiva rawlsiana, a conduta dos povos 
democráticos constitucionais é conforme esta ideia de paz quando 
assegure: (a) um certo grau de justa igualdade de oportunidades; (b) 
uma distribuição decente de rendimentos e riqueza; (c) a sociedade 
como empregador de último recurso através do governo central ou 
local, ou por meio de outras políticas económicas e sociais; (d) cuida-
dos de saúde básicos a todos os cidadãos; e (e) ﬁ nanciamento público 
das eleições e a disponibilidade pública de informação em matérias 
políticas [20]. Neste caso, os povos democráticos empreenderão a guerra 
só e apenas em legítima defesa. 
No conceito de paz democrática convergem duas ideias: a de que 
entre as constantes misérias da vida, por um lado, e os fatalismos, por 
outro, existem instituições políticas e sociais que podem ser mudadas 
pelo povo, de modo a torná-los mais felizes e satisfeitos [21]; e a de moeurs 
19  “Here success refers not to a society’s military prowess or the lack of it, but to other 
kinds of success: achievement of political and social justice for all its citizens, securing 
their basic freedoms, the fullness and expressiveness of the society’s civic cultures, as 
well as the decent economic well-being of all its people”, in Rawls, 1999: 45.
20  Veja-se Idem: 50.
21  “(...) political and social institutions could be revised and reformed for the purpose of 
making peoples happier and more satisﬁ ed”, Idem: 46.
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douces de Montesquieu, de que as virtude promovidas pela sociedade 
comercial nos cidadãos, como a assiduidade, a diligência, a pontua-
lidade e a integridade, conduzem à paz. Nas sociedades liberais, ou 
democracias constitucionais, e entre elas, vive-se num estado de paz 
por satisfação, como descrito por Raymond Aron em Paix et Guerre 
Entre les Nations (1962) à contraluz da “paz por impotência” e “paz pelo 
poder” [22]; situação tanto mais duradouro quanto mais geral e conforme 
à ordem da lei internacional. Neste sentido, sob a égide da Lei dos 
Povos, a sociedade de povos bem ordenados carece desenvolver novas 
instituições e práticas - entre estas destaca-se o respeito e a promoção 
dos direitos humanos.
Rawls concebe os direitos humanos como direitos imprescindíveis 
ao sistema jurídico da sociedade – os direitos à vida (aos meios de 
subsistência e segurança), à propriedade pessoal, à liberdade (o direito 
de resistência à escravatura e à servidão e uma certa liberdade de 
consciência e associação) e à igualdade formal, tal como expressa pelas 
regras da justiça natural –, de direitos que estabelecem a fronteira do 
pluralismo entre povos; que especiﬁ cam os limites da soberania interna 
de um Estado; e que justiﬁ cam a guerra em caso de autodefesa [23]. A 
imposição das obrigações que deles decorrem pressupõe uma concep-
ção de justiça que visa o bem comum e a boa fé da justiﬁ cação legal do 
direito - condições cuja aplicação subentende a concepção de “pessoa” 
como membro responsável e cooperante dos grupos a que pertence, 
peculiar a uma sociedade associativista como a hierárquica decente, e 
não a concepção liberal de “pessoa como cidadão livre e igual”.
Politicamente não paroquiais, os direitos humanos substanciam 
as condições necessárias a qualquer sistema de cooperação social. 
Tratam-se de direitos universais na medida em que “são intrínsecos 
à Lei dos Povos e possuem um efeito político (moral) sejam ou não 
apoiados localmente” [24] - isto signiﬁ ca que são vinculativos a todos os 
povos, mesmo àqueles que não lograram ainda estabelecer instituições 
22  Aron, 1962: 231s.
23  Rawls, 1999: 65.
24  “The list of human rights honored by both liberal and decent hierarchical regimes 
should be understood as universal rights in the following sense: they are intrinsic to 
the Law of Peoples and have a political (moral) effect whether or not they are supported 
locally”, Idem: 80.
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políticas e sociais justas, ou no mínimo decentes, como é o caso dos 
estados fora da lei. Não decorrendo de uma concepção sobre a natureza 
humana, nem de um contrato intercultural e inter-social, a concepção 
rawlsiana de direitos humanos centraliza-se na sua função política, no 
seu papel especial na razão pública da Sociedade de Povos. Trata-se, 
como assinalado por Beitz (2009: 102s), de uma concepção prática.
Ao alargar a base da sociedade dos povos pela inclusão dos povos 
decentes, cuja cultura política é distinta da dos povos liberais, Rawls 
acaba por apresentar uma lista mínima de direitos humanos e de 
cuja a fasquia é ﬁ xada pelos princípios políticos que regem aquelas 
sociedades. Mas a exclusão de certos direitos democráticos - como os 
da participação política, da liberdade de expressão e da liberdade de 
associação - desta lista não signiﬁ ca que não constituam um ideal a que 
todas as sociedades devam aspirar [25]. Não obstante, este não é imposto 
pela comunidade internacional, à qual cabe assegurar as condições de 
fundo que possibilitam o ﬂ orescimento das sociedades bem ordenadas. 
Isto não invalida que, a longo prazo, a sociedade de povos não tenha 
por objectivo “subterrâneo” aumentar o seu horizonte de alcance, sob 
a ideia de que a democracia global exige a civilidade democrata mas, 
antes de mais, a educação das pessoas para a democracia. 
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ON THE CONCEPT OF HOPE IN LACLAU AND MOUFFE
Thomas Decreus
SINCE THOMAS MORE’S UTOPIA, many thinkers have emphasized the impor-
tance of a utopian or hopeful perspective. Most have even stressed the 
unavoidability of this perspective. Oscar Wilde, for example, called 
utopia ‘the country at which humanity is always landing’. [1]  That line 
of thought is also the one Ernesto Laclau seems to start from when he 
states: ‘without hope there is no society, because no society is able to 
cope with what simply exists.’ [2] Chantal Mouffe, with whom Laclau 
wrote Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, also emphasizes the importance 
of hope in politics. In her latest book, On the Political, she makes a plea 
for a passionate politics, one that can offer hope to the people. Yet, 
despite this stress on a politics of hope, both authors theorize start-
ing from a political ontology in which hope seems to have no place. In 
order to show this, I will ﬁ rst highlight some essential features of the 
political ontology developed by Laclau and Mouffe. This will enable us 
to see why this ontology is very difﬁ cult to combine with the concept 
of hope, but rather leads to the opposite of hope namely, nihilism. I do 
not wish to stick with this purely negative conclusion, however, but 
seek to show how hope is still possible despite the nihilism inherent 
1  Wilde (2001) 141. 
2  Zournazi (2002) 128
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to Laclau’s and Mouffe’s political ontology. To do this I will use some 
insights from Maurice Blanchot’s thinking on literature and writing, 
and will attempt to show how these insights can make sense of hope 
within a (radical) democratic context.
A political ontology
In order to see why the concept of hope is difﬁ cult to conceive within 
Laclau’s and Mouffe’s shared theoretical framework, we have to sum-
marize some ontological-political standpoints on which their frame-
work rests. 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, there can be no distinction between 
the discursive and the extradiscursive. [3] Everything appears within a 
discourse, which makes appearance as such possible. A discourse itself 
consists of elements structured around certain nodal points. Meaning 
is thereby construed through  the differential relations in which the 
elements engage each other. Meaning, identity or objectivity are thus 
relative and differential. As Laclau puts it: 
“[…] ‘relation’ and ‘objectivity’ are synonymous. Saussure asserted that 
there are no positive terms in language, only differences – something 
is what it is only through its differential relations to something else. 
And what is true of language conceived in its strict sense is also true 
of any signifying system (i.e. objective) element: an action is what it is 
only through its differences from other possible actions and from other 
signifying elements.” [4] 
But here a problem arises. If differential relations are only possi-
ble within the totality of a discourse, how should this totality itself be 
conceived? If we think of a discourse as being just another differential 
identity, then this can only mean that the discourse is part of another, 
larger discourse in which differential identities are established. This 
opens the door to inﬁ nity, and inﬁ nity makes any meaning impossible 
3  Laclau and Mouffe (2001) 105
4  Laclau (2007) 68.
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because in it there would be constant shifting of the signiﬁ er under the 
signiﬁ ed. A psychotic universe this would be. [5] So a discourse has to be 
limited in a non-differential manner in order to sustain meaning. The 
impossibility of a differential determination of the limit of a discourse 
simply means that the limits of any signifying system or discourse 
cannot themselves be signiﬁ ed. Meaning is only possible due to the 
ﬁ nal impossibility of meaning. Or, to be more precise: meaning can 
only emerge if the endless play of differences is limited, but this limit 
only shows itself as the breakdown of all meaning. [6]
Limits are thus constitutive of meaning. But they are not only con-
stitutive. Every limit also excludes something. Besides being constitutive, 
the limit is also exclusive. The limit is a break or a cut in the endless 
play of differences. But, since a discourse can only exist by limiting 
the play of differences, this means that what is excluded always con-
tinues to threaten the discourse. To shift the limit is to fundamentally 
transform meaning, and to take away the limit is to make meaning itself 
impossible. But, in fact, the limit can always be shifted because it is 
contingent in nature. Where the limit is drawn involves no necessity, 
because if it did, it would only be because the limit itself was part of 
another discourse. [7] Besides being constitutive and exclusive, therefore, 
the limit of any signifying system is also contingent in nature.
This characterization of the limit of any signifying system or dis-
course allows us to understand why the ‘relationship’ [8] towards what 
is excluded is always a potentially antagonistic one. What is excluded 
is always threatening to the existing order since it is able to destroy 
the order as such. The possibility of destruction can never be totally 
avoided because the limit is contingent in nature and can always be 
shifted. Antagonism is the unavoidable dark side of every signifying 
system. If an antagonistic confrontation occurs, it manifests itself as 
a struggle that can only be won or lost. The only decisive factor in 
who will win the antagonistic struggle is power. Since antagonism is 
inevitable in any signifying system, we should draw the conclusion 
that only power is constitutive for the existence of our social reality 
5  Marchart (2007) 136.
6  Laclau (1996) 37.
7  Marchart (2007) 146 
8  Of course we cannot really speak about a relationship here.
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and that, as long as there is any social reality, it will be characterized 
by conﬂ icts or antagonisms. This inevitable antagonistic dimension of 
social reality is what Mouffe calls ‘the political’. And, as everything is 
discursive, ‘the political’ itself becomes an ontological category. 
That is why we can speak about a political ontology. Before I continue, 
let me brieﬂ y summarize the points made above:
There exists no distinction between the discursive and the extra-1. 
discursive. Every reality is discursive in nature.
A discourse can only exist through an act of exclusion2. 
The ‘relation’ towards what is excluded, is always a potentially antagonis-3. 
tic one, because what is excluded forms a threat to the existing order.
This inevitable, antagonistic dimension is called ‘the political’. 4. 
As such, everything is political.5. 
The statement ‘everything is political’, must be understood in the 
right way. It does not mean that everything is the object of politics; 
that would be similar to a totalitarian situation where in every aspect 
of life is dominated by politics. Rather, it should be understood in the 
way in which Carl Schmitt described the political. For Schmitt, the 
domain of politics changes constantly as result of shifting power con-
ﬁ gurations. In this Schmittian view, the political acts like a ghost: the 
social is haunted by the political. Every aspect of social life, whether 
it be health, religion or economics, can suddenly become the object 
of political contestation. [9] But, and this is important, the political can 
never appear in every aspect of the social at the same time. That would 
be equivalent to a Hobbesian state of nature or the psychotic universe 
mentioned above. So, instead of saying ‘everything is political’, it would 
be better to say ‘everything can become (ever again) political’.
At this point we start to see glimpses of the relevance of this onto-
logical position. Indeed, if what is excluded from a signifying system 
is not the result of an underlying necessity, it can only be the result of 
a decision. The act of the decision, is an authoritarian moment which 
has no foundation except in itself. To make this decision acceptable 
is the result of a successful hegemonic operation.  Since the decision 
9  Schmitt (1979) 38.
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is never the result of an underlying necessity, however, it follows 
that every hegemony is susceptible to counter-hegemonic practices. 
In brief, if things could always be different, it can always be claimed 
that things should be different. Everything can become the object of 
political struggle.
However, this positive consequence hangs together with a less 
positive one. If we accept this ontological position, we also have to 
accept that an all-inclusive, ﬁ xed system of meaning is impossible. 
There can be no meaning or identity without excluding something. 
Every identity meets in the end a limit which can no longer be grasped 
in a meaningful way. What lies beyond the limit is fundamentally 
threatening towards what lies inside. But if we start speaking about 
collective identities, this implies the following: 
“we are always dealing with the creation of a ‘we’ which can exist only by 
the demarcation of a ‘they’… [and] [s]ince all forms of political identities 
entail a we/they distinction, this means that the possibility of emergence 
of antagonism can never be eliminated. It is therefore an illusion to believe 
in a society from which antagonism would have been eradicated.” [10]
This quotation from Mouffe points to the impossibility of society as 
such. Society becomes impossible in the sense that there will always be 
a ‘they’, something that cannot be included but that necessarily must 
be excluded. This impossibility of society makes every society politi-
cal. But every society can institute the political in different ways. The 
concrete way in which antagonism is dealt with in particular societies 
is what Mouffe calls politics. Let us now look at how democracies deal 
with antagonism.
Democratic politics and hope
A democratic regime differs from other regimes in the way that it recog-
nizes its own contingency as well as the antagonistic nature of the social. 
The latter is even cultivated by institutionalizing a space for contestation 
10  Mouffe (2005) 15, 16.
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and discussion. [11] In this characterization of democracy, Mouffe and 
Laclau draw from Claude Lefort. For Lefort, modern democracy differs 
from the Ancient Regime in the way the former recognizes that society 
can no longer be thought as a unity. In the Ancient Regime, the King 
brought unity. He was the mediator between a transcendent order 
and society. As such, he functioned as the foundation of Knowledge, 
Power and Law. In a democracy, this foundation disappears. Instead 
of a foundation, there is a constant debate about what can be accepted 
as truth,  how law can be grounded and how power can be legitimate. 
Democracy is a never-ending search, a discussion or even a conﬂ ict in 
which every victory is temporary and every certainty disappears. The 
fundamental difference between democracy and other regimes lies not 
in the fact that it is contingent and characterized by conﬂ icts, because 
that characterizes every political order, but in the public recognition 
and cultivation of contingency and conﬂ ict:
“What is speciﬁ c and valuable about modern democracy is that, when 
properly understood, it creates a space in which […] confrontation is 
kept open, power relations are always put into question and no victory 
can be ﬁ nal. However, such an ‘agonistic’ democracy requires accepting 
that conﬂ ict and division are inherent to politics and that there is no place 
where reconciliation could be deﬁ nitively achieved as the full actualiza-
tion of ‘the people’.” [12]
Starting from this description of democracy, it should become clear 
that democracy manifests itself as an impossible possibility. Indeed, 
the moment we can manage contestation in a perfect way, we can 
no longer speak of contestation, and democracy would be lost. Real 
plurality requires that we never fully agree with each other. A perfect 
democracy is a contradiction in terms. As Mouffe puts it:
“To imagine that pluralist democracy could ever be perfectly instantiated 
is to transform it into a self-refuting ideal, since the condition of possibility 
11  When an antagonism is ‘institutionalized’ it means that it has become an agonism. That 
is why, from now on, we will mostly be speaking about an agonistic democracy. For details 
concerning the difference between antagonism and agonism, cf. Mouffe (2005) 31.
12  Mouffe (2009)15-16.
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of a pluralist democracy is at the same time the condition of impossibility 
of its perfect implementation. Hence, the importance of acknowledging 
its paradoxical nature.” [13]
According to Mouffe, contemporary politics fails to acknowledge 
this paradoxical nature of pluralist democracy. Inspired by philosophers 
like Rawls and Habermas, contemporary politics pays a good deal of 
attention to dialogue and consensus but neglects the important role of 
conﬂ ict and contestation. As a consequence, political parties gather in 
the centre, and the traditional left-right division seems to fade away. 
The idea arises that we have overcome this division and instituted 
a more or less perfect democratic way of living together – at least in 
the minds of politicians. But we pay a heavy price for this. We fail to 
represent existing antagonisms in the public realm, and, as a result, 
these antagonisms are often criminalized or marginalized. Terrorism 
or blind violence could be seen as symptoms of this evolution. Another 
symptom is growing political indifference, as we all seem to agree that 
it no longer matters if we participate in politics or not. 
Indifference and radicalization are the result of a politics which 
is no longer able to offer alternatives to the existing situation, and, 
as such, precludes the possibility of hope. According to Mouffe, an 
agonistic model of democracy that keeps conﬂ ict and contestation 
alive can avoid this. In an agonistic democracy, several legitimate but 
irreconcilable alternatives are recognized and the possibility of change 
is always kept open. This results in the ﬂ ourishing of hope, because 
people can truly believe in change, and politics can claim to realize this 
change. That is why Mouffe holds a plea for the re-institutionalization 
of the traditional left-right division:
“A well functioning democracy calls for a clash of legitimate democratic 
positions. This is what the confrontation between left and right needs 
to be about. Such a confrontation should provide forms of identiﬁ cation 
strong enough to mobilize political passions.” [14]
13  Mouffe (2009) 16.
14  Mouffe (2005) 30.
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From Hope to Nihilism
Is an agonistic democracy enough to establish a politics of passions 
and, ultimately, hope? It is certainly a step in the good direction. It is 
probably true that emphasizing the importance of contestation leads to 
more genuine pluralism. And this pluralism will certainly lead to more 
passionate political debates. But can it offer hope? At ﬁ rst glance we can 
say it does, because an agonistic model of democracy offers alternatives 
to the existing order. Yet what are these alternatives worth? Are they 
worth investing our desires and passions in them? Having an alternative 
does not automatically lead to hope. Something more is needed. In the 
following paragraph, I will try to explain what is missing in Laclau’s and 
Mouffe’s theory and why this leads to nihilism rather than hope.
In Laclau’s and Mouffe’s political ontology and in Mouffe’s concept 
of agonistic democracy the notion of impossibility occupies a central 
place. From an ontological perspective, as it was stated above, society 
as such is impossible, and an agonistic democracy accepts and culti-
vates this impossibility. This means that there can never be a perfectly 
harmonious or just society. It is ontologically impossible, and being 
democratic means accepting this impossibility without reservations. 
So, being democratic implies giving up on striving for a perfectly just 
society, that is, utopia. Utopia has ﬁ nally become a u-topos, ‘a place 
that does not exist’. The question, however, is whether utopia is not 
a necessary illusion for every hope? And can an agonistic democracy 
which establishes a new left-right division even exist without having 
some glimpses of utopia?
First of all, when Mouffe defends the re-institution of the left-right 
division in society, she seems to forget one crucial dimension. The left 
has always been driven by a utopian spirit. The goal has always been 
a society without classes, without capitalism, inhabited by free and 
equal people. Of course, people within the left disagreed about how to 
reach this state, what it should look like, and thousands of other things. 
But it cannot be denied that there always existed, somewhere in the 
background, this utopian hope. This leftist utopian hope collapsed 
after 1989 and the left lost itself in an intellectual crisis that continues 
today. By emphasizing the impossibility of society, Lalcau and Mouffe 
do not solve this crisis. On the contrary, they contribute to it. 
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Let me illustrate this with a remark made by Mark Devenney. [15] 
According Devenney, Mouffe’s model of agonistic democracy can be 
compared with the marxist notion of a ‘permanent revolution’. But the 
big difference with Marx and other authors who used the concept of 
‘permanent revolution’, of course, is that for these authors the notion 
of permanent revolution was framed by the grand emancipatory 
story of Marxism – the kind of story that can no longer be accepted 
if we underwrite the political-ontological framework of Laclau and 
Mouffe. But what is left then? What is left is the pure notion of a 
permanent revolution without any possible end point. Such an end 
point is ontologically impossible because it would be equivalent to a 
signifying system which does not exclude. But this leaves us not only 
with a revolution without a purpose, but also a whole history we can-
not make sense of. 
In the political ontology of Laclau and Mouffe, history is without 
purpose and thus without hope. The antagonism is unavoidable and 
forms part of our human condition. Every victory and every change 
is always partial and in the end doomed to fail. There is no exit. The 
revolution is necessarily permanent. History itself rests without mean-
ing and it appears as an accumulation of rubble and needless blood-
shed. On the question of the ‘why’ after all this, the answer can only 
be silence. The historical-philosophical position towards which the 
political ontology of Laclau and Mouffe leads is nihilism: there is no 
transcendent order which gives us a mainstay for our lives, no eternal 
truths and no absolute good or evil. As Nietzsche already noticed, once 
people realize this, they suffer from a kind of split mind:
“But as soon as man ﬁ nds out how that world [of truth, SC] is fabricated 
solely from psychological needs, and how he has absolutely no right to it, the 
last form of nihilism comes into being: it includes disbelief in any metaphysi-
cal world and forbids itself any belief in a true world. Having reached this 
standpoint, one grants the reality of becoming as the only reality, forbids 
oneself every clandestine access to afterworlds and false divinities – but 
cannot endure this world though one does not want to deny it.” [16]
15  Devenney (2009) 135.
16  Quote taken from Critchley (2004) 9. 
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A split mind leads to strange behavior. Two answers or attitudes 
are possible in facing nihilism. These two answers are inspired by 
what Nietzsche called active and passive nihilism. The ﬁ rst is what I 
would simply call ‘indifference’. Indifference is born from the insight 
that nothing really makes sense: in the end it all comes to the same 
and, fundamentally, nobody can change the way things are. So why 
bother any longer? This attitude means withdrawing from public life 
and seeking happiness in the safe cocoon of private life. It leads to 
conformism and resignation. The second possible attitude is in some 
ways the opposite of the ﬁ rst. As an answer to nihilism, one aims for 
the total destruction of what exists. The act of destroying the existent 
order is more important the establishment of a new order. The most 
clear example of this second attitude, of course, are acts of terrorism. 
But maybe terrorism is just the tip of the iceberg. The destructive 
attitude from which terrorism starts is shared by a larger group than 
just terrorists. It is also present in radical nationalist, racist or fun-
damentalist groups and, by and large, in any group with totalitarian 
characteristics. [17]
Some consequences of nihilism are thus indifference and radical-
ism. Indeed, Mouffe was right in claiming that lack of hope leads to 
indifference and radicalism. For her, an agonistic democracy would 
solve this problem. We just showed, however, that it ultimately leads 
to exactly the same problems. We could even ask ourselves whether 
what Mouffe describes as the post-political or consensus-models of 
democracy is not the consequence of nihilism and lack of hope rather 
than what produces lack of hope and nihilism. Does not post-politics 
correspond to a kind of indifference? Instead of dreaming of a bright 
future, it claims only that things should be ‘managed’ and that we all 
should get along. Nothing more. To me, it seems that it is more like a 
product of nihilism than the engine behind nihilism.
However, one could argue that the latter only makes sense if we 
hold to the political-ontological framework developed by Laclau and 
Mouffe. If we just get rid of this political-ontological framework, then 
17  Apart from inspired by Nietzsche, the identiﬁ cation of these two attitudes as a reaction 
towards nihilism are also partly deﬁ ned by Devenny and Critchley. Cf. Critchley (2004) 
12-13 and Devenney (2009) 135.
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the problem just sketched would evaporate. Yet this does not count as 
an objection, and for two reasons. In the ﬁ rst place, at the beginning 
of this essay I claimed that I wanted to show how there is a tension 
between the theoretical framework on which Laclau and Mouffe base 
their claims and the particular claim they make for a politics of hope, a 
point that was just demonstrated. But, in the second place, this point 
corresponds to a problem that largely exceeds a discussion within 
Laclau and Mouffe. When Laclau states in the very ﬁ rst line of New 
Reﬂ ections on the Revolution of our Time, ‘Every age adopts an image of 
itself’, this also holds for his own philosophy. [18] The political ontology 
of Laclau and Mouffe is a conceptual image of a time in which nihilism 
is a fact. Every transcendent order has indeed disappeared: there are 
no grand ideologies or Great Stories anymore. We can be sad about 
that, but have no other choice than to acknowledge it. It is in this way 
that Mouffe and Laclau bring us into confrontation with a problem 
that exceeds their own philosophy: the fact of nihilism.
The central issue we will deal with in the next part of this paper 
is the question of how this nihilism can be overcome. I will specify 
the question by considering how to localize hope within the political-
ontological framework sketched above, but I also aim to say something 
more general about hope within a democratic context. My answer to 
these questions, however, should be considered as an experiment in 
two ways. Firstly, I cannot claim to solve the problem in this short 
essay. The only thing I can do is give a direction as to where hope can 
be localized. Secondly, my answer will be an experiment because I 
make use of an analogy to give this direction: namely, the analogy of 
the writer’s writing.
The Writer’s Writing
The most central idea in the political ontology of Laclau and Mouffe 
is that of the impossible possibility of every order, which has as its 
consequence the unavoidability of antagonism. The latter results in 
the difﬁ culty of making a place for hope. To show that hope is still 
18  Laclau (1990) 3.
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possible without denying the real possibility and threat of nihilism, 
I wish to use the analogy of the writer’s writing. Why this analogy? I 
see two arguments for it. First, writing has to do with language, with 
building signifying systems and discourses, and it therefore stands 
close to the language and discourse-based theory of Laclau and Mouffe. 
Second, analogy must be used in order to broaden the horizon of the 
problem, because in Mouffe’s and Laclau’s philosophy we are simply 
left with a tension, and there are few, if any, clues towards a solution. 
Analogy is an important tool for solving problems, although we should 
also be aware of its limits. Analogy is never a literal translation of the 
problem to be solved. In the same way, the analogical answer cannot 
be interpreted as a literal answer, but instead must be conceived as a 
direction in which we should search for an answer.
I use the analogy of a writer’s writing because I think the writer is 
constantly confronted with the impossible possibility of writing itself. 
The possibility of writing can only exist through the ﬁ nal impossibil-
ity of writing. A writer never succeeds in writing the Ultimate Book 
which contains everything he ever wanted to say or that ever can be 
said. The writer’s writing never comes to an end. And, if it ever came 
to an end, writing itself would no longer be possible. A writer can 
only continue to write by virtue of the ever-unﬁ nished nature of his 
activity. [19] This is a necessary consequence of the nature of art itself. 
Art always seeks to capture the inﬁ nite in a ﬁ nite object – whether it be 
a picture, a poem or a symphony. [20] The inﬁ nite can only be captured 
through the ﬁ nite, yet, of course, the ﬁ nite can never fully capture the 
inﬁ nite. If we are blinded by the illusion of fully capturing the inﬁ nite 
through the ﬁ nite, then the inﬁ nite as such disappears. 
This same idea is present in Blanchot’s interpretation of the myth 
of Orpheus and Eurydice. In this myth, Orpheus is offered the chance 
to recover his deceased lover Eurydice from the underworld. Hades 
was thrilled by the way Orpheus sung about his lost Eurydice, and that 
is why Orpheus had the opportunity to get Eurydice back. But Hades 
set one condition: Orpheus was not allowed to look back at Eurydice 
while he guided her out of the underworld. Only in broad daylight could 
19  Critchley (2004) 36.
20  Compare to Badiou (2005) 37.
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he look at her again. But Orpheus was unable to resist the temptation 
and looked back at her before daylight. The moment he looked back, 
Eurydice was forever lost in the darkness of the underworld.
According to Blachot, Orpheus made the crucial mistake of desiring 
to possess Eurydice in a direct way, whereas he could only posses or 
even access her in his songs about her. Reaching to Eurydice beyond 
the limits of the song results in her disappearance. Blanchot writes:
 
“[…]only in the song does Orpheus have power over Eurydice. But in the 
song too, Eurydice is already lost, and Orpheus himself is the dispersed 
Orpheus; the song immediately makes him ‘inﬁ nitely dead’. He loses 
Eurydice because he desires her beyond the measured limits of the song, 
and he loses himself, but his desire, and Eurydice lost, and Orpheus 
dispersed are necessary to the song, just as the ordeal of eternal inertia is 
necessary to the work.” [21]
Orpheus looked back because he wanted a pure representation 
of Eurydice, a Eurydice existing outside the limits of the song or the 
language – the Eurydice who made him write songs. But the desire 
itself can never be perfectly represented or expressed. The writer can 
never come to such an expression because of the nature of language. The 
personal longing is always destroyed by the public nature of language 
itself. [22] As Gregory De Vleeschouwer writes in ‘Into the White’: “The 
origin of work is the longing to capture the private feeling with a public 
representation. That is impossible.” [23] Indeed, from the moment that 
a private desire is expressed in language, it can no longer be private 
because it involves a multiplicity of possible interpretations. Yet the 
writer’s utopia is the transcending of this contradiction: showing the 
inﬁ nite as inﬁ nite and bridging the gap between public and private. 
That is why Orpheus looked back. 
21  Blanchot (1982) 173. 
22  De Vleeschouwer (forthcoming) 61.
23  De Vleeschouwer (forthcoming) 55-56. Simon Critchley comes to the same conclusion 
when he states: “Is there not a performative contradiction at the heart of literature insofar 
as its use of language is premised upon the generality of meaning and communication, but 
where what is expressed in language is the writer’s solitude?” Cf. Critchley (2004) 37.
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But it is extremely important to realize that Orpheus’ looking-
back was only possible because of the beauty of Eurydice that he had 
sung about. The beauty of his songs was the only reason he gained 
access to the underworld. The longing for a pure representation of 
Eurydice was cultivated through nothing but the songs he sung. The 
moment Orpheus looked back, the object of desire was touched but 
immediately disappeared again. Orpheus is deﬁ nitively condemned 
again to meet Eurydice only within the limits of the song. The moment 
of looking back is what Blanchot calls the birth of literature. But this 
is a paradoxical statement, because looking back was only possible 
through the singing about Eurydice. This is the paradox of writing 
itself. One must only write to ﬁ nd the opening to what one longs for, 
yet the writing itself is only possible through the longing itself. As 
Blanchot himself puts it:
“[…]one writes only if one reaches that instant which nevertheless one can 
only approach in the space opened by the movement of writing. To write, 
one has to write already.” [24]
Thus, the hope and the longing of the writer are inextricably bound 
to the act of writing itself. The longing is born out of the act of writing 
and the writing is born out of the longing. Longing and writing are like 
head and tail of a snake which bites itself. The impossible moment in 
which the snake has eaten itself is the moment when Orpheus looks 
back and faces the true impossibility of his writing. But what keeps 
the writer writing despite this fundamental impossibility is the long-
ing evoked in the very act of writing. In the act of writing, the longing 
becomes an impossible promise. Writing can only exist by virtue of 
this promise. 
Wanted: a Discourse of Hope
Of crucial importance is the connection between longing and writing, 
or, more generally, between acting and hoping. What counts for writing 
24  Blanchot (1982) 176.
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as an act also counts for political action. Despite the impossibility of 
utopia, every political act is inextricably connected with hope and 
hope with political action. Hope and political action presuppose each 
other. Even within a nihilistic context, there remains a fundamental 
connection between action and hope. Nihilism can destroy religious 
or metaphysical imaginaries, but cannot destroy hope as such:
“We can do away with the teleological and eschatological dimensions, we 
can even do away with all the actual contents of the historical messianisms, 
but what we cannot do away with is the ‘promise’ because it is inscribed 
in the structure of all experience.” [25]
In my view, the threat of nihilism can only be overcome if hope is 
inscribed in the structure of experience as such. If that is the case, we 
can state that hope is ‘the country at which humanity is always land-
ing’, and explain why hope is indeed ineradicable despite a nihilistic 
universe. Only if we connect hope with the conditions of experience 
can we start to make sense of concepts like ‘democracy to come’ – a 
model of democracy that Mouffe often refers to in order to illustrate 
the impossible possibility of democracy. [26] 
Yet not all of the problems are thereby solved. Although we cannot 
strictly distinguish between longing and writing or between political 
action and hope, it remains legitimate to ask what initiates hope and 
political action. Why write in the ﬁ rst place? Why undertake political 
action? What counts for writing in this case also counts for political 
action. Orpheus’ singing found its origin in the experience of a lack 
called Eurydice. Writing starts with the experience of a lack. The same 
holds for political action. [27] The experience of lack, however, is never 
enough. The demand of being free from oppression does not necessarily 
25  Laclau (1996) 75.
26  Mouffe (2009) 136.
27  This position is related to what Laclau states in On Populist Reason. To understand the 
becoming of a populistic front, Laclau states, one must not focus on an existing populist 
front but understand the grieves and demands from which it started to exist. Those 
demands are always the result of experiencing a lack, a shortage, an injustice, etc. And 
as populism is, according to Laclau, a central political logic – one of the most important 
ways of constituting the social – it can be claimed that the experience of a lack is the 
central feature in starting up political action. Laclau (2007) 73.
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follow from oppression as such. There has to be a discourse that makes 
oppression visible as oppression. As Camus puts it in ‘The Rebel’: 
“The spirit of rebellion can exist only in a society where a theoretical 
equality conceals great factual inequalities. […] We can only deduce from 
this observation that rebellion is the act of an educated man who is aware 
of his own rights.” [28]
In the light of this quotation, we can offer a new interpretation 
of Mouffe’s plea for the re-institution of a left-right division. What 
is necessary is not conﬂ ict as such (although it is unavoidable), but a 
(leftist) discourse which shows suppression as  suppression, thereby 
encouraging political action, and thus, hope. Of course, such a discourse 
is not totally exterior to political action and hope. It is interwoven 
with it and receives its shape and content through it, but it retains a 
degree of exteriority. What, then, is the relationship between action 
and hope, on the one hand, and discourse that initiates action, on the 
other hand? I would say that a discourse is on the side of the ontic: 
it is the instance through which action and hope come into existence 
and express themselves. The particular content that will express the 
ontological relation between action and hope is a contingent matter. 
Hope can be embodied by a fascist, nationalist or leftist discourse. The 
ontological connection between action and hope does not determine 
which particular discourse will express it. The latter will become the 
subject of a hegemonic struggle. [29]
Democracy: a tragic hope?
The nihilistic challenge can therefore only be overcome if we accept 
the ontological connection between action and hope. This means that 
28  Camus (1960) 14.
29  Zournazi (2002) 127:“Hope is always related to a certain lack which is the reverse of the 
discourse of hope. The point is […] that the concrete content which is going to incarnate 
that need for something which is unspeciﬁ ed is not given from the beginning… What we 
have to deﬁ ne in this hegemonic game is the attempt to channel this particular content 
and this broad social hope which has no precise content of its own.”
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hope precedes nihilism. Nihilism can only be a response to failed hope, 
to actions which did not succeed. As such, nihilism can never be com-
pletely overcome. Misfortune and despair are always just around the 
corner. Being nihilistic means being paralyzed by the unavoidability 
of failure. Since democracy reveals and recognizes the public failures 
of state ofﬁ cials, government, presidents and more, it will always be 
vulnerable to nihilism. And yet, besides this vulnerability to nihilism, 
it is also the only regime in which citizens have so many possibilities 
to undertake political action. Political hope lives through this action, 
and nihilism can only be cured by undertaking action again. So, if 
democracy seeks to be a political regime of hope, it will have to be able 
to create and stimulate discourses by which people are encouraged to 
take action. But which discourse and which action?
Let me begin with action. By this emphasis on action, we come 
close to what some republicanists claim. [30] Yet we have to be careful 
about embracing republicanism fully. Often, although not always, 
republicanism is about undertaking political action in order to uphold 
a regime, certain rights or beneﬁ ts. Democracy has to be more radical 
than this, in my view. It should not only stimulate those actions that 
beneﬁ t the existing regime, but also ones that radically challenge the 
regime. As such, there should be room for public contestations, extra-
parliamentary action, civil disobedience, manifestations, deviant art 
and the more. This goes further than republicanism. 
But this raises an important question concerning the discourse of 
hope.  If hope is necessary for a democracy to survive, then which kind 
of hopeful discourses can be conciliated with democracy? Which hope 
is democratic? This is a question for further research. But it should be 
clear by everything said so far that it should be a kind of open-ended 
hope, a hope in which a kind of contingency, a recognition of its own 
hegemonic nature and ﬁ nal impossibility, are recognized. Otherwise, we 
would become like Orpheus and make every kind of hope impossible 
by seeking a direct representation of what we are longing for. There 
will thus always be something tragic about democratic hope because 
30  Pettit says “…people must be willing to go along with one another in associations and 
movements that are essential for republican success but that inevitably require patterns 
of mutual reliance and personal trust.” Pettit (1997) 266.
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it has to acknowledge its own ﬁ nal impossibility. This tragedy can 
only be neutralized by undertaking renewed action: the writer starts 
writing again because he feels that not everything has been told in his 
last piece of work. In doing this, the writer holds the words of Beckett 
in his mind: “Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. 
Fail better.” [31] This is also the kind of attitude which corresponds 
to a democratic hope because it puts emphasis on action (it is about 
‘trying’ and ‘failing’, not ‘thinking’ or ‘praying’), and it recognizes the 
contingency of every action and hope.
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WHENEVER THE STATE OF PRESENT DAY DEMOCRACIES IS CONSIDERED, one ﬁ nds 
the widespread view that they developed in a rather unpleasant way: The 
gap between citizens and political establishments is widening, represented 
by declining voter turn-out, waning trust in politicians and decreasing 
membership of traditional political organisations (e.g. Furedi 2005: 30ff. 
Smith 2009: 4, Schmitter/Trechsel (draft): 100-103). Furthermore, there 
is concern that well-organised interest-groups and economic constraints 
are dominating the political process, thereby fostering disillusionment 
of ordinary citizen participation (e.g. Linder 1999: 103, Crouch 2004, 
Shapiro 1999, Walzer 1999). The question therefore arises, of how these 
developments can be countered and the citizen encouraged to reengage. 
However, there are as many approaches to solving this problem as there 
are concepts of democracy. This paper will address two of these possible 
solutions and brieﬂ y discuss the results they yielded when tested in prac-
tice. After that, the argument is put forth that any particular approach is 
likely to miss the intended aims if it does not include a properly designed 
public sphere in its model. Since the concept of the public sphere is both 
extensively used and poorly deﬁ ned, a careful analysis is carried out in 
order to delineate its crucial elements, drawing heavily on the theory and 
practices of ancient Athenian democracy. This proceeding allows in the 
end for advice regarding future democratic innovations.
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Before considering the types of political involvement, one might 
ask why the participation of broader parts of the population is desir-
able at all. Following Schumpeter (in Schmidt 2000: 203) ordinary 
citizens are not suited to engage in political processes. Instead, they 
are viewed as incompetent, infantile and giving way to their affects, 
which leads to irrational decisions and behaviour. While this image of 
the incompetent citizen has partly been conﬁ rmed by political psycholo-
gists (e.g. Jervis 2004: 259-263), the contrasting opinion states that the 
process of participation is conducive to civic skills and that it should 
therefore be promoted ﬁ rst and foremost (e.g. Hüller 2010: 88, Miller 
2001: 416). A claim that can also count on some support from political 
psychology (e.g. Kuklinski et al. 2001). The present paper will follow 
this line of thought, which is also sustained by what neuroscientists 
usually call “use it or lose it”, a formula that refers to the simple insight 
that only skills which are practiced regularly can be maintained and 
developed (e.g. Bauer 2006: 57). Clearly, this only relates to the ability 
of a citizen to act in a participatory process and does not say anything 
about the quality of its outcome. [1] This topic will be addressed again 
at the end of the paper. 
A variety of approaches has already been applied and tested in 
order to increase citizen participation in political processes. At the 
same time, it is difﬁ cult to differentiate the diverse perspectives clearly 
from one another, as for example, deliberative, participatory, direct, 
difference and cosmopolitan democracy (Smith 2009: 5) surely over-
lap in more than one respect. Therefore, the further proceeding will 
concentrate exemplarily on deliberative democracy – which is perhaps 
the most prominent the mentioned approaches – and on information 
and communication technologies – particularly the internet – as a 
potential facilitator of citizen participation of any kind. 
A whole range of deliberative forums have been organised, car-
ried out and analysed so far. In spite of their differing designs, all of 
them aimed at bringing citizens together on an equal basis to discuss 
some speciﬁ c political problem (e.g. Fishkin/Luskin 2005). In line 
1  Following the distinction by Scharpf (1970) between the input- and output-perspective, 
this approach – as participatory approaches usually do (cf. Schmidt 2000: 547) – adopts 
the former, stressing the value of citizen-participation in principle.
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with this similar composition are the results of the research: The most 
common ﬁ nding is that participants were able to elaborate and reﬁ ne 
their knowledge about the debated issue (Fung 2003: 341). However, 
with regard to effects that point to an impact beyond the deliberation 
itself, hardly any success can be reported. Whenever an ofﬁ cial or 
representative is involved to transfer the results into real political life, 
discussions become uneven and one-sided (Button/Mattson 1999: 625-
628). If some speciﬁ c policy is agreed on and recommended, it is either 
ignored by the wider public or dismissed due to a lack of ﬁ nancial 
opportunities (ibid. 629f., Smith 2009: 23). One must therefore conclude 
that contemporary deliberative debating remains largely disconnected 
from real political decision-making (Lösch 2003: 12).
Similar conclusions have been drawn in relation to the internet 
as a facilitator of citizen participation. First of all, the most important 
ﬁ nding is that the internet does not generate entirely new forms of 
participation, but rather provides opportunities for those who were 
already active. It therefore simply reinforces existing patterns of com-
mitment (Metje 2005: 28/43). [2] Moreover, the effects of online participa-
tion are the same as with deliberation: there is no substantial impact 
on real political processes (Smith 2009: 147/155) and in some cases it is 
impossible to overlook the “consistent and systematic disregard” on the 
part of political entities (Hüller 2010: 97). It is sometimes noted that the 
internet fails to create a public sphere, not only because people have 
unequal opportunity to participate, but also because of its non-binding 
structure and overwhelming commercialisation (Ackerly 2006: 125). 
This observation suggests that the internet might be suitable for build-
ing up and maintaining networks between interested and experienced 
activists, but not for facilitating political participation in general. 
If not the web, what else is capable of hosting genuine democratic 
participation? To answer this question, the hypothesis is examined that 
this can only happen within the framework of an accurately designed 
public sphere. This concept is generally well-known and often employed 
by democratic theorists who are aware of their ancient ancestors, 
2  Smith (2009: 148) argues in a very similar way. It must therefore be concluded that regard-
ing the competition among the thesis of reinforcement and that of mobilization through 
internet-based participation (Metje 2005: 20) the former seems to be more adequate.
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which makes it all the more surprising that the vast application and 
recognised importance for a democracy is not matched by equal concern 
about what its central features are. For example, “The Encyclopedia 
of Democracy” (1995) does not even list the term. [3]
When trying to ﬁ nd a deﬁ nition, the ﬁ rst hurdle to overcome is 
the widespread use of different expressions: Everything from “public 
sphere” and “public space” to “public realm” and even simply “public” 
is employed, as well as the closely related term “public opinion”. From 
now on, the expression “public realm” shall be adopted, following 
Hannah Arendt in her seminal work “The Human Condition” (1973). 
This is not only justiﬁ ed because she is perhaps the most consequent 
theorist of the public realm in relation to antiquity, but also because 
it demarcates the concept from the public sphere whose meaning is 
usually strongly linked to Jürgen Habermas’ inﬂ uential study “The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” (1991). In his work, the 
public sphere refers to a space between state and society in which civil 
society debates and reﬂ ects upon public concerns in an open, mostly 
unstructured environment. As will be shown, this notion is different 
from its meaning in the context of ancient Athens, where the public 
realm formed the focal point of the community and was structured in 
several ways. [4] The political reality there, 2’500 years ago, is now to be 
described in order to highlight the central features of a public realm (if 
not indicated differently, the description follows Bleicken 1995). 
For some 150 years, Athenian democracy was characterised by 
an outstanding amount of participation by its citizens. The two main 
democratic institutions were the plenary assembly and the courts. 
Both were ascribed detailed proceedings and competences and also a 
corresponding site where meetings were held and which was physi-
cally deﬁ ned. [5] To prevent a single person or a faction from dominating 
3  A glance at various encyclopaedias of democracy or political science in general reveals 
that the term ‘public sphere’, or a close correlate, is usually granted minor attention – if 
listed at all – with respect to the more dominant expression of ‘public opinion’. 
4  It is remarkable that this difference in conclusion is contrasted by a great deal of agree-
ment regarding the analysis of the problem, especially that the public sphere has increas-
ingly been invaded by intimate and economic elements which in antiquity were ascribed 
to the private realm (oikos) (e.g. Habermas 1991: 57/76/262, Arendt 2002: 39/60/88/157).
5  The plenary assembly originally met at the agora but had to change site, because it became 
too small as more people were enabled to participate. They moved to the Pnyx that allowed 
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political decisions, a series of measures was taken: The underlying 
political units were mixed, in that each of them consisted of three 
geographically different parts: a city, coastal and inland region. The 
chair of the coordinating council with its 500 members rotated among 
these units throughout the year and rotation was also a key element 
of the ofﬁ ces. Moreover, ofﬁ ce holders were mostly assigned by draw-
ing lots, while this was true for all the 201 or more judges who popu-
lated the courts. Unlike today, where elections are usually viewed as 
the key democratic mechanism, back then, it was drawing lots. [6] In 
order to enable every citizen to participate, allowances were granted 
for attendance of the plenary assembly and the courts. This measure 
underlines the immense value that the Athenians attached to political 
life and that is expressed by Pericles who states that a person staying 
away from it is regarded as useless (Thuc. II, 40). Similarly, Aristotle 
deﬁ nes the citizen as sharing in the administration of justice and in 
ofﬁ ces (Pol., 1275a). 
The importance of participation is reﬂ ected by the competence of 
the two institutions: They could literally decide everything. Limitations 
in this respect would have been considered as a negation of the free-
dom that the Athenians as an independent polis enjoyed. Furthermore, 
the budget constraints that shape large parts of today’s politics did 
not exist to the same extent, as funds were raised when needed and 
wealthier citizens expected to contribute. [7] Still, decision-making was 
not completely unrestricted, since every resolution had to comply with 
the existing laws. The laws in turn were not seen as the central issue 
up to 15’000 people to meet. Occasionally, meetings were held in the theatre of Dyonisus 
or – if marine issues were to be decided – in the theatres of Piraeus. Most of the courts 
of jurisdiction were situated next to the agora (Bleicken 1995: 192 and 247).
6  This is implied by Aristotle’s statement that the people were the master of the state 
(politeia) because they were the masters of the ps phos (the pebbles with which the judges 
voted on the trials) (Ath. Pol. 9) and likewise Ober (2008: 8) maintains that the institu-
tions of democracy were never centred on elections. However, while drawing lots was 
the crucial mechanism, it was not exclusively applied but often combined with elections, 
as Buchstein (2009: 91-99) has pointed out.
7  Bleicken (1995: 291-299) gives an overview of the ﬁ nancial sources of the Athenian polis 
and Finley (1977: 176ff.) points out the peculiar characteristic of leitourgia, oscillating 
between its compulsory and honoriﬁ c meaning to wealthier citizens. The overall attitude 
of the Greeks towards fund raising is concisely summarized in Demosthenes’ speech on 
the Navy (14, 26): “The money, I say, we have when it is really needed, but not before”.
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of the political process, [8] but instead as a pre-political condition that 
created the polis as a political entity in the ﬁ rst place (Arendt 2002: 78). 
To quote Hannah Arendt again: they were necessary to contain the 
immoderateness that is inherent in every political action (2003: 118).
In effect, it was not the resolutions that were subject to judicial 
examination, but the person who proposed them. In the same way, 
literally everyone who exposed themselves in the public realm was in 
danger of being accused of acting against the community. Ofﬁ ce holders 
and military generals ran an especially high risk, as their control was 
institutionalised and they were often summoned to the courts which, 
for the latter group, frequently ended with death penalty. A milder 
sentence was ostracism, a punishment that regularly affected citizens 
who were considered to have become too inﬂ uential and powerful, and 
thus a threat to the fundamental equality of all citizens. 
This description of ancient Athenian democracy allows extracting 
three key elements of their public realm which, it is argued, must be 
present in any participatory design: [9]
Equality• : Equality among the politically involved is so crucial that the 
terms related to it, like isonomia (equal-law) and isegoria (equal-public 
address), could be used as synonyms to democracy (Ober 2008: 6). Its 
importance is further underlined by the increasingly reﬁ ned variety 
of instruments designed to secure equality of participation, such as 
ofﬁ ce rotation, drawing lots [10] and allowances. 
Decision-making ability• : Once the institutional framework was set up 
in form of laws – a task that in Athens was perceived to have been 
accomplished by Drakon, and above all, Solon – the citizens were free 
8  After the collection of laws in the wake of the oligarchy of 404/403 BC only seven new 
nomoi were enacted until the end of the democratic order (Bleicken 1995: 223).
9  Clearly, to establish such ﬁ xed criteria narrows the scope of what can rightly be called 
political participation. This consequence is recognised and actually intended. Crouch 
(2004: 16) and Furedi (2005: 36f.) likewise pointed out the danger of labelling any form of 
activity as political, thereby overstating the degree of general participation and shifting 
the focus away of existing problems. Instead, the three categories serve as a heuristic 
either to distinguish political participation or to establish it in the ﬁ rst place. 
10  Aristotle (Ath. Pol. 63-65) gives an impressive and detailed, yet hardly understandable 
description of the process itself. For a comprehensive account see Buchstein (2009: 30-34) 
and especially Bleicken (1995: 316f.).
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to debate and decide on any topic they wanted to. And indeed, they 
did so, not only metaphorically but with decisions that yielded real 
and sometimes unfavourable consequences. 
Accountability• : The constant political involvement did not take place 
under the protection of shadowy anonymity but in the light of the 
public realm, under the observant eyes of fellow citizens. Therefore, 
anyone could and was held accountable for what they did, which 
found its formal expression in the permanent control of ofﬁ ce hold-
ers. However, it also affected less formally involved citizens, as the 
tragic case of Socrates demonstrates. 
Having elaborated on these three key elements•  [11] of the public realm 
and turning back to the participatory experiments discussed before, it 
becomes apparent that their failure can be traced back to the absence 
of one or more of these elements: 
Equality: • Organisers of deliberative forums usually emphasise the 
importance of equality among participants. However, this premise 
was violated as soon as an ofﬁ cial person joined the discussion. This 
ﬁ nding shows that equality is not established by simply positing it, 
but – as the ancient example teaches – it has to be maintained and 
reinforced through cleverly designed institutions and mechanisms 
that must be reﬁ ned as soon as people ﬁ nd ways to by-pass them. 
Decision-making ability• : Admittedly, most deliberative forums do not 
intend nor promise to have a direct effect on real policy decisions. 
Yet, this is also a major source of disillusionment among participants 
of those experiments (Button/Mattson 1999: 629f.). Support for such 
forums would be far more enthusiastic if they actually had an inﬂ u-
ence on political processes. The same is true for online participation 
where in some cases increased citizen involvement in the decision-
making process was overtly aspired to, but it obviously had zero 
11  It is telling that the second of these elements ‘decision-making ability’ is often either 
ignored or taken for granted in normative democratic designs. For example, Hüller 
(2010: 84) identiﬁ es three principles of democracy: “political equality and/or reciprocity, 
publicity and accountability” and seems to assume that the inﬂ uence on actual decisions 
is implied in those principles. Smith (2009: 22-24) is aware of this problem and therefore 
includes “popular control” as a feature to test the quality of democratic innovations. In 
consequence, the present paper corroborates that decision-making ability can neither 
be taken for granted nor will it naturally arise out of other prerequisites, but has to be 
established explicitly at the outset of democratic processes. 
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effect (Hüller 2010). At least some degree of decision-making ability 
would signiﬁ cantly improve these experiments and enhance people’s 
willingness to participate (Münkler/Wassermann 2008: 18). 
Accountability:•  The last factor reveals the iterative character of the three 
elements: if equality among participants is not guaranteed, the process 
is not democratic and therefore need no longer be considered. If there 
is equality but no decision-making ability, the question about account-
ability remains irrelevant, since there is nothing to account for. As has 
been pointed out, most deliberative forums do not go so far as to attempt 
direct inﬂ uence on real policy decisions and thus there is no record of 
accountability that could be judged. However, it can be asserted that 
their widespread design as a one-shot affair would have to be extended if 
the participants were to be held responsible for their decisions (cf. Fung 
2003: 354f. for the case of deliberative polling). Similarly, the absence of 
impact had to be acknowledged regarding online communities. Yet, in 
principle, there are no obstacles for internet-based approaches to pro-
vide accountability, but this can only happen under the conditions that 
credible rules are established to secure privacy protection and if users 
are willing to give up their anonymity. It must therefore be concluded 
that “the internet will not be a tool for democracy unless its users choose 
to use it that way” (Ackerly 2006: 136, original emphasis). 
Alongside these far from ideal examples, there exist more promis-
ing experiments. Maybe the most successful and prominent is partici-
patory budgeting in Porto Alegre, where citizens are allowed to decide 
on the spending of a ﬁ xed part of the city budget within an institutional 
design that combines direct and representative elements (for an over-
view see Fung 2003: 360-362, Smith 2009: 33-39). An analysis taking 
into consideration the three elements of the public realm shows that 
they are all present, at least to some degree: Equality is provided in 
that popular assemblies are open to every citizen and terms in ofﬁ ces 
and councils are strictly limited. Furthermore, a cleverly-designed 
mechanism seeks to equalise demands over districts with regard to 
the number of participants in each neighbourhood. [12] Decision-making 
12  Following Baiocchi, Fung (2003: 361, note 51) describes the mechanism – by which one 
is immediately reminded of the Greeks’ efforts to secure equal participation – as follows: 
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ability is granted as citizens have a ﬁ xed part of the city budget at their 
disposal. In theory, the legislative body could reject their decision, but 
thanks to its strong legitimacy, this is unlikely to happen (Santos 2005: 
316). Finally, past performance is scrutinised every year in popular 
assemblies and delegates are subject to recall at any time. Overall, 
the balanced design of participatory budgeting has led to increased 
participation and to recognition and imitation worldwide. At the 
same time, its complex and long-lasting processes suggest that such 
experiments are primarily suited for the communal level (Fetscher 
2007: 94, Münkler/Wassermann 2008: 17), while at higher levels one 
cannot help but ask what other forms of governance might be employed 
(Volkmann 2002: 609).
In the light of the presented ﬁ ndings it is recommended that any 
participatory experiment should ﬁ rst and foremost check whether each 
of the three elements of the public realm are to some extent integrated 
into its design, above all, if it is to be more than an informative, or at 
best, educational event. As Zhu (2004: 241) has correctly observed it 
was “[t]hanks to Aristotle’s contribution, [that] politics for the ﬁ rst time 
had its proper domain”. As a distinctive domain, the political realm has 
its distinctive characteristics and to deﬁ ne these from a participatory 
standpoint was the aim of the present paper.
However, it must be added that securing participation as suggested 
does not guarantee good governance and Hannah Arendt’s claim that 
the more perspectives included in a judgment, the more qualiﬁ ed it is, 
might be too optimistic a generalisation (2006: 28). Instead, as many 
authors have acknowledged, courage will remain the central political 
virtue (Arendt 2002: 45, Cic. Rep. I, 3, Nordmann 2007: 62, Riecker 
2006, Thuc. II, 39, Vowinckel 2007: 51). First, on a personal level, to 
be able to expose oneself in the light of the public realm, and, second, 
on a communal level, to be prepared to accept the decisions the com-
munity takes, which will always be insecure at the outset and will 
always include the risk of disastrous consequences, as exempliﬁ ed by 
the Athenian expedition to Sicily.
“The number of delegates for a district is determined as follows: for the ﬁ rst 100 persons, 
one delegate for every ten persons; for the next 150 persons, one for twenty; for the next 150, 
one for thirty; for each additional forty persons after that, one delegate. To cite an example, 
a district that had 520 persons in attendance would have twenty-six delegates”.
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Still, one should not conclude that democratic engagement be 
dismissed and its forbearers ignored (Finley 1980: 25), but rather ask 
what the basic features of democratic institutions are and how they 
can be reﬁ ned in order to reach the most balanced outcome. In this 
respect, Athens continues to be a shining example as the community 
in which the proportionally highest number of citizens governed itself 
over a signiﬁ cantly long period of time (Ottmann 2001: 105).
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LIBERAL AND REPUBLICAN PROPONENTS OF FREEDOM HAVE BEEN THE MAIN 
PROTAGONISTS IN A CENTURIES OLD IDEOLOGICAL BATTLE., So it is therefore 
one of the ironies of history that, despite this conﬂ ict, the accounts of 
freedom they defend share a central trait: they both conceive of free-
dom in terms of individual freedom and state freedom alone, either 
making them analogous to one another or making one a condition 
for the other. [1] This means that normally little or nothing is offered 
regarding the freedom of groups, thereby excluding from considera-
tion a whole range of conditions that can limit or enable our freedom 
of action. Most of these conditions are to be found within and between 
the groups intermediate between individuals and the state: the vari-
ous and cross-cutting groups to which all individuals ﬁ nd themselves 
associated and out of which many of the more important forms of 
1  Eg., Machiavelli, Discourses, ed. Crick (Penguin 2003), pp. 104-11, 116, 153-7, 197-8; Rousseau, 
Social Contract, ed. Gourevitch (CUP 1997), pp. 54, 82, 116; Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Tuck 
(CUP 1996), p. 149; Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Laslett (CUP 1967), Bk II, 4, 
22, 27, 57-59, 61, 87, 95, 121-24, 217; J. S. Mill, On Liberty, in On Liberty and Other Essays, 
ed. Gray (OUP 1991), pp. 16-17; 121-2; 124-5; Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard UP 1971); 
Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia UP 1994); Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (CUP 
1998); Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty (CUP 2008); Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory 
of Freedom and Government (OUP 1997); Feinberg, ‘Freedom and Liberty’, in E. Craig (ed.), 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Routledge 1998).
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representation emerge. It should therefore come as no surprise that 
accounts of political representation have generally been conceived in 
similarly stark terms: either representation of the state or represen-
tation of individuals’ opinions or preferences; or, in other words, the 
representation of ‘unity’ – the collective whole and its interests – or 
extreme ‘diversity’ – directly tracking the expressed interests of the 
represented (usually via some means of aggregation). [2]
With reference to South Africa I argue here that we can enhance 
our understanding of freedom and representative democracy if we 
buck this trend of reducing freedom and representation to the level of 
either that of the individual or that of the state. Rather, a more realistic 
conception of both emerges if we focus our attention on the freedom 
and representation of groups that cut across not only one another but 
also the various ways in which individuals and states are represented. 
This is only possible, however, on the basis of a more substantive and 
concrete account of freedom than is the norm within contemporary 
political philosophy, an account in which freedom is understood not 
exclusively in terms of the lack of humanly-generated impediments 
(the liberal position) or living freely within free states (the republi-
can version), but in terms of freedom of action, or more particularly 
in terms of the power to act and the requirements for that power. I 
then go on to argue that groups can be agents, and even when they 
are not agents themselves their representatives give them agency; 
and the dynamics of this relationship of representation is one vital 
determinant of a group’s freedom. The main claim I defend, following 
aesthetic accounts of representation, is that the freedom of the group 
is dependent upon whether or not the representative of the group 
can generate the right kinds of new interests and then defend them in 
the relevant formal institutions of representation. Representation is 
thereby a central component of individuals, groups and states powers 
to act. Like individuals and states, since groups can be represented, 
they can be more or less free.
2  For examples of the former, see Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 121, 128, 184; Burke, ‘Speech to 
the Electors of Bristol’, in Selected Works of Edmund Burke (Liberty Fund 1999); Rousseau, 
Social Contract, pp. 41, 58-65; Siéyès, Political Writings, ed. M. Sonenscher (Hackett 2003). 
For examples of the latter, see Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (Yale UP 1989); Przeworski, 
Stokes and Manin, Democracy, Accountability and Representation (CUP 1999), p. 2.
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Freedom as Power
The account of freedom as power that underpins this argument is 
distinct from both the Liberal and Republican mainstream in that it 
does not reduce freedom to one deﬁ ning feature, be that mere absence 
of (external) impediments, the ability to decide for oneself what to do 
(self-determination) or active citizenship within a free state. These are 
Berlin’s ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ conceptions of freedom and the rival 
Republican account respectively. [3] Rather, this alternative account of 
freedom rejects the common tendency to favour a minimalist conception 
of freedom above a realistic one. It captures the substantive, concrete 
nature of freedom by identifying freedom with power in at least one 
important way. When I say ‘I am free’ normally I am not saying, ‘I am 
externally unimpeded’ or ‘I am self-determining’; no, what I usually 
mean is ‘I am free to do X’ which concretely means ‘I have the power 
or ability to do X’. So real modern freedom here is identiﬁ ed with and 
as power in that it conceives of freedom as a combination of my ability 
to determine what I will do and my power to do it or bring it about.
This way of thinking about freedom chimes very well with a 
number of the reasons and concerns that have driven most, if not all, 
of the various struggles for freedom across the ages, from the sharp 
distinction between freedom and slavery in Antiquity and beyond, and 
the various associated slave revolts, via the myriad liberation struggles 
against colonialism, apartheid, and domination based on race, gender 
or class (or some mixture of all of these), to the everyday attempts to 
gain more independence and freedom from others, the state, the law, 
poverty or crime. In other words, it captures well an important fact 
about human existence: people are interested in freedom as a human 
ideal, goal or aspiration not in and of itself but because it is thought to 
be connected with the actual attainment of ‘something’, that is, some 
good or set of goods; and the actual attainment of that ‘something’ 
depends on my having the power to attain it. The liberation strug-
gle in South Africa did not have as its goal the abstract idea of being 
3  Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Four Essays on Liberty (OUP 1996), pp. 118-172; Skinner, 
‘The Idea of negative Liberty’, Vision of Politics Vol II (CUP 2002), pp. 160-185; Pettit, 
Republicanism; Taylor, ‘What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty?’, The Idea of Freedom, ed. 
Ryan (OUP 1979), pp. 175-93.
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‘free from impediment’ or ‘living in a free state’, but rather a series of 
much more concrete political, economic and social goals: being free 
to determine who rules and how they rule; being free to produce, 
exchange and consume wherever and whenever; being free to love, 
procreate, entertain oneself and others, bring up one’s children and 
so on in conditions free of poverty and racial and gender discrimina-
tion and domination.
It turns out, moreover, that thinking about freedom as both about 
being able to determine what one will do and having the power to do 
what one decides to do is more common than is normally supposed. A 
surprising number and variety of political theorists associate freedom 
and power in exactly these terms. It is a mainstay of much of Antiquity, 
in particular Roman thought and practice. As Livy put it, ‘freedom is 
to be in one’s own power’. [4] Then, at the beginning of the modern era, 
Hobbes argues that: ‘A FREE-MAN, is he, that in those things, which by 
his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will 
to do’. Hobbes therefore sees two essential elements in the concept of 
human freedom. a) The idea of possessing an underlying power or abil-
ity to act: it is in relation to a ‘man’s power to do what hee would that 
we speak of his being or not being at liberty’. [5] b) The matter of being 
unimpeded in the exercise of such powers. Rousseau too argues that 
power is one of two essential elements in freedom: ‘Every free action 
has two causes which concur in producing it, one moral, namely the 
will which determines it, the other physical, namely the power which 
executes it’. [6] And then Burke, a very different sort of political thinker, 
argues that ‘liberty, when men act in bodies, is power’. [7] Even Mill, late 
in On Liberty, argues that, amongst other things the ‘political educa-
tion of a free people’ requires ‘habituating them to act from public or 
semi-public motives’ and that ‘[w]ithout these habits and powers, a 
free constitution can neither be worked nor preserved.’ [8] In other 
words, a whole array of thinkers, even thinkers that Berlin lauds as 
4  ‘Libertas suis stat viribus’: Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, Book 35, Ch 32, 11.  
5  Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 146, 62, 91.
6  Rousseau, Social Contract, p. 82.
7  Burke, Reﬂ ections on the Revolution in France, ed. Conor Cruise O’Brien (Penguin 2004), 
p. 91.
8  Mill, On Liberty, pp. 121-2; and pp. 7, 16-17, 116.
Democracy Today.indb   130 11-08-2012   20:05:52
131
FREEDOM, POWER AND 
REPRESENTATION
Lawrence Hamilton
standard-bearers for his ‘negative’ conception of freedom, are ultimately 
concerned with whether or not someone is able to exercise his or her 
power to act, that is to bring something about, to do something.
 But it is in the work of Marx that we see the full efﬂ orescence of the 
substantive, concrete account of modern freedom as power that under-
pins my argument here. Marx unequivocally identiﬁ es freedom with 
power. Unlike Berlin’s distinction between two concepts of freedom, 
Marx distinguishes three concepts of freedom. The ﬁ rst is what Marx 
associates with the anarchism of Max Stirner, but in today’s parlance 
we would call ‘negative’ freedom or the ‘freedom’ of libertarianism. [9] 
The second concept of freedom Marx discusses he identiﬁ es with 
Kant’s view of freedom and which he deﬁ nes as the ability a creature 
has to make its own decisions, or govern itself. [10] The third concept is 
the one Marx calls the ‘materialist’ notion of freedom that identiﬁ es 
freedom with power and that he thinks is the full, sophisticated notion. 
He argues that in this account, freedom comprises the ‘the conjunc-
tion of the ability to determine what one will do and the power to do 
what one decides to do’, and anything less than this is a mere shadow 
of the concept of freedom. [11] This means that for Marx the other two 
concepts he discusses, and a fortiori the main three concepts analysed 
in the modern literature, are poor approximations of this real form of 
freedom.
Another way of construing the importance of this more substan-
tive account of freedom is that it provides a means of thinking about 
how freedom relates to the exercise of our powers as individuals and 
how we are enabled and disabled by a variety of internal and external 
abilities, obstacles, mechanisms and power relations. This is something, 
again, that a number of other thinkers have identiﬁ ed and stressed from 
a wide range of political perspectives. Here freedom is conceived as 
‘effective power’, that is, freedom is rightly identiﬁ ed as a precondition 
9  Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, in MECW, Vol 5 (Lawrence and Wishart 1976), 
pp. 304-6.
10  Ibid., pp. 193-5. For Kant, freedom is the mere ability to determine the will, irrespective 
of whether this is even translated into actual action in the world. Geuss, Politics and the 
Imagination (Princeton UP 2009), p. 57.
11 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 305-6; quote is from Geuss, ‘Metaphysics 
of Right’, p. 57.
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for certain desirable ‘beings and doings’. Nietzsche, for example, puts 
the association well: ‘That we are effective beings, forces, is our funda-
mental belief. Free means: ‘not pushed and shoved, without a feeling of 
compulsion’... Where we encounter a resistance and have to give way 
to it, we feel unfree: where we don’t give way to it but compel it to give 
way to us, we feel free... – man’s most dreadful and deep-rooted craving, 
his drive to power – this drive is known as ‘freedom’. [12]
Then, in another key, there is Dewey’s famous identiﬁ cation: 
‘Liberty is power, effective power to do speciﬁ c things... The demand 
of liberty is the demand for power.’ [13] And this association is even 
evident at the heart of contemporary analytical political philosophy, in 
Feinberg’s account of freedom: ‘There are at least two basic ideas in the 
conceptual complex we call ‘freedom’; namely, rightful self-government 
(autonomy), and the overall ability to do, choose or achieve things, 
which can be called ‘optionality’…’ [14]
As I argue at length in my forthcoming book, Freedom is Power, 
the main liberal argument that to be free is to act in the absence of 
impediments or obstacles, in particular those that result from conscious 
deliberate human action, rests on a series of mistaken assumptions 
that mask a deep misapprehension about political and social life. I 
cannot summarise the argument here, sufﬁ ce to say the following: 
liberals are concerned with external obstacles because they think it is 
better to have more possible courses of action rather than fewer. That 
is obviously true of some situations, but it is not clear that it is true of 
all; but whether or not it is always a good thing to have more rather 
than less options open, the number of options open depends not merely 
on the presence or absence of obstacles, but the conjunction of one’s 
power and the internal or external obstacles that stand in one’s way. 
Moreover, whether or not a person, act or institution constitutes an 
obstacle will itself often depend on my relative power, in particular my 
position within existing power relations and groups and the power of 
my groups’ representatives. I maintain therefore that freedom is rela-
tive to power and control across four dimensions. Freedom involves: 
12  F. Nietzsche, ‘Notebook 34, April-June 1885’ 34[250] and ‘Notebook I, autumn 1885-spring 
1886’ I[33], in Writings from the Late Notebooks, ed. Bittner (CUP 2003), pp. 16; 57. 
13  Dewey, Problems of Men (Greenwood Press 1968), p. 111.
14  Feinberg, ‘Freedom and Liberty’, p. 1.
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1) the power to get what I want, to act or be as I would choose in the 
absence of either internal or external obstacles or both; 2) the power 
to determine the government of my political association or commu-
nity; 3) the ability to develop and exercise my powers and capacities 
self-reﬂ ectively within and against existing norms, expectations and 
power relations; and 4) the power to determine my social and economic 
environment via meaningful control over my and my groups’ economic 
and political representatives. Freedom is power in the sense therefore 
that it depends upon my power, control and self-control within these 
four domains.
Freedom as power depends upon avoiding or overcoming situations 
of domination by ensuring control over the four above-listed domains. 
However, given the economic and political reality within large, com-
plex modern capitalist states, our individual freedom as power will 
normally not be a simple matter of direct individual control over these 
domains. Given that our lives within complex modern capitalist states 
are characterised by membership of a whole variety of overlapping and 
interdependent groups, our freedom (and avoidance of domination) 
is determined to a signiﬁ cant degree by three associated matrices of 
freedom as power, as I argue below: a) the material conditions and 
power of the groups that we ﬁ nd ourselves (or in some cases choose) 
to be members of; b) the relative power of our groups’ representatives; 
and c) the relationship between our groups’ representatives and our 
formal political representatives. [15]
Since this account conceives of freedom as power in fully substan-
tive and material terms and conceives of group freedom in terms of 
the power of a group’s representative(s), it avoids the mistakes of its 
predecessors, especially regarding the stubborn tendency to focus 
uniquely on individual and state freedom, and the associated libertar-
ian position that ‘[t]he freedom of the group is nothing other than the 
sum total of the degrees of freedom of its individual members’. [16] And 
it remains realistic about freedom and domination. As Foucault, Lukes 
and Geuss have argued convincingly, the concept of ‘power’ is a relation 
15  I prefer the term ‘group’ to ‘class’ because the former is a more catch-all category for 
collections of individuals who are connected with each other in relevant and meaningful 
ways that affect their behaviour or that of others. 
16  Carter, Measure of Freedom, p. 267.
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rather than a resource or property of persons and is connected to the 
abilities of agents to bring about signiﬁ cant affects, either by further-
ing their own interests or affecting the interests of others, positively 
or negatively. [17] I have argued elsewhere that these abilities depend 
upon the extent to which individuals are able to determine and satisfy 
their vital and agency needs. [18] The ability to determine and satisfy my 
needs depends upon the prevailing political and economic institutions 
and representatives and whether or not I ﬁ nd myself in situations of 
domination. A situation of domination arises when the existing power 
relations do not give me (or my group) the power to determine my (or 
our) needs. This can take various forms. Existing power relations can: 
a) mislead me in my attempts to identify my needs, e.g., patriarchy; b) 
ensure that I do not have the means or voice to express my needs, e.g., 
apartheid South Africa; c) disable meaningful evaluation of needs, e.g. 
unregulated liberal capitalism. [19]
Groups
First, though, what is a group? A contemporary deﬁ nition provides 
a good starting point: a group is ‘a collective of individuals who are 
connected with each other in ways that are relevant to them, and/or 
others, and thereby affect their behaviour and/or that of others’. [20] 
The connection that binds the members of a group may be as a result 
of their gender, class, form of employment, lack of employment, mate-
rial condition, political cause, and so on. A group is therefore distinct 
from other kinds of associations since it is characterised by a durable 
connection amongst the members and one that is of signiﬁ cance or 
is meaningful. So a gathering of a collection of friends on a Sunday 
morning in the park is not a group in this sense, unless of course they 
happen to be gathering as members of, say, the Westdene Sunday 
17  Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton UP 2008), p. 27; Lukes, Power: A Radical 
View, 2nd Ed. (Palgrave 2005), pp. 63, 65, 109.
18  The Political Philosophy of Needs (CUP 2003).
19  Cf. ‘domination’ in Pettit, Republicanism and Lovett, A General Theory of Domination 
and Justice (CUP 2010).
20  Vieira and Runciman, Representation (Polity 2008), p. 86.
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morning football club, where the same (or similar) set of individuals 
gathers every Sunday.
There exist various kinds of groups. First, voluntary and invol-
untary groups: the latter are normally groups into which we are born, 
not ones we choose or can exit at our own discretion; the former, are 
groups we join by choice and also exit freely. Then there are cooperative 
groups, in which the members are jointly committed to some agreed 
goal and non-cooperative groups where this shared commitment does 
not exist. An example of the former is a class-based pressure group 
and the later a group of actual or potential creditors. Finally, groups 
can be agents and non-agents. The former have the capacity to act in 
ways that resembles individuals: they can deﬁ ne goals for themselves, 
perform tasks, appoint representatives, and so on, for example, com-
mittees, governments and joint stock companies. Groups that are 
non-agents lack any formal organization and have no capacity to 
coordinate their efforts, although they share common interests, for 
instance the unemployed. These three kinds of distinctions often cut 
across one another: so a group can be voluntary and cooperative and 
have agency, such as a labour union, and a group can be involuntary, 
cooperative and not have agency, such as those born into a group of 
unemployed but cooperatively organized shack dwellers on the margins 
of Johannesburg, and so on and so forth.
The assumption is often made that for groups to act they must 
have clear and explicit rules for the election or selection of representa-
tives, which is only therefore possible for groups with agency. But 
this is to miss the most important fact of the nature of many groups 
and their relation to various forms of economic and political repre-
sentation: groups normally acquire agency by virtue not of direct 
rules for the selection of representatives but more informal forms 
of representation that arise as a consequence of shared identities or 
interests or both; and, given the contested nature of identities and 
interests, these more common forms of group representation are 
characterised by the fact that often the representatives themselves are 
important in determining the relevant identities or interests (about 
which more below). 
Democracy Today.indb   135 11-08-2012   20:05:53
136
DEMOCRACY TODAY
 
Group Representation
All modern states contain at least two distinct groups of people: the 
rulers and the ruled. In formal political terms the rulers are the govern-
ment, sovereign powers, law-makers, or the representatives; while the 
ruled are the citizens, people, voters, or the represented. [21] The relation-
ship of representation is what holds these two groups together, and 
in representative democracies it is what enables the rulers to exercise 
some form of control over the rulers (at the very least via the ballot 
box). But this picture is too stark: even ‘the rulers’ may be comprised 
of various different groups, not to mention the large number and 
diversity of groups that make up ‘the ruled’. The extent of control or 
power any subsection of the ruled have over the rulers will depend 
therefore upon the relationship of representation their group or groups 
have with the ruled.
The representative of a group can be given a warrant to act on 
behalf of the group in one of a number of a ways. First, if the group is 
an agent and thus can act as a principal, a principal-agent relation of 
representation can exist. In this case the group (the principal) appoints 
another (the agent) to perform some action or function on their behalf. 
Here rules must exist by means of which the decisions of the group’s 
members are put together to generate a collective decision, normally 
achieved though unanimity or majority decision. But the latter warrant 
is always subject to the possibility of the ‘tyranny of the majority’, where 
a majority may rule at the expense of the interests of the numerical 
minority. [22] There is no clear solution to this persistent problem. What 
is clear, though, is that the scope for groups to act on each side of this 
principal-agent relation is very narrow. These groups will need to be 
sure of the consent of individual members and the representative will 
have to further the speciﬁ ed directives of the group. There are some 
groups like this, such as small-scale workers cooperatives, but many 
groups do not ﬁ t this model, mainly because they lack the capacity for 
collectivized reason and robust exit mechanisms, e.g. states. But the 
21  Ibid., p. 126.
22  Madison, ‘Federalist No. 10’ in Hamilton, Madison and Jay, The Federalist Papers (CUP 
2003), pp. 40-6.
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main problem with this account is that it assumes that a group has a 
capacity to act prior to the action of its representatives, which is very 
unusual in the case of groups.
Second, one possible candidate for overcoming these problems 
comes from the legal model of a ‘trust’. In common law, a trust is an 
arrangement whereby property is managed by an entity – the trustee 
– for the beneﬁ t of another entity – the beneﬁ ciary – without the latter 
being said to own the property in question. This is achieved through 
the creation of a legal ﬁ ction: representatives act in the group’s name 
and on its behalf, in accordance with rules that treat the group as if it 
were a principal. Trustees act independently, but in the interest of their 
beneﬁ ciaries without having to be given any direct orders or direc-
tives. [23] In other words, even though the corporation cannot act on its 
own, its representatives (or ‘ofﬁ cers’) can act for it. The idea is that the 
representatives act in the best interests of the corporation. But what if 
they don’t? Whose responsibility is it to ensure they do act in the inter-
ests of the corporation? The answers to these questions are not clear, 
but this form of group representation highlights the fact that groups 
can have identities and interests of their own that are separate from 
those of their individual members, and these identities and interests 
are not only given agency by the representatives in question, but they 
are also often directly determined by the representatives without any 
recourse to collectivized reason. The problem with this model is that 
the rules of representation that allow the group to act as an artiﬁ cial 
principal have to be external to the group, since the group cannot act 
without its representative.
A third form of representation does not depend upon this condition: 
that of the identiﬁ cation of interests or identities. Here an individual or 
group of individuals can bring forward a claim to represent a group, 
evidence for which is found in her or their capacity to attract a follow-
ing, for example NGO representation; or a group can make someone or 
group into their representative because they identify with something 
they stand for based, say, on commonality of class, employment and 
so on, for example the representation common amongst national 
23  Maitland, State, Trust and Corporation, ed. Runciman and Ryan (CUP 2003).
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creditors; [24] or, it can arise out of the sharing of some form of basic 
identity, for example, those ascriptive identity groups into which we 
are born, such as country or family, where identity acts as an external 
indicator of the likelihood of the representative acting as the group 
members would in the face of similar circumstances – representation 
by someone who is ‘one of us’. In these forms of representation the 
important component is identiﬁ cation not authorisation, incorpora-
tion or accountability, though these may also be present. The group 
members see themselves as having a presence in the actions of the 
representative by dint of what they have in common with the group. 
These can be common interests, similar descriptive characteristics or 
social perspectives, values and insights. [25]
But, is this the whole story? Some of the more subtle contempo-
rary political theorists think not. This is especially true of those that 
have developed an ‘aesthetic’ theory of political representation, which 
overcomes the shortcomings of the other three accounts of represen-
tation because it does not depend on one or both of two assumptions 
that they make: i) that the interests of group members cohere in such a 
way as to make them a plausible principal; and ii) that there exist a set 
of shared interests/identities prior to or as preconditions for political 
representation. Instead, these theorists borrow from the world of art 
and literature ‘the idea that any form of representation is never simply 
the copy of some pre-existing external reality’. [26] Rather representation 
always creates something new: Tolstoy’s account of the Napoleonic War 
does not simply replicate the historical events, it creates a new version 
of it in the act of representing it. In other words, there is always a ‘gap’ 
between an object and the representation of that object and this holds 
in politics too: as Ankersmit puts it, ‘political reality is not ﬁ rst given 
to us and subsequently represented; political reality comes into being 
after and due to representation’. [27] Political representatives can never 
therefore merely speak for the interests of the people as they existed 
24  Hamilton and Viegi, ‘Debt, Democracy and Representation in South Africa’, 
Representation, 45.2, pp. 193-212.
25  Vieira and Runciman, Representation, pp. 111, 103.
26  Ibid., pp. 138-9.
27  Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value (Stanford UP 
1997), p. 47.
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before being represented; instead the act of representing them creates 
a new version of the people and their interests, and this creative proc-
ess gives representation its dynamism. Political representation is not 
designed therefore as a means either to ‘track’ pre-existing interests or 
provide a reﬂ ection of the people and their interests/identities; ‘rather 
it is designed to give the people an image of themselves to reﬂ ect on’. [28] 
This ‘gap’ between the rulers and ruled is itself ﬁ lled by groups and 
their representatives, and so it is in this gap that the degree of a group’s 
freedom is therefore played out.
Group Representation and Group Freedom
The freedom of the group will depend ultimately not on the individual 
freedom of any of its constitutive members (however that may be meas-
ured or aggregated) but on the relationship of representation that exists 
between the group and its representative and the power of the representa-
tive in question. The internal warrant for a representative to act ‘for’ the 
group can come from any (or a mix) of the four kinds of representation 
outlined above. However, the extent to which the representative (and by 
extension the group) is free to act will depend not only on internal war-
rant, but also on a number of other powers, capacities and conditions, 
such as the power to overcome any internal and external obstacles to 
its decisions and actions and its relative power vis-à-vis other repre-
sentatives. This relationship between representation and freedom is 
most obvious in the case of a group with the collective agency to act as a 
principal, but given that the principal-agent relation of representation in 
groups is the exception rather than the rule, we have to look elsewhere for 
the normal relation between group representation and group freedom. 
This is where the ‘aesthetic’ theory of representation really comes into 
its own, particularly with regard to the nature of representation and the 
role of representation in the formation of interests.
First, the aesthetic theory of representation establishes that what 
matters is not whether representatives establish a mimetic form of 
28  Vieira and Runciman, Representation, p. 139; Ankersmit, Political Representation (Stanford 
UP 2002), pp. 112ff.
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identity between themselves and the groups they represent or between 
rulers and ruled, that is, that they provide a copy of the people and 
their interests, but that they give the people an image of themselves 
to reﬂ ect on. This is why the most important forms of representation 
have developed within the gap that representation itself opens up 
between the government and the people. [29] To this I add the idea that 
it is possible to see this best if we analyse in any given context how 
this gap is ﬁ lled by a variety of group representatives with varying 
relations of power between themselves and those that govern, power 
relations that are characterised by more or less domination and thus 
enable more or less freedom as power for the representatives and 
thereby the groups in question. The relation between freedom, power 
and domination discussed above is thus better conceived here as one 
regarding the relationship between groups and their representatives 
and these representatives and the rulers.
Second, needs and interests are never pre-existing and ﬁ xed in 
politics. On the contrary, they require identiﬁ cation, articulation, 
expression, evaluation and so on. Needs and interests are more objec-
tive than wishes, opinions and preferences, in that they are more easily 
detached from any speciﬁ c group of ‘holders’ (e.g. the collective interest 
in a sustainable environment), but they are never totally unattached 
either. Like needs, interests have a dualistic nature – they are attached 
and unattached, subjective and objective – and this lies at the heart of the 
ambiguities of any form of interest group representation. [30] Moreover, 
individual and group interests are more often than not constructed in 
the process of representation itself. In other words, pace the assump-
tions of both ‘aggregative’ and ‘deliberative’ models of democracy, needs 
and interests are never simply objective givens waiting to be tracked 
through representation. [31] They often only become present as a result 
of representation, that is, they may only be experienced, identiﬁ ed and 
29  Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics; Ankersmit, Political Representation; Lefort, Democracy and 
Political Theory (University of Minnesota Press 1988).
30  Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (University of California Press 1967).
31  Despite many other differences, ‘aggregative’ and ‘deliberative’ models share the 
assumption that legitimate representation must track interests. For more on the problems 
of both models, see Hayward, ‘On representation and democratic legitimacy’, in Shapiro 
et al, Political Representation, pp. 111-35; Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (Verso 2000); and 
Wolin, ‘Fugitive Democracy’, in Benhabib (ed.) Democracy and Difference.
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expressed as a result of the actions and concerns of representatives. 
And this fact undermines the very notion of the idea of representatives 
directly tracking existing interests or identities.
It follows from this that if group representation and representa-
tive institutions in general are to be freedom enhancing they cannot 
simply ‘track’ interests; rather, they must encourage the formation 
of new political interests, especially in conditions in which existing 
relations of power create or reinforce situations of domination. The 
new interests will be freedom-enhancing if they enable groups to 
escape these situations of domination. And therefore here the rela-
tionship between group representation and group freedom is one in 
which the freedom of the group is dependent upon whether or not 
the representative of the group can generate the right kinds of new 
interests and then defend them in the relevant formal institutions of 
representation. Depending on context this combines representation 
as aesthetic reﬂ ection, interest identiﬁ cation and even principal-agent 
representation.
The conditions in South Africa today illustrate well these facts 
about interests and the shared shortcomings of the ‘aggregative and 
‘deliberative’ accounts of democracy: historical inequalities and the 
interests formed by conditions of poverty, crime, fear and the persist-
ance of extreme inequalities cannot be overcome by means of represen-
tation simply ‘tracking’ interests (or post-deliberative interests). Since 
individual needs and interests are formed within particular institutional 
contexts and these contexts are, amongst either things, characterised by 
membership of cross-cutting groups and their representatives embed-
ded in power relations which may or may not generate domination, it 
follows that the individual power to act as one would otherwise act, to 
satisfy one’s needs, to evaluate and criticise the norms and institutions 
of one’s society and to control one’s economic and social environment 
depends upon four associated variables (or components of representa-
tion): a) the nature and relative power of the groups of which one is a 
member; b) the relationship of representation that exists between the 
members of the group and the group’s representatives; c) the relative 
power of the groups’ representatives; and d) the relationship between 
one’s groups’ representatives and the formal political representatives 
of one’s polity.
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Third, in any system of representative democracy there will always 
therefore be more than one version of ‘the people’ at work. There is 
‘the people’ conjured up by formal political representatives in the act of 
speaking for them; there are conﬂ icting views of ‘the people’ generated 
by group membership and representation; and there are ‘the people’ 
who pass judgement on these conjuring acts. ‘Indeed, the functioning 
of representative democracy depends upon politicians being able to 
offer competing versions of the people to the people, in order for the 
voters to be able to choose the one they prefer’. [32] It follows from this 
that the aesthetic theory of representation is advantageous for a fur-
ther reason: it allows us to view representative democracy as a form 
of politics that accommodates aspects of all three of the other models. 
If groups and their representatives are given greater and greater par-
ity of power and control (and thus freedom) it is possible to see how 
groups and their representatives can have principal-agent, trustee and 
interest/identity relationships of representation: the people with an 
active role, as the arbiters of representation, act much like principals; 
the people with a passive role, as the objects of representation, act 
much like the legal ﬁ ctions characteristic of trusteeship; and in judg-
ing in their active role what they think of the image offered to them 
by their various representatives, individual citizens often side with 
whom they identify best or with whom they think will defend best 
their particular interests.
Finally, none of the versions of the ‘the people’ on offer to ‘the peo-
ple’ ought ever to succeed in closing the gap between the represented 
and their representatives. If they do succeed in closing the gap, or even 
aspire to do so, they open up the possibility for tyranny or despotism, 
the best recipe for unfreedom. As Ankersmit has argued, the attempt 
to close the gap between the people and their representatives is futile 
and dangerous: it is not the realization of democracy but an invitation 
to tyranny because it thwarts any opportunity for the people to reﬂ ect 
on and judge the actions of their representatives. [33] As Machiavelli, 
Constant and Madison have all argued, this is the case because the effect 
of closing the gap – and at the extreme the complete identiﬁ cation of 
32  Vieira and Runciman, Representation, p. 141.
33  Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics, pp. 51-6; and Ankersmit, Political Representation, pp. 112ff.
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the rulers and the ruled – is (paradoxically) to exclude the people from 
politics in their active or judgmental, role. If the gap is closed there is 
no longer any room for the various groups that constitute ‘the people’ 
to evaluate the images of themselves on offer, in most cases because 
the effect of closing the gap will be to remove the possibility for the 
portrayal of other competing images or visions of the polity. When 
functioning properly, therefore, political representation understood in 
these aesthetic terms highlights the advantages of some institutional 
arrangements over others.
Group Representation and Group Freedom in South Africa
To articulate this overall insight regarding representation is to iden-
tify which groups and their representatives are kept off the agenda, 
either through lack of meaningful representative or via one group or 
set of representatives successfully closing the gap. In South Africa 
the unemployed as a group tend not to have meaningful representa-
tion, despite dubious claims to the contrary by the African National 
Congress (ANC) that they represent them, not only because they lack 
organization and representatives, but also because their situation of 
poverty makes their immediate interests poor competitors in the race 
to reﬂ ect a successful version or vision of ‘the people’. Moreover, the 
system of party list proportional representation used in South Africa 
excludes alternative versions or visions of the polity since it is based 
on a completely different (and deeply problematic) conception of 
representation: that the legislature should directly reﬂ ect the electoral 
tally of parties rather than either the interests of the electorate as a 
whole or a vision of that whole. It sacriﬁ ces the ‘gap’ and the potential 
for competition amongst various visions for an alleged exact copy of 
‘the people’ via replicating in parliament identical proportionality of 
party support. [34]
34  South Africa’s electoral system is in fact very rare. Only Israel has the same system. In 
every other democracy in the world, citizens are represented by where they live (though 
exactly how and what proportion of the representatives are elected in this fashion varies 
quite widely). A. Rehfeld, The Concept of Constinuency: Political Representation, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and Institutional Design (CUP 2005), p. 3.  
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The fact that one party is still so dominant only exacerbates this 
problem and consequent lack of freedom, as does the fact that the party 
rules as part of a tri-partite alliance with another party (the SACP) and 
the main Trade Union umbrella body (COSATU). In recent times this 
gap has been further reduced by the tendency of the ruling part to claim 
constantly and aggressively that it, and it alone, represents ‘the people’, 
and that not only are other claims to represent ‘the people’ dubious 
but also worthy of being silenced. This is most obvious in two related 
quarters: a) the constant eroding of the power of the legislature in favour 
of the power of the executive; and b) an associated tendency to fail to 
distinguish between the state and the party. The latter is exempliﬁ ed 
by the fact that when the party makes a decision it claims that it is a 
decision made by ‘the people’ (as with the recall of Mbeki as president); 
and when it is suggested that the strength of the ruling party and the 
lack of a viable opposition party does not undermine democracy since 
‘the party’ structures are themselves fully democratic. These claims 
mistakenly identify ‘the party’ with ‘the people’ and thus ‘the state’, 
which not only gives the party the unique and complete legitimacy of 
rule that it seeks, but also silences all other groups and their repre-
sentatives. This is a deeply ironic and unfortunate development since 
in healthy polities the party acts as one of the many important groups 
and (sets of) representatives that occupy the gap between the rulers 
and the ruled. [35] At present in South Africa not only is the executive 
usurping the power of the legislature, but the ruling party is usurping 
the power of the people as it situates itself as a microcosm or exact copy 
of the democratic polity it ought to be creating: the party attempts to 
represent the people (in the sense of copying them) rather than act as 
one amongst many representative versions of the people for the people 
to judge and choose.
This tendency by the ANC to silence opposing groups and their 
representatives prior even to judgement by ‘the people’, is a perfect 
instance of erosion not only of particular freedoms in society, but also 
the freedoms of these silenced groups and thus the freedom of their 
members. The various groups that constitute South African society 
are represented in different ways, and have differing levels of power to 
35  Ankersmit, Political Representation, pp. 125-32.
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determine social and economic policy. The formal political representa-
tives and institutions would maintain and advance freedom not only 
by empowering those who lack power (which requires effective ‘service 
delivery’), but also enabling a polity in which the representatives of all 
groups are given equal access to those that rule, in particular to those 
that determine macro-economic policy.
This is very far from the case in South Africa. At least one third 
of the population is either unemployed or no longer economically 
active (either as a consequence of illness, age and disability or because 
they are discouraged workers). The number of South African’s unem-
ployed stands at 4.3 million, or a formal unemployment rate of 25.3%; 
the number of economically inactive workers stands at a staggering 
14.35 million (with actively discouraged work-seekers comprising just 
under 2 million of this total); so even if we only consider the actively 
discouraged work-seekers and the formally unemployed, we have a 
real unemployment rate of approximately 37% of the population. [36] If 
this percentage is combined with that proportion of the population 
that is involved in menial and underpaid jobs (quintiles two and three, 
see footnote below), most of whose representatives give them little or 
no meaningful means of criticising macro-economic decision-making 
since they fall under a set of trade unions whose umbrella body is in a 
ruling alliance with the ANC, and if we assume that the unemployed 
household heads occupy the lowest quintile, on a conservative esti-
mate a staggering ﬁ gure of 77% of South Africa’s population has little 
or no meaningful representation. [37] This large group is a relatively 
homogeneous group – in the apartheid era categorizations that are 
36  ‘Labour Force Survey 2009’ in Statistics South Africa Quarterly Labour Force Survey 
Quarter 2, 2010 at http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2010.
pdf .
37  There are ﬁ ve quintiles of household head income. The three lower quintiles include all 
those with an income of R30 000 ($4000) per annum or less; 72.5% of the ‘black’ popula-
tion, 44% of the ‘coloured’ population, 15% of the ‘indian’ population and 3% of the ‘white’ 
population are situated within these lowest three quintiles, so given the demographics 
of South Africa the lower three quintiles comprise 55% of the population earning a 
monetary income. The ﬁ gure of 77% is reached by adding together the real proportion 
of the population that is unemployed (37%) and the percentage of the population that is 
employed but occupy quintiles two and three (40%). Statistics South Africa .2009. Income 
and expenditure of households 2005/2006. http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0100/
P01002005.pdf .
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still in use today, it is the ‘black’, ‘coloured’ and ‘indian’ marginalized 
or working class group of South Africans. If this economic situation is 
coupled with the macro-political situation with regard to representation 
discussed above, it is beyond dispute to conclude that most groups in 
South Africa remain unfree as a direct result of their lack of meaning-
ful representation: either they have no agents, trustees, defenders of 
their identities/interests or varieties of possible images upon which to 
reﬂ ect or they have powerless representatives, whose powerlessness is 
a consequence of the persistence of domination within extant power 
relations or institutional arrangements that do not enable effective 
representation.
One of the ruling party’s responses to these problems regarding 
meaningful representation has been to try and enhance democratic 
participation of the citizenry at local government level. But this is not a 
response to the problem since it is based on the premise that the prob-
lem regarding national representative politics arises as a consequence 
of lack of citizen participation and is thus best resolvable via greater 
participation and deliberation at local level. As I have argued above, the 
problem is not about the degree or form of citizen political participation 
but about the way in which representation is being enacted in South 
Africa. Moreover, even if we were to assume for argument’s sake that the 
logic behind these initiatives is a good one, it amounts to nothing more 
than window-dressing. This is the case because although citizens are 
given some access to deliberation prior to decision-making, it is ward 
councillors who ultimately make the decisions behind closed doors 
and most have ﬁ rm party loyalty, not least of all because, in accord-
ance with the electoral system speciﬁ ed in the constitution, half of the 
councillors are instated through proportional representation, whilst 
the remaining half are ward constituent representatives. Therefore, 
as is the case at national level, councillors are not accountable to their 
constituencies but accountable to party leaders. [38]
This condition of little or no meaningful representation is unhealthy 
for any state, let alone a new, emerging democracy and nor does it bode 
38  Tapscott, ‘The Challenges of Building Participatory Government’, in Thompson (ed), 
Participatory Governance: Citizens and the State in South Africa (University of the Western 
Cape 2007), p. 87.
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well for the future: ‘Any system of representation will contain elements 
of these different models and how they interact with each other will go 
a long way to determining how the state evolves over time’. [39] The exact 
causes of the poor health of South Africa’s polity and economy may not 
be plain for all to see, but what is currently unambiguously clear is that 
large cracks are beginning to appear in the ruling alliance’s represen-
tation of ‘the people’. Ever since before the FIFA Football World Cup 
of June-July 2010, the country has been wracked by prolonged strikes 
and service delivery protests. The lucky few that have employment as 
well as those that are supposed to be reaping the beneﬁ ts of a party 
‘for the people’ in terms of the satisfaction of vital needs such as the 
provision of water, housing, electricity and so on are contesting the 
image that the ruling alliance has tried to conjure up of them. Outrage 
over years of jobless growth and very poor service delivery driven by 
corruption and incompetence is manifest and there is evidence that 
the three parts of the ruling alliance no longer portray the same uniﬁ ed 
image. The possible outcomes are revolution or a successful decoupling 
of the alliance and the institutionalisation of effective and meaning-
ful representation for all groups. [40] Needless to say, the latter choice 
would be better for all concerned. South Africa must change now the 
power relations that exist between groups, their representatives and 
the people’s formal political representatives; and in order to do that it 
has to transform not only its electoral system and the structure of its 
ruling party, but also its property ownership, distributive mechanisms 
and macro-economic policies. My main submission in this paper is 
that few will see this unless and until representative democracy is 
understood in terms not just of individual and state freedom and 
representation, but also of group freedom and group representation, 
linked together via an account of freedom as power, in particular the 
power of individuals and groups to determine their economies and 
polities via the relative power of their representatives.
39  Vieira and Runciman, Representation, pp. 143-4.
40  Cf. A. Mngxitama, ‘Tripartite Tussle? Get real, it’s just a game’, Mail & Guardian 
September 3 to 9 2010.
Democracy Today.indb   147 11-08-2012   20:05:54
Democracy Today.indb   148 11-08-2012   20:05:54
149
DEMOCRATIC COMPROMISE 
OR COMPROMISING 
DEMOCRACY: RETHINKING 
PARTICIPATION
Heidi Matisonn
DEMOCRATIC COMPROMISE OR COMPROMISING 
DEMOCRACY: RETHINKING PARTICIPATION
Heidi Matisonn
UKZN SOUTH AFRICA
DEMOCRACY HAS WON.  WHETHER IN THE FACE OF EXTERNAL FORCES OR INTERNAL 
PRESSURES, the label ‘democracy’ has become the ultimate legitimiser. 
A political regime is justiﬁ ed when it is ‘a democracy’; policies, laws 
and actions are acceptable when they are ‘democratic’.  As John Dryzek 
puts it ‘democracy is today a near-universal validating principle for 
political systems’ (Dryzek 2005: 218).  In practice, however, although 
professing to conform to the notion of democracy, these regimes, 
policies, laws and actions often differ substantially from one another. 
In theory too, interest in democracy is evident from the amount of 
scholarly attention given to and time spent on it, whether the attention 
is positive or critical.  Less evident are the normative justiﬁ cations for 
democracy today given the meritocratic and competitive global society 
(in other ways) in which we live.  With the exception of a select few, 
philosophers from the time of Plato have been very negative about 
‘democracy’, however conceived.  Even those who appear to have sup-
ported something resembling what we know as democracy did not do so 
unequivocally, with some, like Jean Jacques Rousseau, James Madison 
and Karl Marx, being unwilling to use the term itself.  Today, however, 
despite there being signiﬁ cant disagreement as to what democracy’s 
value is, there seems to be widespread agreement that it does have 
a value.  But while vastly differing political regimes throughout the 
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world claim to be democracies – what democracy actually means in 
practice is sometimes quite difﬁ cult to discern. It is all very well for Ian 
Shapiro to claim that ‘different people understand different things by 
democracy’ (Shapiro 2003: 3) but surely the term cannot extend from 
the very narrow - majority rule – to the very broad - encompassing all 
that is humanly good?  Leaving the empirical questions aside for the 
moment, in the theoretical debates too, there is signiﬁ cant divergence: 
as Larry Diamond noted a decade ago, ‘so serious is the conceptual 
disarray that more than ﬁ ve hundred and ﬁ fty subtypes of democracy 
are identiﬁ ed in Collier and Levitsky’s review of one hundred and ﬁ fty 
(mostly recent) studies’ (Diamond and Plattner 1996: 20).  
The lack of consensus around the meaning of democracy has 
created signiﬁ cant problems such that some have alluded to a ‘crisis’ 
in modern political science (Ricci 1984: 297; Held 1987: 272).  David 
Ricci, in The Tragedy of Political Science (1984) suggests that the conﬂ ict 
between the commitment to science and the commitment to the good is 
responsible for this crisis: that is, that research is driven by empirical 
(speciﬁ cally quantitative) concerns on the one hand and by normative 
concerns on the other and the two seldom meet. What is somewhat 
curious about this divergence is that when political science began to 
emerge as a modern academic discipline in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, classical political theory had a great impact: 
political philosophy began with moral reﬂ ections on and attempts to 
justify political structures in the context of established cultural, social, 
economic and historical considerations. The concern with political 
ideals and duties was accompanied by a preoccupation with ascer-
taining which political institutions produce the optimum – usually 
in the normative sense – type of society and individuals.  Evidence of 
this can be seen in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau among others. Today however, political science 
is concerned with that which is empirically manageable; and because 
concepts such as justice, nation, rights, patriotism, society, virtue and 
tyranny cannot be operationalised, they are devalued, studied only by 
an ‘insightful minority’ who 
remain faithful to the conversation concerned with the good life, wisdom, 
genuine human needs, illuminated by the intelligence derived from a study 
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of history and rewarded by an appreciation of the political verities to be 
found in the good or great books (Riemer 1962: 69). 
Thus more than twenty years on, Ricci’s observation holds true: 
he argues that the ‘critical, normatively charged questions about 
the foundations of politics and democracy’ have been relegated to 
political philosophy, replaced, ‘in the brave new world of mass data 
and policy analysis, by bloodless technical concepts like “attitude”, 
“cognition”, “socialisation” and “system”’ (Ricci 1984: 297).   This 
means that those scholars concerned with the concept of democ-
racy and its relation to other concepts such as liberty, truth, justice 
and equality, tend not to be the same people who have expertise in 
political institutions.  
The result of this ‘sitting at separate tables, like Rattigan’s actors’ 
(Almond 1988: 828) has meant that ‘democracy’ is treated either as 
a strangely scientiﬁ c matter on the one hand or as an abstract and 
idealised notion on the other.  Empirical positivists are moving from 
an assumption of democracy as the hegemonic model of (acceptable) 
political systems while normative idealists construct democracy in 
relation to certain key values so this separation is somewhat under-
standable.  That said, its consequences for current conceptions of 
‘democracy’ are signiﬁ cant.  Many contemporary contributions of 
‘political scientists’ seem to be offering a ‘blueprint’ for achieving 
accountable and legitimate government, whether it is more democracy 
or less.  Alternatively, ‘political philosophers’ seem to be caught up 
in naïve abstraction, detached from the reality of actual politics.  For 
example, Simon Thompson and Paul Hoggett suggest that much of 
the literature (speciﬁ cally on deliberative democracy) exists ‘at such 
a high level of abstraction’ that it seems ‘quite unaware’ of the many 
empirical issues that actually characterise contemporary democra-
cies (Thompson and Hoggett 2001: 354).  As such, the importance of 
treating the study of democracy in an engaged and concrete manner 
has been all but lost.  
The implications of the separation of political philosophy and 
political science are not simply a matter of methodology: what is at 
stake is what democracy means in substantive terms as the second 
part of this paper aims to show.  So just how should we treat the study 
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of democracy?  I suggest that the twains of political philosophy and 
political science need to (re)meet.  Alone, neither normative political 
philosophy nor empirical political science can succeed because both 
approaches make a series of assumptions about the nature of politics. 
While we should not pursue morally desirable but culturally or socially 
unacceptable goals, we should also not uphold a morally undesirable 
political conception solely because it is acceptable (and achievable). 
The methodological bifurcation in the study of democracy has been 
to its detriment since each version grasps only partially the central 
feature of democracy, namely participation.  
Although both the (pseudo-)scientiﬁ c and normative approaches 
recognise political equality and popular control as democracy’s funda-
mental characteristics, neither seems to tell the full or indeed accurate 
picture of democracy today. Of course, not all scholars of democracy 
are trying to provide the full or accurate picture of democracy today: 
some (particularly the deliberative democrats) offer purely normative 
arguments as to what they think democracy ought to be or become.  I 
think that both sides neglect another value of participation, perhaps 
even the primary one: that democracy provides the opportunity for 
facilitating human fulﬁ llment irrespective of its beneﬁ ts for creating 
legitimate, accountable and responsive government [1].
That is ultimately my task: to posit another value of participation, 
what I term its ‘categorical’ value, or the justiﬁ cation of participation 
on moral grounds rather than (purely) political ones.  This conception 
of participation is not meant to replace the instrumentalist concep-
tions but rather, signal a shift in emphasis.  I want to argue that both 
minimalist and deliberative accounts of democracy neglect the value 
of participation as being about the development of agency in a collec-
tive process.  I think that the accounts by minimalists and deliberative 
democrats are actually much more similar than either side recognises. 
The essential difference between them is simply a practical one: they 
offer opposing conceptions of what constitutes ‘equal participation’.  In 
essence, minimalist democrats argue that voting is the most egalitar-
ian form of participation, whereas deliberative (and other normative) 
1  Supposedly achieved through simple aggregation (minimalist democrats) or extensive 
deliberation (deliberative democrats).
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accounts of democracy suggest that voting is meaningless if it is not 
accompanied by deliberation.  Participation is thus justiﬁ ed primarily 
on its instrumental beneﬁ ts: it brings about better governments and 
better decisions. 
This is because even if we disregard for the moment, the differ-
ence between minimalists, for whom voting plays the crucial role, and 
deliberative democrats, who argue that while its signiﬁ cance cannot 
be denied, it should not be overstated, it seems that for both sides, 
the decisive test of a democracy is participation, and participation 
that is egalitarian.  I reject the common argument that the divergence 
between the two in terms of what constitutes egalitarian participa-
tion is because one is pessimistic about citizens’ capacity while the 
other is optimistic: there is enough evidence to suggest that the basis 
for limiting participation by minimalist democrats is not necessar-
ily due to a suspicion of the competence of the masses; conversely, 
many deliberative democrats seem to accept the unﬂ attering picture 
of citizens’ capabilities (and/or their democratic tendencies).  Even if 
this supposed disagreement on people’s capabilities is at the centre of 
the two conceptions, ﬁ nding ways to ‘prove’ either generalisation of 
people’s competence is methodologically difﬁ cult and even if we can 
ﬁ nd a way, the evidence will be subject to ﬂ uctuations across space 
and time.  It seems much more reasonable to regard the minimalist 
versus deliberative accounts as being two different ways of interpret-
ing political equality rather than two different conceptions of human-
ity’s ‘goodness’.  In other words, the division between minimalist 
and deliberative democrats appears to be less about the quality of 
citizens themselves and more about the optimum institutional design 
to ensure equality. For minimalists, voting is less unequal than other 
forms of participation; for deliberative democrats, voting that is not 
preceded by deliberation is ﬂ awed.
It would appear then, on both minimalist and deliberative account, 
the objective of democratic politics is one of inﬂ uencing decision-making 
with the aim of securing one’s interests.  In other words, participation, 
whether more or less, is valued because it is viewed as the optimum 
means of achieving good government whether this is deﬁ ned as legiti-
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mate [2] government; accountable [3] government, efﬁ cient [4] government 
or a government able to solve conﬂ icts without resorting to violence [5]. 
While there is little doubt that these beneﬁ ts are both desirable and 
(sometimes) achievable, in the event that participation fails to bring 
about good government, what then? 
It is in response to this ‘what then?’ that I propose we shift our con-
ception of participation away from seeing it as a mechanism (whether 
think or thin) for the governed to select and control the governors 
(and hence to produce legitimacy, responsiveness and accountability). 
Instead, I want to consider the value of participation as being categori-
cal, a conception in which the citizen is considered as a moral entity 
rather than one that is purely political. 
Although the use of the term ‘categorical’ in this context is (I 
think) original (and hence its moral rather than political dimension), 
the idea of democracy as having ‘intrinsic’ value (Swift 2006: 203-213) 
or ‘non-instrumental’ value (Ober 2007) is not.  Adam Swift discusses 
three ‘intrinsic’ values of democracy, all of which are linked to politi-
cal participation: 1) autonomy; 2) self-realisation; and 3) equality but 
interesingly, he considers the ‘intellectual and moral development of 
citizens’ (Swift 2006: 218) under the ‘instrumental’ beneﬁ ts of democracy 
(along with ‘good or correct decisions’ and ‘perceived legitimacy’). Swift 
argues non-democratic systems are thus ‘infantilising’ because they 
‘deprive adults of the chance to develop their intellectual and moral 
powers’ (Swift 2006: 218).  
2  Since a legitimate government is one that is recognised by others as having the right to 
govern, it stands to reason that if the majority of ‘others’, that is, the citizens, has chosen 
that government, they recognise this right.
3  In a functioning democracy, the threat of being voted out is usually sufﬁ cient to ensure 
at least a degree of accountable and responsive government: as Thomas Pempel explains, 
‘democracy is predicated on the ability to throw the rascals out’ (1990: 7).
4  A la Condorcet who argued that as the number of people participating in a decision 
increases, so too does the probability that the majority decision is correct.  Of course the 
theorem only holds if we assume that each voter is more likely to vote correctly than not. Be 
that as it may, this is often the argument used in supporting broad-based participation.
5  Because of the pluralist nature of most democracies, there is often no powerful decision-
making centre: because there is a balance of resources obtained through an overlapping 
membership between factions, no single group can achieve a permanent majority and 
hence marginalise other groups ad inﬁ nitum. Instead of resorting to violence, groups 
wanting to advance their interests have only to wait for the next election to do so.
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But Swift has fallen into a trap: although he speaks of ‘personal 
development’ as being an instrumental beneﬁ t, he then explains it 
terms of an intrinsic one, albeit using the term ‘outcomes’.  The ‘out-
come’ of moral and intellectual development is instrumental in terms 
of its effect on decision-making (and hence on the quality of those 
selected to rule): the moral development is that through participation 
(and hearing the views of others) citizens will be less selﬁ sh and the 
intellectual development is that citizens will be ‘better at gathering and 
assessing information’ (Swift 2006: 218).  In other words, participa-
tion is still (primarily) linked to its ability to produce better decisions 
rather than to its effect on citizens’ self-realisation.  Thus while Swift 
acknowledges that participation ‘acts over time to change people for 
the better’ (Swift 2006: 219) he suggests, somewhat strangely, that 
someone who took part in politics only for self-development ‘wouldn’t 
be seriously engaging with the arguments of others, or responsibly 
exercising her agency as a member of her political community’ (Swift 
2006: 219).  But surely this is in fact what we mean by participation 
– or at least, what we ought to mean if we are going to argue that par-
ticipation has intrinsic value, that is, is a requirement of being fully 
human?  If we do not mean this, then any kind of participation must 
be seen as contributing to self-realisation: participation in vigilante 
groups, separatist movements and organisations that discriminate 
on the basis of race, gender, nationality and so on would also qualify 
as an essential part of human ﬂ ourishing. The point is that any deﬁ ni-
tion of participation must include meaningful engagement with others 
where ‘meaningful’ necessarily entails certain conditions: we must 
engage with those with whom we disagree, substantive debate and/
or action on collective political issues must occur under conditions of 
freedom and equality and participation must conform to the rule of 
law.  These conditions are required if engagement is to contribute to 
moral self-development [6].  
6  In previous work I have argued that ‘participatory’ responses to crime in South Africa 
(in other words, non-state policing) can be categorised either as ‘responsible citizen 
responses’ or ‘autonomous citizen responses’.  The former is where citizens seek to ﬁ nd 
solutions to crime and security concerns that are within the ambit of the law; the latter 
are generally characterised by reactive, ad hoc and often violent methods of control. 
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Josiah Ober’s account of democracy as a ‘non-instrumental good-
in-itself’ (2007: 59) is, in essence, a claim that ‘association in decision is 
necessary (although insufﬁ cient) for happiness’ (Ober 2007: 59) where 
happiness is interpreted in the sense of Aristotle’s ‘eudaimonia’.  Ober 
sees participation as being a good-in-itself that is ‘both inherently hap-
piness-producing and necessary to our full happiness’ (Ober 2007: 60). 
This is linked to the Aristotelian premise that we are political animals and 
thus have a ‘natural capacity’ for participation (or ‘association in decision’ 
as Aristotle calls it).  Ober claims that we have a ‘moral responsibility’ 
(Ober 2007: 73) to encourage the expression of this natural capacity 
(while simultaneously acknowledging possible unintended – and ‘bad’ 
– consequences of allowing every natural capacity of every ‘being-kind’ 
to be expressed).  We therefore do not value democracy as substantive 
participation because of its ‘self-realisation’ effects (even though it may 
have these) but because it is part of our duty as citizens: a commitment 
to democracy means a commitment to participating in decision-making 
that affects our collective futures.
I think Ober is on to something here, implicit in his reference to 
moral duty. In the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, there is some-
thing ‘moral’, or worthy of admiration about a person who does her duty 
for no other reason than that it is her duty.  The difference between the 
moral and immoral person is not that one is good and the other bad, 
it is that one does what is right whether it will bring her happiness or 
not, while the other is concerned only with her welfare.
In order to be good, or moral, one must possess a good will.  But a 
good will does not, according to Kant, derive its goodness from being 
directed to the achievement of intelligence, courage or wealth, for these 
things are good only when directed by a will that is already good.  Kant’s 
belief in equality is evident in his claim that every human capable of 
rational thought is capable of developing a good will.  The ideal state 
to which he aspires – the ‘Kingdom of Ends’ – is one in which free, 
rational agents achieve autonomy, or self-rule, simultaneously living 
the life of ruler and subject [7].  
Regulated citizen responses therefore signal the conditions of meaningful engagement 
considered here whereas autonomous, unregulated responses do not.
7  What is critical to understand is that in the Kingdom of Ends, one is subject only to 
laws and rules which one has derived through pure reason.  As for Rousseau, being a 
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For Kant, the source of value is ‘humanity’, or free, rational, agency. 
He argues that we should recognise that others also possess humanity, 
and as such we ought to respect it in everyone equally.  And if we do so, 
we will realise that autonomy is not simply a case of ‘achieving one’s 
own selﬁ sh ends’ but rather, a state in which it is agreed that all ends 
are equally valid and as such, one ought not be swayed by the special 
circumstances of particular cases, (especially one’s own).  Fulﬁ lling the 
criterion of universality and the recognition of humanity in ourselves 
and in others is the only way of achieving a ‘good will’, the possession 
of which is the true test of morality.  
While democrats are unlikely to be committed to a Kantian position 
in moral philosophy, given that Kant himself was not a democrat, any-
one who respects Kant’s supreme principle of morality, the autonomy 
of the will, will ﬁ nd democracy intrinsically valuable.  Autonomy is 
not a consequence of democracy; it does not arise after or because of 
democracy.  In it, as in no other system of government, this principle 
is clearly and fully embodied because participation, the direction and 
control of agents from within, is moral autonomy.  And while it may not 
be sufﬁ cient, it is necessary for the most praiseworthy conduct.  If the 
rules governing individuals do not arise from our own participation, 
but are imposed from without or by some despotic element within, the 
moral character of the individual suffers, even if the decisions imposed 
are good ones.  If however we see democracy as being synonymous with 
autonomy, that is, the expression of self-government as a moral ideal, 
we may begin to understand that the value of participation is categori-
cal, it is worthy of being prized for its own sake, and not because of the 
government or system it gives rise to.  If we acknowledge that autonomy, 
rationality and indeed morality are accessible (only, or at least largely) 
through interaction between citizens, we ﬁ nd value in such interac-
tion irrespective of whether it brings about ‘good government’.  Put 
differently, ‘the human results that accrue through the participatory 
process provide an important justiﬁ cation for a participatory system’ 
(Pateman 1970: 25).
subject is not a limit to or constraint on one’s freedom or autonomy, but an expression of 
it because a participant in the Kingdom of Ends is someone who ‘legislates in it universal 
laws while also being themselves subject to such laws’ (Kant 1785: 433ff).
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I have used Carole Pateman’s comment intentionally because I 
think that the value of the participatory conceptions of democracy 
offered by Pateman et al in the 1970s is where we should be looking 
if we are to understand the categorical value of participation.  I think 
that deliberative democrats are not the natural successors of partici-
patory democrats as many of them claim because the vision of this 
new cohort of democratic theorists stops ‘well short of the sweeping 
changes participatory theorists believed must be part of the process 
of democratisation’ (Hauptmann 2001: 398).
Part of the reason why real interest in participatory democracy was 
relatively short-lived is I think because participatory theorists in the 
main were offering critiques of actually existing democracy, but their 
accounts were not always backed up with empirical evidence.  Mark 
Warren for example argues that ‘although the transformative ideals 
of radical democracy are attractive for many reasons, they are beset 
by a fuzzy utopianism that fails to confront limitations of complexity, 
size and scale of advanced industrial societies’ (Warren 1996: 242).  I 
think that advances in our abilities to conduct research mean that 
we can revisit participatory democracy and back it up with research. 
And I want to suggest that the place to start is not in the north, or 
west, but in the developing world because it is here where we ﬁ nd a 
lot of this kind of talk – especially Latin America but in South Africa 
too. Participatory theorists focus not only, and not even mainly, on 
the impact participation has on political decisions, but rather, on the 
impact it has on citizens themselves. Although as Jane Mansbridge 
explains, participation can generate ‘greater feelings of political efﬁ cacy 
and ultimately beneﬁ t the larger society by anchoring it in a citizenry 
clearer about its interests and responsive to the claims of justice and the 
public weal’ (Mansbridge 1997: 424), it is the claim that less participant 
citizens have a reduced capacity to develop their faculties through join-
ing with others that provides support for the claim that participation 
has a categorical value in addition to its instrumental one. 
So my ﬁ nal point is this: as political philosophers, we need to 
incorporate the reality of our complex world into our theories if we are 
to make any meaningful contribution to democracy.  And I think we 
need to start with a re-evaluation of participation, one which takes seri-
ously the participatory theories that grew out of the 1960s considering 
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them in and for the twenty-ﬁ rst century. In so doing, we may be closer 
to a conception of democratic participation that does not compromise 
democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Revisiting the Think Piece
WRITING IN 2005 AT THE REQUEST OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN AFRICA (CODESRIA), for a special issue of their 
Bulletin dedicated to the African woman and, which was to mark 20 
years of development or is it non-progress in gender related questions, 
many issues, termed feminist issues, struck me as completely lacking a 
social base. Quite a sweeping statement, one would argue. Nonetheless, 
my view was that the missing social base is in the sense that it was a 
struggle by a few for many who did not recognize with the resistance, 
and if they did, saw the agenda as speaking out of context. Taking stock, 
as I termed my introductory paragraph in the think piece, looked at 
the incremental gains that the women’s movement had achieved so 
far. My analysis then was based on the well researched and highly 
provocative United Nation Research in Development (UNRISD) 2005 
Report [1]. Some of the achievements that the report identiﬁ ed were 
as follows: In the educational sector. The write-up made mention of 
the increased number of girl-children and their move from primary 
1  Gender equality: striving for justice in an unequal world. UNRISD 2005, http://www.
unrisd.org/publication/html
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level education on to tertiary educational levels. Remarkable was 
the increased number of females taking on science related subjects, 
changes in curriculum, especially at tertiary levels to include feminist 
epistemologies and the embrace of gender sensitive issues by many 
who were hither-forth gender blind. The report further pointed out 
the gains made in the health sector singling out some of the successful 
reproductive rights campaigns on to the increased access, by women, 
to crucial health care systems. 
The treatise acknowledged that despite the entry of many women 
in the economic sector, the continued informalization of the market and 
the non-recognition of women’s contribution to this critical sector had 
served not to lessen the burden of poverty but rather to accelerate its 
vicious cycle. Such a dismal gain was also noted in yet another critical 
arena in society and that is the political sphere. The report recognized 
that despite an increased number of women in critical political eco-
nomic positions, no meaningful gains have been realized. It is on these 
identiﬁ ed lacunae that my contributions rested. Here in, I singled out 
the participation or continued non-participation of young women in 
critical social-economic and political spheres with examples drawn 
from the Kenyan context.
Contextualisation:  
Analysing the changing African Demographic Make-up
The African environment is currently facing what is deﬁ ned as an 
intergenerational shift. This, in demographic terms, is basically deﬁ ned 
as a demographic transition brought about by a population change 
whereby the age structures of especially the labour force experiences a 
change either because of a low or a high fertility rate (Hirschman 1994, 
Lucas 1994). For example, The United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa-UNECA (2001) report discusses the state of Africa’s popula-
tion and asserts that because of the high fertility rate coupled to low 
infant mortality rates due to better and accessible health care systems, 
Africa’s population is changing to comprise of a more youthful popula-
tion (UNECA 2001:4). Socially, economically and politically, it neces-
sarily means that a different generational age-set takes up positions of 
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inﬂ uence and begins to map out societal changes. Nonetheless, how 
they do this and with which hypothesised consequences is a question 
that still warrants scientiﬁ c inquiry. 
It is with this question in mind that this paper tasks itself. The 
point of departure is that society has several spheres of inﬂ uence. 
Without relegating the other spheres dismal positions, of importance 
are the governance and economic spheres. For the purposes of the 
issue at hand, the governance sphere takes centre stage. The main 
line of questioning is: with the coming of age of a new generation, 
especially young African women, to take up positions of inﬂ uence at 
the public domain and thereby contributing to governance issues of 
the day, which new institutional forms are necessary? Importantly 
which are the old institutional forms of legitimacy that act as structures 
of exclusion and which need to be transformed to accommodate this 
emerging category? 
Forms of Social Exclusion
Cultural legitimacy – of marriage, motherhood and seniority
Analysis of predominant forms of African social structures abound [2].. 
For women, three institutions cut across and necessarily marked entry 
into society and thereby accorded women access to entitlements and a 
voice in society. These are institutions of cultural legitimacy that can be 
broadly categorised as marriage, motherhood and seniority. However, 
with the advent of the demographic transition several signiﬁ cant shifts, 
which can be attributed to certain predetermining conditions, can be 
witnessed. Population analysis show that, not only are we witnessing 
a bulge in the category of single unmarried women or delayed mar-
riages (UNECA 2001: 32-38) at the socio-economic level we are also 
witnessing an increase in young women who are engaged in both 
the formal and the informal labour markets (Achieng’ 2004). Again, 
studies in demography provide us with an interesting insight into the 
2  An up-to-date bibliographic reference on the social structures of the different com-
munities in Africa and who consider themselves African is availed by different paper 
authors featured in the CODESRIA Bulletin, Special Issue: The African Woman, Nos. 
1&2, 2006
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types of life and career choices that this newly emerging category of 
young women [3] pursues. Of importance is the institutional change 
that is heralded with this demographic shift. Not only are the cultural 
institutions of legitimacy absconded as new forms of rules and regula-
tions negotiated, but also a new kind of assertiveness among young 
women is being witnessed. Young African women are more aware of 
their femininity and in doing this project a new kind of consciousness 
which hinges on a slight modiﬁ cation of what I have conceptualised 
in an earlier article (Achieng’ 2006) as the three C’s, that is, Capacity, 
Capability and Cooperation. In short, their new consciousness capi-
talises on the power within [4] – translated as these 3 C’s. 
Nonetheless, an analysis of the 3 C’s that young African women 
exhibit necessarily means that ﬁ rst and foremost, we have to analyse 
the paths to power that young African women have to negotiate with. 
Secondly, an analysis of how these paths to power coupled to the 
cultural legitimacy become the persisting forms of exclusion is called 
for. Lastly, how, amidst these contravening processes, young African 
women are able to negotiate forms of inclusion albeit on the periphery 
through the exercise of the 3 C’s , forms further analytic interest.
Further Forms of Social Exclusion: Paths to Power
Studies on power [5] demonstrate that society is constituted on a power 
maze principally known as the power web. Certain prerequisites 
underscore an understanding of this power web.  Of importance are:
the rules of entry i.e. who is allowed in, under what conditions and i. 
why. Here the line of inquiry is what capabilities do they bring with 
3   CODESRIA has carried out a number of initial research inquiries into this demographic 
shifts. For an analysis see the reports of the Child and Youth Studies Institute 2004 that 
focused on Children and Youth in the labour market and a conference on Youth in the 
Global South held in 2006. For a current analysis on the youth bulge see documents 
available from the Child, Youth and Family Studies Programme of the Human Science 
Research Council. 
4  See select bibliography for reference that informed this point 
5  See select bibliography for reference that informed this point
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them and how does it ﬁ t to the established power web/disrupt the 
power web
an understanding of shifting power boundaries where of necessity is ii. 
a comprehension of who the guardians and opinion makers are. In 
short understanding the shakers, breakers and makers.
in further understanding the power boundaries a comprehension iii. 
of the role of mentors/protectors is crucial as points of reference in 
negotiating entry
the communicative practice and the rules of engagement i.e the secret iv. 
codes of behaviour, language and conduct
an acknowledgement of the ‘invisible hand of power’ and thereby v. 
strategically positioning oneself in order to access this power
These paths to power have worked to the contrary in allowing 
young African women critical access and thus enabling them partake 
fully in governance issues of the day. Despite these persistent forms of 
social exclusion, young African women using their agency show inge-
nuity in negotiating new institutional forms and have thus created for 
themselves transformative spaces, or new forms on social inclusion, 
albeit on the periphery.  These are:
A.   Capacity Development – 
 Enhancement of Individual Endowments 
The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD) report [6] pinpoints to many of the gains that women and 
especially young women have accomplished.. The report demonstrates 
that young African women have made great leaps in following career 
choices that were previously reserved for men only. Not only have 
they excelled in these ﬁ elds, but they are also projecting a new kind of 
professionalism that signiﬁ cantly departs from the ‘old boys club’ rites 
of passage and rules of engagement. Despite these individual endow-
ments, dismayingly, young women face new structural discrepancies 
which they are either unaware of or are ill-equipped to challenge. 
6  See http://www.unrisd.org/publications
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This is partly due to their continued lack of engagement in critical 
issues and partly because of the restrictions imposed on their agency 
to act otherwise. The latter arises through being cut off by their ‘older’ 
counterparts, the continued denial or diminishing of their voices in 
a society that refuses to acknowledge this new category with rules of 
engagement that depart from the status quo, their lack of transforma-
tive alliances/lack of alliances. Again, a glaring example is the public 
sphere (here taken to mean the political space in society). In countries 
such as Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’ivoire where we 
have young men congregating in the public space, vying for posts and 
representing their communities in various capacities, we hardly wit-
ness women in the same age group engaged in similar political actions. 
An analysis provided by African Woman and Child Features (AWC 
Features 2004) shows the hard road faced by women seeking entry 
into the public sphere. Two articles in a recently realised publication 
on Kenya: the struggle for democracy (2007) clearly illustrate the dou-
ble edged sword women have to contemplate with when engaged in 
governance issues (Nasong’o and Ayot 2007:164 – 196) not to mention 
the social boundaries erected to keep young people out of govern-
ance issues at the pretence that they have not come to age (Mwangola 
2007:129 – 163). The constitution making process in Kenya is telling in 
this regard. Young Kenyan women constituted a univocal ‘yes’ to the 
adaptation of the new constitution and some of its guiding principles, 
which spoke to issues of social justice, social economic development 
and equity in political participation. However, certain political and 
church led groups reduced their (young women’s) agenda of seeking 
social redress through support of a new constitution that better spoke 
to the changing social-economic and political order, to a reproductive 
rights debate and demonized  the ‘yes’ agenda for pursuing calls for 
abortion, increase in the use of contraceptives and rights to ones own 
body (divorce, pursuing justice in the case of rape or knowledgeable 
infection by HIV/AIDs positive other i.e. criminalisation of deliberate 
infection). Such that, the dilemma that is being dealt with is: one the one 
hand, an emerging category of young African women with individual 
endowments and enhanced individual capacities but societal structures 
that have refused to allow them entry. The question therefore is, are 
there other windows of opportunity for these young African women 
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and how have they capitalised/should they capitalise on this in order 
to create further rooms for manoeuvre for themselves?
B.   Cooperation 
 i.   Strategic positioning – a paradigmatic shift from wrestling the 
phallus to exploring cooperation with pro-feminist men
With certitude young African women cannot go it alone. There is need 
for cooperation at several fronts. These can be conceptualised as the 
formation of transformative alliances. A strategic positioning has to 
be envisaged whereby young women have to be aware of hegemonic 
masculine structures. Sadly, these are being perpetuated not only by 
men but more so by women themselves (see Tamale 1999 and Sall 
2000 for an analysis of such structures in the public sphere and in 
the academy respectively). In my opinion, a paradigmatic shift has 
to occur. This, I envisage as a shift from wrestling the phallus (which 
earlier generation feminists had embraced) to exploring opportunities 
of transformative alliances being offered by especially pro-feminist 
men and who are taking over positions of inﬂ uence in the governance 
structures. Already some female networks – for example FEMNET [7] 
are working with ‘Men to Men’ agendas. Nevertheless, this cooperation 
and alliance does not mean that women are not better placed to address 
structures that oppress them and bring about signiﬁ cant changes. It 
rather means the negotiation with men about changing structures 
that perpetuate inequalities. It is here that indeed power within has 
to be exercised. Thus, the communicative practice becomes of major 
importance. This means being aware of the secret codes of behaviour, 
the use of language and conduct that exhibits a certain kind of stance 
and that pushes forward a transformative agenda and which contributes 
to a positive change in governance and policy issues. Conceptually, it 
culminates to exercising women’s agency through appealing to social 
relations in a gendered manner.
7  FEMNET is the acronym of African Women’s Development and Communications 
Network
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ii.   Trans-local Networking among Female Movements at  
various levels
Global geopolitics, especially women mobilising at the international 
level has had positive effects on the course of women’s regional net-
working (Tripp 2003, Mbilinyi 2006: 46 - 48). Incremental gains can be 
recounted: from government’s relaxing some of the coercive means of 
governance to a renewed interest in bringing the state back in on devel-
opmental and governance issues and holding it accountable through 
global and regional checks. Notable among these global and regional 
checks are social movements, UN bodies and the recently enacted 
International Criminal Court.  Due to their nature of formation, social 
movements manifest a more communal spirit, participatory democracy, 
mutual support and networking. Above all, they offer new visions of 
society (Mamdani, Mkandawire and Wamba dia Wamba 1988). For 
young women, these different forms of socially embedded movements 
offer avenues for self-organisation and arenas for interaction, discus-
sion and information sharing on critical social and political issues. 
Increasingly, young women are forming professional groups which 
are linked in one way or another to the enterprise of society.  They (the 
young women) not only meet their peers in such groups but are often 
accorded opportunities for mentorship by other feminist women hold-
ing positions of inﬂ uence and who have deﬁ ned themselves as agents 
of a transformative agenda (Mbilinyi 2006:46 – 48). 
However, I am of the opinion that young women have not yet fully 
capitalised on the opportunities offered by trans-local networking. This, 
as earlier explored, is either because governance issues and agendas 
that could form the basis for inter-linkages are still poorly deﬁ ned. 
This could be due to different factors, for example, either being over-
whelmed by information, not having the correct information/having no 
information that could enlighten the basis of analysis of major issues. 
This leaves young women isolated and forces them to trend the ‘known 
paths’ before branching off by which time many of the issues are passé 
and devoid of their (young women) points of views. It seems to me that 
men have developed better coping mechanisms in this regard, which 
help them quickly sieve through information, get correct information 
and thus stay abreast of governance issues, thereby being competitive 
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in offering up-beat, timely decisions that serve to push forward their 
agendas.  Indeed, the issue of dissemination of critical information in 
a timely manner is crucial. The task however is of ﬁ rst deﬁ ning those 
common agendas of interest for the different groups seeking to network 
trans-locally and there-after remaining vigilant in translating these 
agendas accordingly across time and space. This I conceptualise as 
the oscillation of agendas in the articulation of voice, a matter I will 
now turn to in the next section.
C.   Capabilities 
i.  articulation of transformative voices through the 
inter-linkage of  agendas at different levels
As already touched upon in the foregoing paragraph, how one articu-
lates issues (exercising a transformative voice) is of crucial importance 
in how young African women engage governance issues. Here the 
critical point is a thorough knowledge of the modes of articulation. 
This means being informed of what the agenda is (both overtly and 
inertly), knowing how to speak to these different agendas and with 
whom to speak. I will provide an example: At a workshop on Muslim 
women negotiating development [8] a whither rights debate ensued. The 
critical question was: whereas at an international level a discourse of 
rights is the buzz-word, can we comfortably claim the same of local 
contexts? In critically analysing women’s life worlds and their lived 
experiences and especially young women’s everyday experiences, 
can one argue on the basis of a rights discourse? Indeed, the tension 
that still exists in African environments is this in-between position, 
that is, between tradition and modernity. The issue then is how one 
does negotiate (articulate a transformative voice) with this in-between 
position in mind?
First and foremost, as already discussed, young women have 
to recognise their endowments and achievements and appreciate 
their competencies and abilities as individuals. With this comes an 
8  The workshop was titled, Negotiating Development: Trans-local Gendered Spaces in 
Muslim Societies, 13 – 15 October 2005, University of Bielefeld, Germany
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assertiveness and a consciousness that goes a long way into changing 
some of the taken for granted cultural assumptions and goes along 
way into changing the order from that of purely cultural legitimacy 
to a recognition of achievements, competencies and abilities as a basis 
for entitlement. Thereafter, young women have to be vigilant enough 
not to take for granted agendas being articulated at different fronts 
and applying this unquestioningly in their various environments. 
A critical and questioning stance has to be adopted with the aim of 
ensuring that an oscillation of agendas through its translation into 
different contexts occurs. For example, agendas being propounded at 
the international level could be distilled and translated into different 
African contexts, not with an aim of adopting them unquestioningly 
but rather with the objective of using these as mirrors into further 
reﬂ ecting on the context speciﬁ c changes and the new modes of 
action required. The reverse could hold, whereby the context speciﬁ c 
agendas are refracted on to the international scene with the aim of 
gauging whether changes occurring at the international level neces-
sitate different ways of conceptualisation and modes of action when 
translated in speciﬁ c contexts.
ii.   Strategic use of places as spaces for critical reﬂ ection
From the aforementioned discussions, one cannot but appreciate the 
constant need for critical reﬂ ection. In an earlier article Achieng (2006: 
72), I explicated how the religious space is now being transformed 
into a political space. The church has acquired the quality of a public 
space where pertinent political issues are exposed, debated upon and 
concerted efforts at changing the prevailing order engaged in. For 
young women, more secularized places are sought for. For example, 
the work-place is increasingly being transformed as a space for critical 
reﬂ ection and information sharing on emerging governance issues. 
Increasingly, recreational centres and public forums have become 
spaces for an engagement in debates and critical reﬂ ection. This phe-
nomenon is mostly found in the urban centres where pubs, cinema 
halls, recreational parks and youth sports clubs provide spaces for 
critical engagement on issues of governance. 
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One cannot ignore here the proliferation of the radio and televi-
sion series and of course the music arena as some of the spaces being 
used by young people to express their voices. From the music arena, 
we see a move from classical love songs to political songs from the eyes 
of young people castigating some of the ‘wrongs’ society is unleash-
ing on its young generation. Young women have not been left behind 
in expressing transformative agendas through their use of voice. An 
analysis of music generated by young women show a certain political 
consciousness, whereby structures of oppression are exposed and 
remedial governance measures appealed to. Again, in an earlier article 
(Achieng 2005) I discussed at length the accelerated use of radio as 
space where critical voice is increasingly being exercised.
The internet has become a common phenomenon in most African 
cities and town centres. Although this means of communication is still 
being used as a way of keeping in touch with friends, some groups of 
young people are exploiting this means as a way of keeping abreast 
governance issues. The controversial elections in Kenya in 2007 and the 
violent aftermath that followed in its wake and that left many people 
displaced and returned them to a state of destitution is clearly a case 
in point.  Blogs were set up that allowed public opinion on governance 
issues of the day to be critically debated upon. Worth mentioning is the 
current page ‘Mzalendo’ meaning Citizen, which is being run by two 
young people. This Blog not only informs on pertinent issues but also 
offers space for critical discussion among young people (women and 
men alike). Indeed, the role of the media in building a consciousness 
on governance issues especially among young African women cannot 
be underestimated. 
Despite all these forms of trials at social inclusion, young women 
still face animosity at various levels. The question that begs further 
research analysis is: Do young African women’s agendas lack a social 
base? Are young women living in contexts which are still traditional 
and conservative, meanwhile they are progressive and forward look-
ing? How do young women strive to bring about social change in the 
face of relentless, repressive and exclusionary social structures? How 
is society changing and how are young women using their agency to 
negotiate new rooms for manoeuvre?
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Conclusion: A note on Inter-disciplinarity
One will readily agree that the magnitude, depth and complexity of 
analysis that the foregoing questions warrant cannot be tackled uni-
vocally. There is an increasing corpus of scholars who argue for an 
interdisciplinary approach in studying the rapidly changing nature of 
African lived realities (Chege 2004, Achieng 2010) through unravelling 
its complexity and multidimensionality, and understanding the seg-
mentation and fragmentation of different processes.  Borrowing from 
sociological studies, demography and political philosophy, the paper 
at hand has shown how an interdisciplinary inquiry could proceed.
The paper departed by asking a basic question, i.e. why there is a 
continuous lack of articulation of a critical voice by a signiﬁ cant group 
in society. In it, I showed that two conﬂ icting processes are evident. On 
the one hand, whereas indeed young African women are articulating 
a critical voice, there seems to be reluctance from the rest of society to 
integrate these issues into broader ones that being put across. In this 
manner, social inclusion of this signiﬁ cant group is denied. Young African 
women’s issues are either being reduced or ridiculed, and in this manner 
ridding them of a strong social base from which to legitimize their voices 
and institutionalize their actions. On the other hand, young African 
women as a social group are continually ignored as a group that has not 
yet come of age. Although young African women using their agency 
have come up with strategies in a bid to create rooms for manoeuvre for 
themselves and thus get their issues across, the need for a strong social 
base on which to rest these concerns and thus give these a wider legiti-
macy is still lacking. Indeed, as one author in a recently ended conference 
expressed, it is a matter of gaining an edge, being relevant and obtain-
ing preferential status [9]. This calls for research into social contexts and 
processes that are integrating young women’s voices, legitimizing their 
concerns and institutionalizing decisions arrived at. This is critical given 
the demographic shift that is on-going and the democratic processes that 
are being institutionalised in many African contexts.
9  Calif, Ofer, 2010, Forms of domination in Liberal Democracies: Power, Hegemony,Alienation 
and Inequality, a paper presented at the International Conference on Political Philosophy 
and Political Theory: Democracy Today- Participation, Abstention, Representation and 
Exclusion, Braga, Portugal, 3rd – 6th November 2010
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1. Introduction
WHILE A FEDERALIST DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL COMPETENCES, inside the 
State is often considered as a good way to improve public deliberation 
(regarding on both institutional and civic actors); the link between 
high quality deliberation and direct democracy is unclear (Habermas, 
J. (1985). Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik). 
The exciting public debate about GMO food will serve us to focus 
on the relationship between federalism, direct democracy and delibera-
tion’s quality. Our paper will present an empirical contrast between the 
way in which regional newspapers of Bayern (Germany), Saint-Gallen 
(Switzerland), Aragon and Murcia (Spain) informed about this topic 
between 2003 and 2010. 
Taking into account elements as the number of pieces of informa-
tion per year (as regards to Switzerland considering also the press 
activity around the key days in which a referendum took place), the 
bias of news and editorials and the source and geographical attach-
ment of the information (international, national or regional parties, 
institutional actors, associations, corporations,…), we will get hold 
of some objective dates about the way in which federalism and direct 
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democracy give an incentive to political deliberation in newspapers, a 
small but important part of the public sphere.
2. Some Agricultural and Industrial of Features Murcia: 
    Absence of GMO Cultivations not Politically Motivated
        Murcia is a region of the south-
east of Spain that had experi-
enced in the last decades an 
important growing and mod-
ernisation of the agriculture, 
which is an important economy 
sector in the whole south of the 
Iberian Peninsula. 
An intensive farming of 
citrus, fruits and vegetables 
(lettuce, tomato, cucumber 
and so on) is characteristic in 
this region, where the cultivated area are 600.000 ha. (53’5% of the 
regions area). 
 MURCIA SPAIN
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2004
CULTIVATION AREA 606.000 606.000 606.000 605.839 25.175.260
AVERAGE 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.9
Table 1: Evolution of greenhouses cultures (1978-2004). Modiﬁ ed from “Atlas de Mur-
cia”, Diario La Verdad, http://www.atlasdemurcia.com/index.php/secciones/2/la-agricultura/ 
Agriculture in Murcia is directed to exportation. That implies the 
parallel development of a transport network able to take out products 
to the principal markets in Europe. An industry which works in the 
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elaboration of tinned food, juices and other products created with the 
fruits and vegetables of the region is also consolidated.   
Taking into account the commercial nature of Murcia’s agriculture, 
new techniques that increase the rhythm of production have prolif-
erated from the eighties. The number of greenhouses has specially 
increased in contrast with the traditional vegetables gardens. This kind 
of culture represents already 1/6 of total ﬁ elds (100.000 ha).     
Figure 1. Evolution of cultivation in greenhouses (1978-2004) [1]
Even if the technique is nowadays very important in the region, at 
the end of 2009, Murcia didn’t product any GMO.  It is very important 
to mention that until Mars 2, 2010, when the European Commission 
authorised the culture of Amﬂ ora potatoe (BASF), the only GMO 
culture allowed in the EU was maize MON810. Production of maize 
in particular and other cereals in Murcia is much reduced and is 
decreasing in the last years. This fact is very important to understand 
why Murcia has been almost preserved from the introduction of GMO 
technology in recent past. 
1  Source: “Atlas de Murcia”, Diario La Verdad,     http://www.atlasdemurcia.com/index.php/
secciones/2/la-agricultura/ 
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We can also speak from a growing ecological sensibility in Murcia 
and in other regions of Spain that, nevertheless, is not predominant. In 
June 2010 bio farmers used 60.742 ha, one of the best averages in Spain, 
especially if we compare it to bigger regions like Catalonia (71.734 ha) 
or Valencia (38.754 ha), where irrigated lands are also an important 
part of the ﬁ elds [2]. 
On the other hand, in Murcia there is a low success of European 
initiatives like GMO free regions. Only the little village of Bullas (with 
a famous wine production) has adhered to the initiative, widely sup-
ported in other regions of Spain (Fig 2).  
We can say that even if Murcia is a de facto free GMO region, there 
is not a social pressure in order to make the Autonomy adhere to some 
de iure compromise.
 We will try to explain this estrange situation as a fact related to the 
little discussion about GMO food topic in the public sphere of Murcia. 
Newspapers keep little traces of the debate, small with regards to the 
huge system in which the social formation of public opinion takes 
place, but perhaps enough to have some evidences about the quality 
of the public debate about GMO cultures in the region. 
In our opinion, we can speak about an anomalous situation if we 
consider that Murcia’s ﬁ elds have already been cultivated with GMO 
2  http://www.interempresas.net/Agricola/Articulos/41118-Espana-lider-en-cultivo-de-
productos-bio-en-la-UE-exporta-el-80-por-ciento-de-la.html
Figure 2. Free GMO regions 
in Spain. From Amigos de la 
Tierra, http://www.tierra.org/
spip/spip.php?article433
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seeds in 2004 and 2007, facts that we will study after taking a brief 
look over the agriculture in Aragon.   
3. Some Agricultural and Industrial Characteristics of Aragon:   
    European Leader in GMO Cultures
        In contrast to Murcia, Aragon 
is a north-east region of Spain 
with a characteristic continen-
tal climate of cold winters and 
dry summers, not very good 
to produce vegetables. 
However, cereals culture is 
consequently the basis of 
regional agriculture. In 2009, 
the hectares cultivated with 
wheat, maize or malt was 
more than the double than the 
area of other plants (Table 3). 
Cult. Cereals Legu -mes Oils Forage
Vegeta-
bles Fruits Wine Olives
Hectares 822.394 12.149 20.826 115.967 8.948 101.411 43.203 46.471
Table 3: Aragon cultures in 2009.  From: Secretaría General Técnica. Servicio de 
Planiﬁ cación y Análisis. Departamento de Agricultura y Alimentación. Gobierno de 
Aragón.
Around 600.000 ha of maize where cultivated in 2008, the whole 
agricultural area of Murcia (Fig. 3). This is a very important fact to 
understand the huge and increasing number of GMO plants that 
are being cultivated in Aragon, European leader in GMO plants’ 
production. 
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Figure 3. Evolution of maize cultures in Aragon (2000 – 2008). From: Anuario estadístico 
agrario de Aragón 2008-2009, Sección de Estadística del Departamento de Agricultura 
y Alimentación del Gobierno de Aragón. 
4. Evolution of GMO Fields in Spain, Aragon and Murcia 
The contrast of the number of hectares cultivated with GMO plants in 
Murcia, Aragon and in the whole Spain (Table 4) will allow us to set 
in a better context our analysis of the regional press news about GMO 
food in Murcia and Aragon. 
Spain ARAGON MURCIA
2009 76.075 29.540
2008 79.269 31.857
2007 75.148 35.860 24
2006 53.667 23.734
2005 53.226 21.259
2004 58.219 25.547 12
2003 32.249 12.592
2002 23.280 9.200
2001 11.540 4.250
2000 25.816 9.000
1999 24.952 7.300
1998 22.317 11.500
Table 4: Distribution of the hectares cultivated with OMG in Spain. From: Cuaderno 
transgénicos 2009. Informe elaborado por Plataforma Rural y Ecologistas en Acción.
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In 2009, Spain was the ﬁ rst EU GMO plants producer (76.075 ha of 
94.750 ha, total production of the EU). Besides, Spanish authorities 
are more tolerant to GMO plants than EU administrators. Between 
1998 and 2005 culture of maize Bt 176 was not authorised by the EU. 
It was, in contrast, allowed in Spain.
In spite of their great extension, GMO cultivated area in Spain is 
far away from the areas in USA (64 millions of ha.), Brasil (21’4 m.ha), 
Argentina (21’3m.ha) or India (8’4 m.ha).
Inside Europe, Aragon is clearly the ﬁ rst region in GMO plants pro-
duction, while in Murcia, climate characteristics have stimulated an only 
occasional cultivation. In the next section, we will try to determine how 
these economic conditions have an inﬂ uence in the discussion about 
GMO plants and food in Murcia’s and Aragon’s main newspapers.
5. Some Political Philosophy Questions about GMO cultivation  
    and federalism
While discussing about GMO plants and food, we should take into 
account that we are facing a debate in which two irreconcilable visions 
of nature are ﬁ ghting. For the partisans of gen technologies, the inno-
vations in that ﬁ eld allow us to increase the global production of food 
(a solution to huger in the world) and the nutritional qualities of some 
plants. On the other hand, ecologists, green and left groups underline 
some health risk usually associated to the use of gen techniques and 
alert about the increasing economic inﬂ uence of great pharmaceutical 
and agricultural enterprises like Syngenta or Bayern. They are some 
of the economic groups, associations and lobbyers that take part in a 
complicated debate where there is not and perhaps, there cannot be a 
satisfactory solution to all the actors involved. 
Is federalism a good political model to carry on discussing about 
problems with a non evident solution? Subsidiary application of com-
munitarian decisions about GMO food has been the key tool in the 
EU regulation of GMO plants cultures and importation. While the 
WTO agreements avoid any attempt of limiting the importation of 
GMO, Article 23 of Directive 2001/18 give the State members the pos-
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sibility of employ a national ban to MON 810 (in force in France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland and Greece [3]).
The case of Swiss federalism, also important for our research is 
even more complicated in some aspects. Swiss politics beneﬁ ts from 
its national autonomy as a non-EU member. On the other hand, the 
pressure of the WTO agreements is similar to that experienced by EU 
members. National politics are ﬁ nally conditioned by some speciﬁ c 
citizens’ political rights, characteristics of a semi-direct democracy.
As a result of a popular initiative, submitted in September 13, 2003 
and voted in November 27, 2005, GMO plants cultivation is banned in 
Switzerland. Is this practice of direct democracy in opposition to the 
federalist principles? For their critics, in the Swiss case we are dealing 
with the imposition of a majority of national citizens against some local 
and particular interests, heavily damaged. On the contrary, partisans 
of direct democracy consider popular initiatives and referendums as 
the culmination of federalist principles: separation of governmental 
powers and active role of regions and their citizens.
Our analysis of the debate about GMO plants in regional press 
and public spheres of Murcia, Aragon and Saint-Gallen will provide 
us some objective arguments in our quest about the link between 
political rights, deliberation and federalist principles.
We will try to give an empirically founded answer to the follow-
ing questions:
Do the relations of production determine society’s other relationship • 
and ideas? (Marxist approach) 
How can political rights’ theory improve the Marxist conception about • 
the relationship between facts and ideas? 
How does the economical structure of this regions inﬂ uence the • 
discussion?
Are citizens’ political rights important regarding to the way in which • 
the debate takes place? As a result of the difference between Spanish 
and Swiss democratic systems we will observe two different types 
of public deliberation. 
3  Source: http://www.gmo-free-regions.org/gmo-free-regions/bans.html
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Pursuing a better understanding of the link between direct democ-
racy and good quality deliberation our press analysis will focus in the 
following elements: 
Number of information’s about GMO plants per year. For the Swiss A. 
case it is also important to carefully study the press activity just before 
and after the popular initiative of November 27, 2005.
Presence of international, national and regional topics and actors in B. 
newspapers, related to the federalist importance of local politics. 
Plurality of institutional agents and groups of civil society.C. 
Partiality of information. D. 
6. GMO Plants in la Opinión de Murcia
Second regional newspaper of Murcia. Daily circulation: 23.650.• 
Presence of local correspondents in the towns and villages of • 
Murcia.
Dependent on national and international press agencies with regards • 
to non-regional news.
Period of news’ compilation: June 2004-11 March 2010. • 
Key word of the research: • transgénico/a/s
http://www.laopiniondemurcia.es/servicios/hemeroteca/hemero-• 
teca.jsp 
INFORMATION PRO YEAR TOTAL : 34
2004s.June 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010u.Mars
2 0 2 2 16 11 1
Table 5: Information about GMO plants in La Opinión newspaper
Opinion about  
GMO in the news Quite positive Quite negative Almost neutral
7 25 2
Table 6: Opinion about GMO plants in the news of La Opinión newspaper
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SECTION OR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF 
INFORMATION NUMBER OF NEWS
Regional 2
National 3
International 17 (all concerning the EU, apart from one information about China)
National/International (news con-
cerning both Spain and the EU) 2
Editors 7
People 3 (opinions of Prince Charles of England)
Table 7: Section of the newspaper where information about GMO appears. Geographic 
provenance of the news. 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTORS NUMBER OF NEWS
Ecologist 13
Institutions 5 
Parties 1
Biotechnological companies 3
Scientist, experts 3
Editors 4
People 3 (Prince Charles of England)
Other medias 2
Religious groups 1
Table 8: Political and social actors who explain their point of view or whose opinions 
are reported
As a preliminary interpretation of the information gathered, we 
should remark:
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 • La Opinión says anything about the GMO cultures in the region 
(2004-2007)
The Spanish EU-leadership in GMO plants is only two times men-• 
tioned. There is even more information about foreign countries like 
France or Germany
Predominance of EU information where European institutions are • 
criticised. Local and national authorities are almost absolved when 
problems related to GMO cultivations and consume are discussed. 
European institutions and ecologist (Greenpeace) usually speak about • 
the problem. Political parties, farmers or consumers don’t appear in 
the articles written on La Opinión. 
7. GMO Plants in El Periódico de Aragón
Second regional newspaper of Aragón. Daily circulation: 15.000.• 
Presence of local correspondents in the towns and villages of • 
Aragón.
Dependent on national and international press agencies with regards • 
to non-regional news.
Period of news’ compilation: 2003-11 March 2010. • 
Key word of the research: transgénico/a/s• 
http://www.elperiodicodearagon.com/noticias/hemeroteca.asp • 
INFORMATION PRO YEAR. TOTAL : 41
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010u.mars
9 8 5 1 4 6 7 1
Table 9: Information about GMO plants in El Periódico de Aragón newspaper
Opinion about 
GMO in the news Quite positive Quite negative Almost neutral
14 23 4
Table 10: Opinion about GMO plants in the news of El Periódico de Aragón newspaper
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SECTION OR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF 
INFORMATION NUMBER OF NEWS
Regional 12
Regional/National 9
National/International 2 (all concerning the EU)
Regional/National/International (in-
formation concerning Aragon, Spain 
and the EU)
6
Opinion 7 
Table 11: Section of the newspaper where information about GMO appears. Geographic 
provenance of the news. 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTORS NUMBER OF NEWS
Ecologist 12 
Institutions 5 
Parties 9
Companies 3
Experts, scientists 5
Editors 3
Farmers organisations GMO friendly 5
Farmers organisations against GMO 18
Consumers 6
Table 12: Political and social actors who explain their point of view or whose opinions 
are reported
After studying the information about GMO plants that was pub-
lished in El Periódico de Aragón, we can state that:
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There is a similar number of articles pro year in • El Periódico and in 
La Opinión.
El Periódico•  offers more information about regional and national 
problems
El Periódico•  offers news where interrelated facets of the GMO debate 
are discussed. Their news are then, more relevant and interesting 
than La Opinión ones.
The regional economy, where local farmers use GMO crops, creates a • 
debate between them (ASAJA) and traditional or bio farmers (UAGA). 
We can then conﬁ rm a part of the Marxist approach to political ideol-
ogy. Economic forces create organisations and discourses in order to 
ﬁ ght for their common goals.
The position of Spain and Aragon as leaders in GMO plants production • 
is constantly underlined by UAGA and ecologist (Greenpeace)
There is a tendency to neutrality in the information concerning GMO • 
plants offered by El Periódico.
 The opposition of rival economic groups is in favour of a more inter-• 
esting and rich information.
Only the critical political parties (IU, CA) take part in the debate• 
We notice a positive evolution of • El Periódico. In 2004 and 2005 they 
only received and published press releases from parties, farmers and 
so on. In 2006 they began to prepare their own information. 
8. GMO and Economic Lobbyes in German Speaking 
    Switzerland
Following the structure that we chose in the precedent sections we 
will take a brief look on the German speaking Switzerland economic 
elements that have a real inﬂ uence upon the GMO plants debate. 
It is important to underline the great diversity of economic sectors 
involved in the GMO Swiss debate. As a main actor in favour of new 
gen techniques we ﬁ nd the agribusiness company Syngenta, third 
world producer of genetically modiﬁ ed crops. Syngenta claims for 
more public support to their activities. The principal goal of its com-
munication strategy is to reduce the perception of risk associated to gen 
technologies by investors and consumers.  In the last years, Syngenta 
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has invested great capitals in the research on applied biotechnol-
ogy. The prestigious ETH Zürich, one of the greatest beneﬁ ciaries of 
these investments and a key actor in Swiss debate usually shares and 
defends the opinions of the company. A high alarm about GMO will 
inﬂ uence very negatively the allocation of public and private founds 
to the biotechnological research.
On the other side of the barricade, the Union of Swiss Farmers 
considers the reject of GMO plants as a mark of distinction and qual-
ity of Swiss products. One of the ﬁ rst strategies in their ﬁ ght against 
GMO plants was the creation of the Suisse garantie labels in 2004. 
The renunciation to the employ of gen techniques is a sine qua non 
requisite for national and regional products, which beneﬁ ts from a 
great national costumers’ trust. 
Consumers associations are also highly concerned about techno-
logical evolution and their hypothetical risks. All the political parties 
made their own statements about the matter. The complexity of the 
Swiss federal system, in which very important rights to vote in ref-
erendum or promote a popular initiative are accorded to citizens, is 
one of the main causes of the great diversity of opinions between the 
parties and also inside the parties (CVP, SVP,…). That is why the Green 
Party, introducer of the popular initiative plays a key role but doesn’t 
monopolize the creation of public opinion in Switzerland. 
9. GMO Plants in Saint Galler Tagblatt
First regional newspaper in Eastern Switzerland. Daily circulation: • 
99.000.
Presence of local editorial ofﬁ ces in 11 towns of the region.• 
Less dependent on national and international press agencies than • La 
Opinión or El Periódico.
Period of news’ compilation: 2004-11 March 2010. • 
Key word of the research: gentechnisch, gentechnologie.• 
 http://www.tagblatt.ch/suche/• 
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INFORMATION PRO YEAR. TOTAL : 337
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010u.mars
64 132 (94 from October 27 to November 30) 31 35 46 22 7
Table 13: Information about GMO plants in Saint Galler Tagblatt newspaper
Opinion about 
GMO in the news Quite positive Quite negative Almost neutral
58 134 145
Table 14: Opinion about GMO plants in the news of Saint Galler Tagblatt newspaper
SECTION OR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF 
INFORMATION NUMBER OF NEWS
National 124
Regional 78
Regional/National 21
Regional/International 11
National/International Total 48
National-EU 21
National-Other nations 28
Regional/National/International 4
International 61
International EU 26
International-Other nations 35
REGIONAL TOTAL 114
NATIONAL TOTAL 197
INTERNATIONAL TOTAL 123
Table 15: Section of the newspaper where information about GMO appears. Geographic 
provenance of the news. 
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POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTORS NUMBER OF NEWS
Ecologists  42
Institutions 103
Parties 89
Companies (Syngenta, Monsanto,…) 52
Experts, scientists 61
Editors 6
Farmers against GMO 64     (exception : 2 farmers pro GMO)
Consumers 19
Table 16: Political and social actors who explain their point of view or whose opinions 
are reported
After reﬂ ecting about the wide range of information appeared in 
Saint-Galler Tagblatt, we notice that: 
Public sphere grows around the 27th November. The popular initia-• 
tive plays a key direct role.
The indirect role of this direct democratic tool is also important if we • 
consider PNR 59 “Uses and risks in spreading genetically modiﬁ ed 
plants” as an effect of the popular initiative and the moratorium to 
GMO cultivations. Considering the vote as a popular will of more 
information about gen technologies, Swiss institutions an interest 
groups are already preparing new scientiﬁ c arguments that will 
inﬂ uence next deliberations and decisions.
The combination between direct and indirect procedures of decision • 
creates permanent and temporary discussion groups. As a result of 
this great number of actors taking part in the GMO debate, there is 
also an increasing number of news about that topic which are spread 
in the public sphere
Saint-Galler Tagblatt•  considers as the most important sources the 
federal ones. It is logical considering that GMO legislation is estab-
lished at the federal level
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The cantonal and municipal actors are also key actors in political • 
communication. A lot of local committees and parties’ sections send 
releases to the press.
The international sources, very important and usually considered • 
as references in the debate about national politics, are taken into 
account. In fact, Saint-Galler Tagblatt gives more information about 
EU GMO legislation than Spanish regional journals. As we know, 
Spain is an EU member and Switzerland only cooperates with EU 
in some policies.  
Saint-Galler Tagblatt•  offers more information than El Periódico or La 
Opinión about foreign GMO producers like India, Panamá, South 
Africa, Brazil, Argentina and resistance to European Commission deci-
sions about GMO plants in neighbour countries (Austria, Germany,…). 
International conferences of WTO, FAO or even the International 
Conference of Bodensee Regions are considered as important sources 
of information.
In contrast with other democratic countries, where members of gov-• 
ernment and main political parties concentrate the media’s attention, 
Swiss public sphere of deliberation is occupied by a great number of 
different political actors.
Federal Conseil’s members don’t take part directly in the debate about • 
GMO plants. On the contrary, we notice some political interventions of 
the executive institutions and leaders of other States or multinational 
organisations in our press analysis. 
The presence of other social or civic organisations doesn’t mean a • 
reduction of the role of the parties. On the contrary, the pressure 
that popular initiative exerts over parties and over the whole political 
system coincides with an increasing number of parties’ assemblies 
and press releases.
Democratic tools force the parties to be clear with regards to their • 
own position, something important when unpopular measures are 
being discussed.
There is an increasing transparency in SVP and CVP positions. At • 
the beginning they where doubtful or didn’t want to state an ofﬁ cial 
position about such a topic, which divides their political supporters 
(farmers, Catholics, big companies,…).  
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Civil society groups (ecologist, consumers, farmers, corporations,…) • 
make a great effort in the communication of their opinion about GMO 
plants. The possibility of inﬂ uencing the course of a debate about 
their main interests that ends into a crucial vote stimulates their 
communicative abilities
The wide range of political, ecological or economical associations • 
which take part in the discussion creates a tendency to neutrality in 
the information. Neutral articles that detail, for instance, an institu-
tional decision and the opinions or both partisans and opponents to 
that decision are a large majority.
Nevertheless, there is a difference between negative articles (134) • 
and positive opinions (58) about GMO. Owing to the great number 
of organisations who refuse GMO plants, their important presence 
in public sphere can be considered as something logic.
The effort of • Saint-Galler Tagblatt in the elaboration of non biased 
articles and even pedagogical contents must be praised. 
10. Conclusion: Swiss Federalism has still Speciﬁ c
       Deliberative Qualities
The contrast between the way in which the GMO food debate appears 
in the three cases of Spanish and Swiss regional press that we have 
studied is surely a tiny empiric base to make general statements about 
federal systems, direct democracy and plurality of public opinion.
Our little analysis allows us to show only some signs in favour 
of a general hypothesis whose conﬁ rmation would need a further 
compilation of information in which other regions, mass-medias and 
debate topics were included.
Our deliberative approach to politics, in which the organisation of 
the public sphere and the possibilities offered to parties, citizens and 
associations to communicate about politics are considered as the most 
important characteristic of a political system is an impulse to focus on 
different aspects while speaking about federal systems. 
Other academic scholars keep on limiting their comparative analy-
sis of federations to the study of the distribution of competences between 
federal and local entities. Federations can nevertheless be compared by 
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taking into account other elements of the political systems. The nature 
of their public sphere and the conditions and instruments of forma-
tion of public opinion in such systems is perhaps as important for the 
democratic nature of the whole system as the local-central division of 
political tasks and rights. In fact, what would be the democratic role 
of a citizen or interest group in a federal system where they can hardly 
communicate? Our work can only show little signs of how insigniﬁ cant 
and superﬁ cial public debates can be when a federal system lack of 
instruments allowing the real interaction of individual citizens, local 
and regional groups.
As we saw, Spanish regional press presents great differences in the 
way the GMO debate is set out. El Periódico and La Opinión offered a 
very different perspective about GMO cultivations and that is, obvi-
ously, a result from the division of political competences in Spanish 
federal system, a division which allows the existence of very different 
regional public spheres
The Swiss federal system goes on in the promotion of plurality 
in public sphere. Our paper offers some irrefutable facts that link the 
speciﬁ c direct democratic rights of Swiss citizens to the good quality 
of public debates about irreconcilable matters like the GMO debate.
In order to conclude, we can state that even if, in the last years, 
other countries have also created federal structures (Spain, Germany, 
India, Belgium,…), Swiss federalism, due to the rights of referendum and 
popular initiative granted to their citizens has still particular delibera-
tive qualities. In our opinion, these qualities are extremely important if 
we take into account the key role of public information and discussion 
to guarantee the democratic nature of highly complex societies. 
The philosophical implications of that problem should be still 
discussed. As Kant stated in The Conﬂ ict of Faculties: 
“It is said that a superior power can fairly take our freedom to speak and 
to write. But, could we think a lot and good if we were not able to think, 
so to say, in community with the others?” [4] 
4  Kant, Inmanuel, Der Streit der Fakultäten (1798), English translation by Mary J. Gregor, 
New York, Abaris Book, 1979. 
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A BUEN SEGURO, uno de los grandes desafíos de las democracias avan-
zadas de carácter liberal apunta a la necesidad de persuadir a sus 
ciudadanos de que la libertad conlleva inseparablemente una res-
ponsabilidad cooperativa en aras del interés público. Porque una 
democracia fortalecida requiere no sólo una garantía jurídica eﬁ caz 
de los derechos fundamentales, sino también la asunción de una 
ética pública compartida y de unos deberes cívicos por parte de la 
ciudadanía. No obstante, como ha aﬁ rmado recientemente Victoria 
Camps [Camps, 2010], la realidad es muy otra, pues la conﬁ guración 
de las actuales democracias liberales conduce a la angustiosa cons-
tatación de unas “democracias sin ciudadanos” o, en palabras de 
Marcel Gauchet, de una “democracia contra sí misma”. Las causas son 
bien conocidas: el individualismo posesivo y atomizador, el talante 
posmoderno y “líquido” de un ser humano fragmentado, indeciso y 
pragmático hasta llegar a la amoralidad, la desafección ciudadana 
frente a los problemas de interés público y la paupérrima participación 
en la vida sociopolítica de la Res Publica, el poder avasallador de los 
medios de comunicación en la conformación de la opinión pública, 
la inﬂ uencia todopoderosa de la economía en la toma de decisiones 
de los dirigentes políticos –a menudo incluso contra la voluntad 
democrática del pueblo soberano…
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Ante este panorama desalentador, que evidencia unas deﬁ cien-
cias graves tanto en la concepción como en el funcionamiento de los 
sistemas democráticos occidentales, hayamos en la ﬁ losofía moral y 
política contemporánea unas primeras respuestas para la recupera-
ción de una sólida ética pública y el paralelo robustecimiento de una 
ciudadanía más activa y participativa. Se trata, evidentemente, de las 
contribuciones realizadas desde el republicanismo y el comunitarismo 
a modo de crítica al liberalismo político de corte clásico. 
Sin embargo, como multitud de estudios sobre ciudadanía y demo-
cracia han desvelado durante los últimos veinticinco años, ambos 
vectores de ideas sufren a su vez carencias de distinta índole que 
diﬁ cultan en gran medida su adaptación a sociedades democráticas 
profundamente plurales en lo político y diversas en lo sociocultural 
y religioso. Ya que, por un lado, un discurso republicano como el de 
Jürgen Habermas, a pesar de sus avances en el reconocimiento de 
una razón práctica intersubjetiva apta para la consecución del con-
senso, adolece aún de un marcado cariz de abstracción formal, ciego 
a la situación concreta del ciudadano en cuanto a sus necesidades y 
adscripciones identitarias, así como de un peligro innato a todo dis-
curso republicano: la tendencia hacia un laicismo estatal que impone 
valores morales, cuando no identitarios, pretendidamente neutrales 
[Habermas, 1998]. Por otro lado, el comunitarismo en su versión más 
dura, expresada en la obra de Alasdair McIntary o de Michael Sandel 
[McIntary, 1987], se encamina hacia un holismo centrípeto de valores 
morales que ahoga irremisiblemente el pluralismo ético y político de 
la ciudadanía, imprescindible para poder hablar de una auténtica 
democracia viva y dinámica.
De esta manera, en relación a las críticas vertidas sobre el republi-
canismo habermasiano y el comunitarismo más radical, la evolución 
del debate teórico nos dirige hacia la confrontación de puntos de vista 
más conciliadores y, en cierta medida, integradores de algunos aspec-
tos propios de posiciones en principio contrarias. En medio de esta 
sana interrelación de perspectivas, cabe destacar las contribuciones de 
la tercera generación de la Teoría Crítica frankfurtiana (Axel Honneth, 
Seyla Benhabib, Claus Offe, Albrecht Wellmer…) junto a la elabora-
ción de un liberalismo comunitario de la mano, sobretodo, de Charles 
Taylor y Michael Walzer [Taylor, 2003]. Indefectiblemente, todas estas 
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propuestas favorecen, de forma complementaria aunque en tensión 
dialéctica, la profundización en una democracia liberal de estructu-
ras cada vez más sensibles al fenómeno de la multiculturalidad. Y 
ello, en la línea de un reconocimiento paulatino de nuevos derechos 
de tercera generación a grupos culturales diferenciados (minorías 
nacionales, inmigrantes, homosexuales…), supone la integración 
compleja de los principios de diferencia e igualdad democrática a la 
hora de acomodar la legítima diversidad sociocultural en el seno de 
las instituciones [Fernández Ruiz-Gálvez, 2003; Benhabib, 2002]. Pero 
además, no cabe olvidar que, a un nivel superior, también comporta 
una revisión de los grandes conceptos deﬁ nidos por la modernidad 
política y jurídica, dado que surgen formas novedosas de concebir el 
vínculo entre el individuo y la sociedad política [de Lucas, 2002]. Por 
ejemplo, el ciudadano ya no sólo aparece como sujeto abstracto de 
derechos sino como una alteridad moral en sus circunstancias con-
cretas; la división taxativa entre lo privado y lo público se relativiza, 
ampliando el espacio de acción de la sociedad civil frente al Estado; 
la noción de universalidad abandona su formulación abstracta y 
trascendental pura y, de acuerdo con la bipolaridad entre lo local y lo 
global, adopta un sentido más enraizado en las vicisitudes vitales del 
sujeto moral; e incluso, en cuanto a la base epistemológica se reﬁ ere, 
la razón práctica intersubjetiva, sin menospreciar su articulación 
procedimental, se abre a la narratividad en la conformación de las 
identidades personales y comunitarias. 
Es por tanto dentro de estas coordenadas donde surge el objeto 
especíﬁ co de este trabajo, a saber, el análisis y la confrontación entre la 
teoría crítica de Seyla Benhabib y lo que consideramos un precedente 
cercano pero no reconocido del liberalismo comunitario actual: el 
federalismo integral del s.XX. Con ello pretendemos mostrar como 
dichos discursos ﬁ losóﬁ cos, desde orígenes y tradiciones de pensa-
miento distintos, están en disposición no sólo de dialogar de forma 
fructífera en beneﬁ cio de una mejor fundamentación de la teoría sobre 
la democracia, sino también de converger en interacción mutua en pro 
de cambios innovadores en las prácticas y las estructuras de nuestras 
instituciones democráticas.
Democracy Today.indb   199 11-08-2012   20:05:57
200
DEMOCRACY TODAY
 
I
Seyla Benhabib, desde parámetros comunes al resto de miembros de 
la tercera generación de la Escuela crítica de Frankfurt, busca reela-
borar, sin desmantelar por completo, los ideales morales y políticos de 
la modernidad, la Ilustración y la democracia liberalrepublicana, en 
medio de una atmósfera posmoderna de franco escepticismo respecto 
a su actual vigencia [Sánchez Muñoz, 2009]. Semejante objetivo lo 
aborda a través de dos reﬂ exiones ligadas entre sí. En primer lugar, 
un replanteamiento de las ideas de sus antecesores frankfurtianos 
facilitado en gran medida por la inspiración de Hannah Arendt, cen-
trándose sobretodo en las limitaciones y constricciones detectadas en 
la obra de Habermas [Benhabib, 1986 y 1996]. Y, en segundo lugar, una 
apertura al diálogo con las más destacadas corrientes del pensamiento 
hodierno: el liberalismo de Rawls, los comunitaristas, las feministas 
y los pensadores posmodernos.
En esta línea de trabajo, el legado universalista de la modernidad 
aún tiene mucho que decir frente a las fragmentaciones culturales y 
nacionales y los ataques constantes a los derechos humanos desde 
visiones relativistas. Para Benhabib, los elementos más sobresalientes 
de la herencia moderna que cabría salvaguardar a toda costa serían: 
1) un universalismo comprometido con el respeto universal de cada 
persona en virtud de su humanidad; 2) la autonomía moral de los 
individuos; 3) la consecución de la igualdad y de la justicia socioeco-
nómica; 4) la participación democrática; 5) el más extenso sistema de 
libertades políticas y civiles compatibles con principios de justicia; 
y 6) la formación de asociaciones humanas solidarias. En todo caso, 
cabría atender también a las certeras y sagaces críticas lanzadas sobre 
las teorías universalistas por parte del comunitarismo, el feminismo y 
el posmodernismo. Y de forma especialmente perentoria a las siguien-
tes tres cuestiones: 1) el escepticismo hacia la posibilidad de que una 
razón legisladora por sí sola sea capaz de vertebrar un “punto de vista 
moral” (“posición original” en lenguaje rawlsiano o “situación ideal de 
habla” en lenguaje habermasiano); 2) el cuestionamiento del carácter 
abstracto y desarraigado del sujeto autónomo moderno, nostálgico 
del ego masculino; y 3) la inadecuación de esa razón legisladora o 
normativa para dar cuenta de la indeterminación y multiplicidad de 
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los contextos y situaciones vitales con las que se enfrenta la razón 
práctica [Benhabib, 1992].
Ante los retos suscitados, Benhabib responde planteando alter-
nativas válidas desde la misma ética discursiva en provecho de una 
democracia deliberativa remozada. Estas reformas internas a la propia 
Teoría Crítica se plasman en un conjunto de cambios de perspectiva 
respecto a algunos de los conceptos más importantes de la tradición 
universalista que va de Kant a Rawls y Habermas. Tales revisiones, 
efectuadas según la autora de origen turco mediante el uso estricto de 
recursos proporcionados por el mismo pensamiento moderno surgido 
a partir del s.XVI, versan básicamente sobre los siguientes elementos: 
la razón práctica, el sujeto político y de derecho, el proyecto de univer-
salización y, por último, el papel de la ética pública conectado con la 
relación entre lo público y lo privado dentro de la sociedad democrática 
[Benhabib, 1992].
En cuanto al tipo de razón práctica, gracias al inﬂ ujo arendtiano, se 1. 
da un giro narrativo a la razón comunicativa trazada por Habermas, 
con lo cual corrige el trazo meramente normativo que le había dado 
el ﬁ lósofo alemán. Tal proceso se produce mediante dos transforma-
ciones: a) una primera asunción de la postura universalista posmeta-
física que lleva a cabo Habermas por medio del paso de un concepto 
sustancialista-trascendental de la racionalidad a otro de carácter 
discursivo-comunicativo, explicitado en la formulación de una razón 
práctica intersubjetiva de carácter formal; b) un segundo paso que 
supone el reconocimiento de los sujetos de la razón, no como cogitos 
incorpóreos o unidades abstractas de percepción trascendental, sino 
como criaturas ﬁ nitas, corporeizadas y frágiles. En deﬁ nitiva, aparece 
aquí una razón práctica intersubjetiva no sólo comunicativa-discursiva 
sino también narrativa.
Por lo que se reﬁ ere al sujeto político y de derecho que se identiﬁ ca 2. 
con la ﬁ gura del ciudadano, se plantea una distinción inicial entre el 
“punto de vista del otro generalizado” y el “punto de vista del otro 
concreto”. El primero, propio de la modernidad de raíz ilustrada, 
destaca los elementos comunes que constituyen la dignidad humana 
de individuos abstractos, simétricos, racionales y autónomos, los 
cuales, mediante normas de igualdad formal y reciprocidad, poseen 
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unos mismos derechos y deberes en el ámbito público e institucional. 
El segundo hace abstracción de lo común y considera a cada persona 
en su individualidad especíﬁ ca, con su historia, su identidad parti-
cular y su constitución afectivo-emocional, lo cual conlleva normas 
privadas de equidad, amistad, amor y cuidado. A partir de esta dife-
renciación, se postula una relación entre los puntos de vista del “otro 
generalizado” y el del “otro concreto” como un continuum, ya que la 
visión del “otro generalizado” es necesaria pero no suﬁ ciente para 
deﬁ nir el “punto de vista moral” en las sociedades modernas. Por 
consiguiente, la incorporación del otro concreto resalta el carácter 
situado o contextual del ciudadano, quien se halla entretejido en 
una red de narrativas identitarias, intereses privados y relaciones 
afectivas, alcanzando la autonomía en un proceso de comunicación 
y reconocimiento mutuo.
Dado lo anterior, el anhelo de universalización ya no puede revestir 3. 
las características de abstracción formal e idealismo trascendental 
inherentes a la Ilustración dieciochesca. Un proyecto de universa-
lismo posilustrado debe ser pues interactivo y globalizado, es decir, 
no circunscrito tan sólo a la dimensión legislativa o normativa, sino 
abierto también a conocer y expresar las diferencias entre géneros 
así como las distintas situaciones contextuales. Es por ello que este 
universalismo interactivo se encuentra íntimamente ligado, de una 
banda, a la visión de un yo encarnado en las relaciones humanas a 
través de identidades narrativas, y de otra, a la formulación de un 
“punto de vista moral” entendido a modo de realización contin-
gente de una forma interactiva de racionalidad práctica, más que 
como punto de vista ahistórico y abstracto de una razón meramente 
legislativa.
Por último, recogiendo lo que acabamos de decir, el papel de la ética 4. 
pública parte de la aﬁ rmación de un “punto de vista moral” de carácter 
contingente, pragmático e interactivo, posibilitado por medio de una 
razón práctica intersubjetiva no sólo comunicativa-discursiva, sino 
también abierta al contexto situacional y a la narratividad identitaria. 
A este respecto cabe señalar dos puntualizaciones. Por un lado, la 
reformulación de la tradición universalista en el campo de la ﬁ loso-
fía moral dirige a Benhabib hacia la construcción de un “punto de 
vista moral” basado en el diálogo sobre cuestiones éticas y políticas 
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desde los parámetros de “pensamiento ampliado” y “reversibilidad 
de perspectivas” elaborados anteriormente por Arendt. Este pensar 
representativo que nos coloca en el lugar de los demás, circunscribe 
el objetivo del diálogo no al hecho de lograr un consenso sustantivo 
sobre el interés general, sino, más bien, a la intención de conseguir 
“llegar a un acuerdo” sobre él a guisa de simple ideal regulativo. 
Por otro lado, aunque ciertamente se comparta la necesidad de un 
estado constitucional democrático garante de los derechos funda-
mentales y el procedimentalismo en la toma de decisiones, hay aquí 
también un replanteamiento de la esfera pública en el modelo de 
democracia deliberativa. Ya que, frente al modelo liberal de esfera 
pública, presente tanto en Rawls como inevitablemente en el repu-
blicanismo de Habermas, se critican las importantes restricciones 
al diálogo público nacidas del principio de neutralidad, el cual, con 
un excesivo formalismo, silencia a los grupos excluidos por mor de 
la misma neutralidad y establece rígidas fronteras entre lo público 
y lo privado, justicia y felicidad, intereses públicos y necesidades 
privadas. Todo ello conduce ﬁ nalmente a una interpretación más 
laxa de los límites entre lo público y lo privado, así como, a través 
de la deliberación procedimental, a la ampliación de lo político hacia 
temas “privados” de carácter sociocultural. Las distinciones entre 
justicia y vida buena, entre normas y valores, no resultan entonces 
anteriores al proceso deliberativo, sino posteriores y subsecuentes, 
a guisa de resultado de la propia deliberación, pudiendo ser rene-
gociadas y reformuladas. En conclusión, se incrementa el espacio 
de decisión de la esfera pública a la vez que aumenta el número y la 
pluralidad de interlocutores (partidos, asociaciones civiles, iglesias, 
iniciativas ciudadanas…), fortaleciendo en último término el prota-
gonismo de la sociedad civil y la participación ciudadana en la vida 
de las democracias contemporáneas.
Después de este somero análisis, no cabe duda de que la gran vir-
tud del modelo de democracia deliberativa de Seyla Benhabib radica 
en que articula una doble vía para el diálogo sociocultural y político 
así como para el desarrollo de la ética comunicativa: uno el clásico 
liberal, reﬂ ejado en un modelo jurídico-legalista de derechos, y otro 
de impronta democrático-participativa a través de los mecanismos 
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discursivos propios de la sociedad civil. Además, esta última vía sirve 
de principal motor de impulso para el proceso utópico de emancipa-
ción ciudadana, porque permite, desde el interior mismo del demos, 
renegociar el reconocimiento de derechos de ciudadanía a los grupos 
excluidos de la esfera pública por no cumplir con los requisitos de 
pertenencia [Benhabib, 1992]. 
Esta cuestión no es por tanto baladí y aparece con especial relieve 
en lo que respecta a la acomodación democrática de la multicultu-
ralidad. Tanto es así que Benhabib, rechazando de entrada toda 
fragmentación nacionalista o guetización comunitarista, postula la 
reivindicación de derechos de minorías culturales o nacionales desde 
una óptica de constructivismo social no esencialista –coherente con su 
universalismo interactivo–, lo cual se encamina hacia una propuesta 
de síntesis entre solidaridades colectivas e identidades pluralmente 
constituidas. Muestra así una aproximación parcial y crítica al libera-
lismo comunitario, denominado en su obra “participacionista” (Taylor, 
Walzer, Kymlicka…) por oposición al comunitarismo “integracionista” 
(McIntyre, Sandel…) –considerado incompatible con los valores de auto-
nomía, pluralismo, reﬂ exividad y tolerancia de las sociedades modernas. 
Tal conﬂ uencia parcial de perspectivas se puede mostrar en un triple 
acuerdo: 1) La admisión de que la identidad está constituida de forma 
narrativa mediante una trama de interlocuciones. Aunque Benhabib 
pone en tela de juicio las consecuencias que de ello concluye Taylor, 
es decir, la derivación partiendo de una tesis ontológico-hermenéutica 
sobre la identidad personal de una justiﬁ cación normativa acerca de 
las pretensiones jurídicas de los grupos. 2) En caso de conﬂ icto entre 
la norma universal de autonomía moral y las demandas culturales 
de vida buena, las libertades liberales triunfan sobre los derechos 
culturales. 3) La posibilidad de conciliación entre el universalismo 
democrático y el pluralismo legal a la hora de estructurar un equilibrio 
entre los principios de igualdad democrática y diversidad cultural 
[Benhabib, 2002].
Por otra parte, en la actualidad, un último reto a la democracia 
deliberativa diseñada por medio de un universalismo interactivo radica 
en su globalización, y en consecuencia, en la creación de un “punto 
de vista moral” válido para toda la humanidad mediante una ética 
discursiva mundial. Benhabib afronta este desafío construyendo un 
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proyecto de solidaridad posnacional fundamentado en la democracia 
y los derechos humanos. De esta manera, acoge en su seno una teoría 
de la justicia no centrada en esquemas de distribución justa, sino en 
los principios y prácticas que determinan el “derecho de pertenencia” 
al demos o comunidad político-jurídica. En este sentido, aprovecha la 
idea del “derecho a tener derechos” de la ﬁ losofía arendtiana en virtud 
del cual plantea una pertenencia política transnacional sensible al 
reconocimiento de las demandas y derechos de “los otros” (extran-
jeros, refugiados, demandantes de asilo…). En deﬁ nitiva, semejante 
renegociación en términos de democracia deliberativa de los “derechos 
de pertenencia” al demos tiene como ﬁ nalidad la atenuación, que no 
eliminación, de lo que llama la “paradoja de la legitimidad democrá-
tica”, a saber: el hecho de que la legitimidad de los Estados dependa 
del respeto a principios universales expresados en el régimen de dere-
chos humanos, aunque éstos se concreten en derechos restringidos de 
ciudadanía, respondiendo así a la soberanía singular de cada Estado 
[Benhabib, 2004 y 2006].
II
En la introducción a este trabajo hemos aﬁ rmado que la ﬁ losofía socio-
política del federalismo integral constituye un antecedente próximo, 
pero no reconocido, del actual liberalismo comunitario, con el que 
comparte puntos de vista bastante similares en muchos aspectos. 
Abordemos pues el análisis detallado de esta aseveración. 
En cuanto a sus orígenes intelectuales, esta doctrina federalista 
posee un carácter omnicomprensivo de los distintos aspectos de la vida 
social del ser humano al estilo proudhoniano, sin dejar de encontrar 
su inspiración básica desde sus inicios en la antropología ﬁ losóﬁ ca 
del personalismo comunitario. Su corpus teórico principal ha sido 
desarrollado exclusivamente por autores europeos como Alexandre 
Marc, Denis de Rougemont, Henri Brugmans o Guy Héraud desde la 
década de 1930, pero sobretodo desde después de la Segunda Guerra 
Mundial, hasta ﬁ nes del s.XX, aunque su huella continúa presente hoy 
gracias a un elevado elenco de discípulos estrechamente vinculados al 
Democracy Today.indb   205 11-08-2012   20:05:58
206
DEMOCRACY TODAY
 
europeísmo político (Dusan Sidjanski, Ferdinand Kinsky, José Manuel 
Durão Barroso…).
Como veremos mejor a continuación, al centrarnos en concreto 
en el estudio de la obra paradigmática de Denis de Rougemont dentro 
del tercer bloque del presente trabajo, sus postulados personalistas y 
federalistas, preocupados por recuperar la vivencia comunitaria en 
el seno de las sociedades modernas y democráticas más avanzadas 
durante la segunda posguerra e incluso con posterioridad al mayo 
de 1968, van a tener un reﬂ ejo claro en ciertos parámetros del debate 
ﬁ losóﬁ co-político más actual. Esta conﬂ uencia de ideas se observa, 
evidentemente, respecto a las posiciones intermedias o más conci-
liadoras y autocríticas que irán apareciendo en medio de la disputa 
posmoderna entre liberales y comunitaristas, en unas ocasiones con 
planteamientos de fondo paralelos o casi miméticos y en otras más 
distanciados, aunque siempre con el tamiz diferenciador del uso de 
un lenguaje terminológico distinto, de una conjunción de fuentes 
ﬁ losóﬁ cas heterogéneas y, aún, de un alcance normativo en la práctica 
política e institucional diverso. Tal controversia, que durante las últimas 
décadas ha buscado un ajustamiento ecuánime entre los principios 
de igualdad democrática y legítima diferencia cultural, ha tenido la 
virtualidad de mostrar así los íntimos lazos de unión que conectan 
el federalismo integral de raíz personalista con las propuestas más 
recientes del “liberalismo sustantivo” de Charles Taylor y Michael 
Walzer o, asimismo, con las de un “comunitarismo liberal de carácter 
posconvencional o dialógico” de autores como Adela Cortina, Pietro 
Barcellona o Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Y ello sin olvidar tampoco 
la proximidad con aquellos liberales que rozan la heterodoxia a causa 
de su sensibilidad hacia los desafíos teóricos de la multiculturalidad, 
lo cual, en el caso de Will Kymlicka o Rainer Bauböck, les lleva a poner 
en tela de juicio el procedimentalismo formal, unilateral y atomista del 
liberalismo clásico. Vayamos por partes. 
De una banda, cabe resaltar como este “comunitarismo liberal de 
cuño dialógico” rechaza de plano todo retroceso nostálgico en pro de 
algún tipo de comunidad organicista o premoderna –como es el caso 
del comunitarismo anglosajón más holista de los años ochenta (A. 
McIntyre, M. Sandel…). Consecuentemente, junto a la defensa básica 
del contrato social democráticoliberal, propugna compensar el exceso 
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de individualismo, abstracción jurídica y utilitarismo economicista 
que rige en él por medio de una pluralización del vínculo social 
que reconozca las potencialidades de una idea abierta y autocrítica 
de comunidad [Cortina, 2001]. En opinión de Pietro Barcellona: 
“Hoy sabemos que la idea de comunidad no puede pensarse como 
un espacio opresivo y autoritario, sino como elección libre basada 
en la conciencia de que sólo en la reciprocidad de las relaciones no 
dinerarias se produce el verdadero reconocimiento de la diferencia 
y de la particularidad. La comunidad puede ser el lugar donde [...] 
se evite la conversión de todos nosotros en «analfabetos sociales»” 
[Barcellona, 1996, p. 125].
De otra banda, por lo que respecta al “liberalismo comunitario”, 
es interesante analizar brevemente la evolución intelectual sufrida 
por Charles Taylor para comprender mejor el trasfondo común que 
une su disertación ﬁ losóﬁ ca con la de Denis de Rougemont. En este 
sentido, es relevante destacar previamente que, como es sabido, el 
liberalismo social de John Rawls y sus esfuerzos constructivistas para 
integrar la ebullición de la diversidad identitaria dentro del plura-
lismo formal liberal no dan un resultado satisfactorio. Mientras que 
el conjunto del liberalismo más doctrinario e individualista no oculta 
la total ausencia en él de una teoría normativa ante la necesidad de 
acomodar el fenómeno multicultural. Así, argumenta únicamente 
soluciones de carácter pragmático y niega a los “multiculturalistas” 
la posibilidad de conseguir una teoría política genuinamente liberal 
para legitimar políticas de reconocimiento de grupos culturales, bajo 
la acusación, en caso contrario, de connivencia con el nacionalismo 
[Rivero, 1999].
Precisamente, conforme recalca Àngel Castiñeira, Taylor padecía 
en su biografía intelectual de una cierta esquizofrenia, que desvinculaba 
la ﬁ losofía política liberal, aprendida de sus estudios en Oxford, y la 
realidad de su militancia política en el Québec, en medio de las tensas 
transformaciones del federalismo canadiense. De la constatación de 
ese reduccionismo metodológico inoperante, al que conducía el indivi-
dualismo liberal, se engendra su interés por la antropología ﬁ losóﬁ ca, 
en especial por la dimensión comunitaria en la formación del yo, y, en 
consecuencia, el giro hacia una razón práctica intersubjetiva de carácter 
hermenéutico [Castiñeira, 1999]. No obstante, a nuestro parecer, en 
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semejante trayectoria tayloriana se adivina la impronta de uno de sus 
maestros en la sede académica inglesa: Isaiah Berlin. Quien, desde 
posiciones inequívocamente liberales y universalistas –primando la 
libertad negativa de los modernos sobre la libertad positiva de los anti-
guos–, pero alérgico a la deriva autoritaria de un racionalismo formal 
y desarraigado –en la línea que va de Platón al jacobinismo y, como 
colofón, al totalitarismo marxista–, se abre a una tensión enriquecedora 
en referencia a la diversidad de afectos comunitarios y sentimientos de 
pertenencia identitaria, propios de la faceta romántica de la condición 
humana [Berlin, 1997 y Serna, 2002].
Es debido a esto que, según Castiñeira, en Taylor las dos iden-
tidades (individual y colectiva) se ven retroalimentadas, pero con la 
característica de que la identidad individual no depende exclusiva-
mente de una cultura, sino que puede superarla. La identidad del 
individuo moderno es así una “identidad compleja”, constituida por 
un lado mediante lealtades a valores universales (supragrupales) y, 
por otro lado, mediante la lealtad y la pertenencia a una comunidad 
histórica particular y a su modo de vida. Su tesis de un liberalismo 
2 de carácter sustantivo representa pues el auspicio de un Estado 
comprometido con el principio de reconocimiento de la diversidad 
identitaria. Y ello, tanto a nivel de preservación moral y jurídica de 
las libertades individuales clásicas, como de protección y fomento, a 
través de un proyecto político federativo, de las minorías culturales 
que dan forma a una identidad colectiva compleja dentro del mismo 
Estado [Castiñeira, 1999, p. 108, 116-117]. El mismo Taylor explica, con 
sencillez, todo este proceso de introducción ﬁ losóﬁ ca del derecho a 
la diferencia, gracias a un enriquecimiento del concepto de igualdad 
heredado de la modernidad.
 “Es así como el discurso del reconocimiento se ha vuelto familiar para 
nosotros en dos niveles: primero, en la esfera íntima, donde comprende-
mos que la formación de la identidad y del yo tiene lugar en un diálogo 
sostenido y en pugna con los otros signiﬁ cantes. Y luego en la esfera 
pública, donde la política del reconocimiento igualitario ha llegado a 
desempeñar un papel cada vez mayor. [...] Deseo concentrarme aquí 
en la esfera pública [...]. En realidad ha llegado a signiﬁ car dos cosas 
bastante distintas, relacionadas, respectivamente, con [...] dos cambios 
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principales [...]. Con el tránsito del honor a la dignidad sobrevino la 
política del universalismo que subraya la dignidad igual de todos los 
ciudadanos. [...] Por contraste, el segundo cambio, el desarrollo del 
concepto moderno de identidad, hizo surgir la política de la diferencia. 
Desde luego, también ésta tiene una base universalista, que causa [...] 
una confusión entre ambas. [...] Con la política de la dignidad igualitaria 
lo que se establece pretende ser universalmente lo mismo, una «canasta» 
idéntica de derechos e inmunidades; con la política de la diferencia, lo que 
pedimos que sea reconocido es la identidad única de este individuo o de 
este grupo, el hecho de que es distinto de todos los demás. La idea es que, 
precisamente, esta condición de ser distinto es la que se ha pasado por 
alto, ha sido objeto de glosas y asimilada por una identidad dominante 
y mayoritaria. Y esta asimilación es el pecado cardinal contra el ideal de 
autenticidad” [Taylor, 2003, p. 59-61].
La salvaguarda de este desiderátum moderno de autenticidad o 
ﬁ delidad a uno mismo, aunque integrando el factor comunitario en la 
modelación del yo personal, acerca a Taylor al designio rougemontiano 
de búsqueda de sentido existencial dentro de la vocación individual 
de cada ser humano. La común orientación de ambos pensadores, 
epistemológicamente hermenéutica y antropológicamente relacional, 
lo facilita en mayor grado.
III
En beneﬁ cio de una mejor fundamentación de la democracia moderna 
así como de una mejor respuesta a los problemas y desafíos futuros 
que acompañan su desarrollo presente, ﬁ nalmente, en este último 
apartado vamos a contrastar la convergencia de perspectivas, parcial 
pero complementaria, que, desde parámetros ﬁ losóﬁ cos y metodologías 
diferentes aunque en diálogo, se puede detectar entre la teoría crítica de 
una democracia deliberativa abierta a un universalismo interactivo y 
globalizado en Seyla Benhabib, el “liberalismo sustantivo o comunitario” 
de Charles Taylor y el federalismo integral de Denis de Rougemont. 
Se trata, por tanto, de una apuesta común, aunque desde plurales y 
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a veces muy diferentes matices, a favor de un ser humano auténtica-
mente libre pero enraizado en su entorno sociocultural, a la vez que 
ética y cívicamente responsable de los otros ciudadanos en pro de la 
creación de las mejores condiciones político-jurídicas e institucionales 
para el desarrollo de la personalidad de todos los miembros del demos 
o comunidad democrática.
En esta labor, tras haber comentado ya los posicionamientos de 
Benhabib y Taylor con anterioridad, nos corresponde ahora exponer, 
en síntesis, el pensamiento rougemontiano: un federalismo integral 
de base personalista que bien podría traducirse en la actualidad como 
un humanismo cívico y federalista a favor de una posmodernidad 
constructiva [Martínez i Seguí, 2009].
Al aproximarnos a la figura y a la obra del suizo Denis de 
Rougemont (1906-1985), nos hallamos, si se nos permite la expresión, 
ante un auténtico humanista del siglo XX en el sentido clásico de la 
palabra. Hay en él una reﬂ exión centrada en la dignidad y la libertad 
inalienables de toda persona humana, siempre desde la exigencia de 
arraigo al contexto histórico y, más profundamente, a la experiencia 
vital que le ha tocado vivir a cada persona concreta. Tal perspectiva 
lo acerca, indiscutiblemente, al nervio intelectual de otros grandes 
moralistas coetáneos, como José Ortega y Gasset, George Orwell o 
Albert Camus. Aunque, a diferencia de éstos, mantiene una volun-
tad constante de diálogo ﬁ losóﬁ co entre su fe cristiana, de confesión 
reformada, y la cultura moderna, de cuño laico y plural. En este 
sentido, elabora una antropología ﬁ losóﬁ ca propia, inserta dentro 
de la esfera de los variados personalismos comunitarios, llegando 
incluso, durante sus últimos años posteriores al mayo de 1968, a 
cultivar un pionero discurso posmoderno de carácter ecologista 
y cívicamente constructivo, lejano en todo caso del nihilismo y el 
relativismo cultural. 
Asimismo, la reciente conmemoración de la efeméride del 500 ani-
versario del nacimiento de Juan Calvino en 1509 junto a la emergencia, 
a lo largo de las últimas décadas, de una renovada y más profundizada 
investigación historiográﬁ ca en torno al inﬂ ujo directo ejercido por la 
reforma protestante sobre el surgimiento del vector libertario y fede-
ralista de la modernidad política –ampliando e incluso corrigiendo en 
distintos puntos la visión tradicional ﬁ jada por Georg Jellinek y Max 
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Weber–, incitan hoy a acometer la actualización crítica del humanismo 
social de inspiración calvinista [Rivera, 1999]. Una tradición de ideas 
preliberales, casi olvidada por falta de estudios, que inspiró a Europa 
el tránsito del Renacimiento al Barroco, oponiendo el modelo de unas 
instituciones republicanas y federalistas al asentamiento triunfante 
de la soberanía del Estado moderno absolutista. De esta manera, en 
medio del s.XX, conforme bien explicita André Biéler [Biéler, 1961], 
la ﬁ losofía personalista de inspiración protestante, de autores como 
Rougemont, representa un ﬁ el reﬂ ejo evolucionado de ese humanismo 
social genuino de Calvino, aunque no distorsionado por el postrer 
puritanismo. Además, lo mismo se puede aﬁ rmar de la ﬁ losofía social 
y política rougemontiana, el federalismo integral, heredera de autores 
calvinistas de primera hora como Johannes Althusius, como también 
del Rousseau elogioso de las virtudes de la pequeña república gine-
brina, de los Federalist Papers norteamericanos y, en gran medida, del 
segundo Proudhon, aquél que apostaba por el federalismo político y 
el mutualismo socioeconómico.
En consecuencia, desde estos parámetros, a continuación esboza-
remos de forma breve los perﬁ les de la obra rougemontiana, en ver-
dad copiosa y multidisciplinar, reﬁ riéndonos sobretodo a su ﬁ losofía 
moral, social, política e incluso jurídica. Propósito que no nos evitará 
la necesidad de plasmar también las bases metafísicas, antropológicas 
y epistemológicas sobre las que se levanta su modelo de “federalismo 
integral”, enraizado, ciertamente, en el ejemplo histórico de su Suiza 
natal.
En primer lugar, la variedad de estudios y matices propios de 
Rougemont no obstan a la integración del conjunto de las materias 
tratadas dentro de una perspectiva global no sistemática, deudora en 
gran medida de las ideas de P.-J. Proudhon. Es el método dialéctico 
de la antinomia constructiva en diálogo permanente, una paradoja 
estructurada con argumentos a contrario. Se trata pues de un enfo-
que relacional de la realidad humana, basado en la razonabilidad 
práctica y opuesto a cualquier tipo de sistema racionalista y formal 
cerrado en sí mismo; en especial al del idealismo hegeliano con sus 
derivaciones y al del cientiﬁ cismo positivista. Sin embargo, sería 
erróneo deducir de aquí una organicidad metodológica indescifrable 
que ocultara las partes en el todo. Semejante peligro se conjura con 
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éxito desde una doble acción complementaria: 1) La percepción clara 
del conﬂ icto antinómico a modo de una dinámica entre lo uno y lo 
diverso, entre la unidad y la pluralidad, valores ambos esenciales. 
2) La lectura hermenéutica circular de la globalidad de la obra que, 
no obstante, incide de igual forma sobre la autonomía de cada uno 
de los niveles.
En segundo lugar, cabe destacar que, desde el decenio de 1930 hasta 
su muerte, el personalismo comunitario se mantendría como la ﬁ losofía 
matriz y nunca abandonada desde la que Rougemont construiría la 
visión del mundo que le es singular; estrechamente imbricada en una 
sensibilidad existencial emanada del protestantismo de inspiración 
calvinista y, más concretamente, de la obra teológica de Karl Barth. De 
ahí que, desde una actitud de “pesimismo activo”, se encuentre lejos 
del planteamiento de una renovada cristiandad, desde la autonomía 
de lo temporal, propuesta por el neotomista Jacques Maritain y, en 
contraste, mucho más cercano a la nueva civilización secularizada 
buscada por Emmanuel Mounier, es decir, a una sociedad plural de 
hombres libres y responsables, donde la “primacía de lo espiritual” 
guíe a cristianos y no creyentes.
Seguidamente, Rougemont considera que este humanismo de 
base cristiana debe ponerse en comunicación dialógica con el otro 
humanismo occidental, el surgido de la modernidad, el cual, no obs-
tante, sería parcialmente rechazado por lo que respecta a las notas de 
individualismo y racionalismo que lo acompañan. Con esto, el pensador 
helvético, de acuerdo con el conjunto del personalismo, alimenta una 
aspiración sincera a “rehacer el Renacimiento”, como decía Mounier, 
a enmendar los déﬁ cits y los errores detectados en el interior de la 
tradición cultural moderna sin renunciar a sus éxitos obvios. Por eso 
mismo, utilizando la terminología acuñada por la Escuela de Frankfurt, 
su pensamiento se torna una respuesta a tener en cuenta cuando se 
constatan los fracasos y las carencias surgidos de la propia “dialéctica 
de la Ilustración”.
Sin embargo, a pesar de esta coherencia ejemplar en las ideas, 
expresada también en un compromiso cívico y político consecuente, 
su ﬁ gura no se libró de graves ataques y difamaciones en medio de 
las frecuentes controversias intelectuales y vaivenes ideológicos que 
salpicaron el pasado siglo. Así, en referencia a la última década del 
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período de entreguerras, un sector historiográﬁ co minoritario (Zeev 
Sternhell, Bernard-Henri Lévy…) le ha acusado, junto al grueso de 
jóvenes personalistas, de colaborar al deterioro de las ya de por sí 
debilitadas instituciones democráticas con el uso de un lenguaje con-
testatario, próximo al del fascismo. Esta reprobación es difícilmente 
sostenible no sólo por sus numerosos compromisos mantenidos, a lo 
largo de los años, a favor de las libertades y en contra de las hegemo-
nías autoritarias –colaboración con Vendredi (órgano de expresión del 
Frente Popular francés), crítica lúcida al nazismo (Journal d’Allemagne, 
1938) y apoyo a la resistencia interior a Hitler (movimiento evangélico 
de la Iglesia Confesante)…–, sino también y sobretodo por la labor 
fundamental de regeneración democrática que el ideario personalista 
propició después de 1945.
Además, durante la segunda posguerra hasta ﬁ nales de los sesenta, 
el comunismo junto a la izquierda neutralista y ﬁ locomunista, Mounier 
y la revista francesa Esprit incluidos, le acusaron, junto al resto de 
miembros del federalismo integral, de atlantista y subordinado a los 
intereses norteamericanos en razón de su apoyo decidido al euro-
peísmo. Hasta incluso, después del mayo de 1968 y del pavor ante el 
descubrimiento del Gulag soviético –que, por fín, permitió superar 
los impedimentos para la generalización del discurso antitotalitario 
en Occidente–, el giro de Rougemont hacia la ecología política y el 
diálogo con la contracultura de izquierda, en especial con el sector más 
preocupado por la recreación de la dimensión comunitaria del vínculo 
social, le causó el menosprecio y las injurias más feroces por parte del 
neoconservadurismo liberal naciente.
En tercer lugar, transﬁ riendo los conceptos antropológicos y 
epistemológicos al orden de la ﬁ losofía moral y jurídica, la dignidad 
de la persona humana, libre y responsable ante la comunidad, junto 
a la dinámica antinómica de la unidad en la diversidad, expresan una 
exigencia ética básica: la urgencia de su garantía complementaria a 
través de una “común medida humana” o mínimo común de ética 
pública. De esta manera, atendiendo al iusnaturalismo formal o 
deontológico formulado por Barth en términos teológicos y trasladado 
por Rougemont al ámbito ﬁ losóﬁ co, esta ética objetiva de carácter 
minimalista, acordada desde el diálogo entre las diferentes éticas de 
máximos presentes en la sociedad civil (religiones, culturas, ﬁ losofías 
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de vida…), constituye un “derecho natural humano de contenido his-
tórico y variable”. En última instancia, esta “común medida humana”, 
llamada a nutrir un prolíﬁ co civismo ciudadano, sirve de legitimación 
para dotar a los derechos humanos de una fundamentación univer-
salista y, además, representa el elemento axiológico ineludible que 
el contrato político debe tener en cuenta a la hora de vertebrar un 
Estado democrático de derecho.
En cuarto lugar, a nivel de ﬁ losofía sociopolítica, el federalismo 
integral, desde la separación entre sociedad civil y Estado, se muestra 
como una concepción global de la actividad humana y, en concreto, de las 
relaciones públicas, con un sentido extenso de la política, abarcando, de 
forma complementaria, tanto una dimensión público-social como una 
dimensión público-estatal. Así, la ﬁ losofía política federalista, emanada 
del personalismo y no carente de inspiración helvética, se deﬁ ne en 
Rougemont a modo de un “contractualismo cooperativo”, que, según 
él, encuentra sus raíces históricas en la tradición democratizadora y 
libertaria de la modernidad.
Enfrentada pues, dentro de un esquema dual, a la otra tradición 
política moderna, la unitaria –que de Maquiavelo y Bodin conduce 
al Estado-nación, al nacionalismo y, en último término, al totali-
tarismo–, esa línea de pensamiento rougemontiano, regida por la 
meta de organización de las libertades humanas, se remontaría al 
institucionalismo republicano de inspiración renacentista, culmi-
nado con la obra del calvinista Althusius. Quien, en tránsito entre 
el adiós al organicismo medieval y el anuncio del liberalismo pos-
terior, formuló un primer federalismo. Asimismo, heredero de éste 
en el contexto del s.XX, el federalismo integral de raíz personalista 
postula, por medio de la política, la necesaria transformación de la 
razón de Estado –de los ﬁ nes uniformizadores excluyentes hacia el 
interior y de conquista hacia el exterior– en unos ﬁ nes cívicos de la 
persona. Y, por tanto, se ubica, a título de tercera vía, tanto entre el 
liberalismo individualista y el socialismo colectivista, como también 
entre el mismo individualismo liberal y el comunitarismo holista, 
cerrado sobre sí mismo.
De esta manera, la relación federativa se entiende a guisa de una 
comunidad de comunidades orgánicas y, a la vez, autónomas, donde 
cada una de ellas se estructura en una democracia de la participación 
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cívico-política y de la previsión socioeconómica (en pro de un mínimo 
social garantizado). Bajo la inﬂ uencia autogestionaria de Proudhon, la 
organización política de inspiración federal se vertebra de abajo hacia 
arriba, a través de una especie de teoría de conjuntos, más o menos 
concéntricos. Estos círculos de articulación de la convivencia humana, 
que también connotan una identiﬁ cación comunitaria del vínculo social, 
crean la red de una democracia ascendente, que, progresivamente, va 
ampliándose del espacio local y regional al continental, pasando por 
el estatal, hasta llegar al mundial. En todo caso, la región, deﬁ nida a 
la vez por criterios socioeconómicos y étnico-culturales, es concebida 
como ente principal de participación cívico-política. No es casualidad 
pues que, desde inicios de los años sesenta, Rougemont fuera uno de 
los impulsores más decididos de la idea de la “Europa de las regiones” 
(“Europa de los pueblos o de las etnias” en la versión más etnicista de 
Guy Héraud).
Cabe enfatizar, como ya se presumirá, que el “contractualismo 
cooperativo” rougemontiano está sustentado en los cuatro princi-
pios básicos que destila la tradición federalista, es decir, autonomía, 
cooperación-solidaridad, participación y subsidiariedad. Debido a 
ello, este discurso conduce, en deﬁ nitiva, a diseñar una auténtica 
democracia sustantiva, superadora del modelo democrático formal 
del liberalismo clásico. Se trata de la suma, en interacción com-
plementaria, entre una democracia liberal y representativa y una 
democracia participativa. Hecho que produce el resultado de dividir 
y distribuir en mayor medida los poderes, así como de difundir la 
iniciativas y los controles, más allá del cuadro institucional y ver-
tical del Estado, en dirección hacia la sociedad civil de estructura 
horizontal. Lo cual redunda en beneﬁ cio de unos ciudadanos y 
unos grupos sociales que ven aumentada la responsabilidad sobre 
su futuro, a la vez que incrementan la posibilidad activa de ejercer 
sus derechos y libertades.
Para una mejor comprensión, lo resumimos en la siguiente tabla, 
donde se puede apreciar la tensión complementaria entre dos conjuntos 
de ideas-fuerza:
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Democracia liberal y 
representativa (clásica)
Elemento cuantitativo.• 
Razón teórica o • mos geometricus.
Autonomía.• 
Igualación jurídica de carácter • 
formal.
Sujetos: individuo abstracto y • 
Estado.
Contrato: intersubjetividad • 
simétrica y formal dentro de los 
campos del Estado y del derecho. 
Se corresponde con el espacio 
público-estatal.
Principio de legalidad.• 
Lógica de los derechos, individua-• 
les o colectivos, con primacía de 
los primeros sobre los segundos. 
División de poderes del Estado • 
y representación política de los 
ciudadanos.
Democracia participativa
Elemento cualitativo.• 
Razón práctica o razonabilidad.• 
Responsabilidad.• 
Igual dignidad moral de todo ser • 
humano dentro de la diferencia, 
la alteridad y el conﬂ icto.
Sujetos: Persona concreta en • 
sus circunstancias vitales y 
comunidades intermedias o 
“naturales”.
Alianza comunitaria: • 
intersubjetividad asimétrica y 
sustantiva dentro de los ámbitos 
de la sociedad civil y de la ética 
pública. Se identiﬁ ca con el 
espacio público-social. 
Principio minimalista de justicia • 
pública (que sirve de conexión 
entre las éticas privadas de 
máximos y el derecho, desde los 
parámetros de un iusnaturalismo 
formal o deontológico).
Lógica de los deberes morales, • 
basada en el respeto a la ética 
pública, que se resume en un 
único deber jurídico de respeto a 
los derechos de los otros.
Autogestión directa y • 
organización subsidiaria de abajo 
hacia arriba.
Por otro lado, el federalismo integral, en virtud del instrumento 
metodológico que le proporciona la hermenéutica fenomenológica, plan-
tea un paradigma identitario basado en el “pluralismo de ﬁ delidades” 
o pluripertenencia a distintas comunidades de sentido, más o menos 
concéntricas. Abjura así de cualquier tipo de monismo etnocéntrico, 
reductor de la condición humana, y, en especial, del que se identi-
ﬁ ca como nacionalista. Pero también se aleja de toda fragmentación 
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atomizadora que, desde el relativismo cultural, quiera legitimar alguna 
forma de discurso multiculturalista de carácter formal, el cual, a la 
postre, llega a legitimar paradójicamente los guetos comunitaristas. 
Así pues, en oposición a un cosmopolitismo abstracto y racionalista de 
origen ilustrado, Rougemont opta por otro discurso universalista que, 
no obstante, mantiene su arraigo en las realidades concretas vividas 
por la persona. Aquí se haya una voluntad de búsqueda constante de 
la comunión humana, de relación intercultural feraz –diríamos en 
terminología actual–, mediante la tensión ﬂ exible entre la unidad y la 
diversidad. Encontramos, por tanto, una misma y sola actitud espiritual 
y ﬁ losóﬁ ca que se repite y atraviesa de forma similar los diferentes nive-
les del pensamiento rougemontiano: desde la antropología personalista 
y la política federalista hasta el fomento del ecumenismo cristiano e 
incluso de un pionero “diálogo de las culturas” –diseño inicial, ya desde 
comienzos del decenio de 1960 en medio del marco poco propicio de la 
Guerra Fría, de lo que hoy se conoce como diálogo intercultural.
En quinto lugar, se evidencia, desde inicios de la década de 1970, 
la confección de una ecología política de impronta personalista, cola-
borando así en la génesis de la ecoética contemporánea. Próximo al 
ecologismo humanista de Fritz Schumacher, el “ecologismo persona-
lista” de Rougemont constituye una resistencia contra la civilización 
industrial moderna, contra la tecnocracia estatalista y el gigantismo 
cuantitativo macroeconómico y, como no podría ser de otra manera, 
contra su violencia destructiva del equilibrio medioambiental y del 
hábitat natural de la persona. Hay aquí una llamada a la responsabilidad 
solidaria y al cultivo de unas mejores condiciones cualitativas para la 
vida humana, que, irremisiblemente, pasan por la revalorización de 
lo pequeño y frugal.
Sobre estas perspectivas, promotoras de un desarrollo sostenible, 
se engendra un patrón socioeconómico rougemontiano de carácter 
autogestionario, ecoregionalista y federalista, bastante alejado del neo-
liberalismo imperante hoy. Y de ahí surge el requerimiento a la unidad 
de acción entre los movimientos ecologistas, regionalistas y federalistas 
europeos, ya que los tres se encuentran vinculados, orgánicamente, 
como rechazo a un mundo de opresiones uniformizadoras.
En sexto lugar, cabe enfatizar el reiterado talante utópico de la obra 
de Denis de Rougemont, que radica en el uso de la razón práctica en 
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provecho de una revisión crítica de la utopía moderna. Pues, al rehuir 
el idealismo irrealizable de inspiración platónica, se acoge a un tipo de 
utopía caracterizado por la adopción de una teleología realista, crítica y 
humanista. Realista, porque, desde una conciencia temporal reﬂ exiva, 
arraiga en la historia y cuenta con los conocimientos prospectivos de 
las ciencias (en cuestiones como la demografía, la ecología…). Crítica, 
porque se fundamenta en un conocimiento prudencial y razonable de 
rasgos éticos. Y humanista, porque, incluyendo la dimensión afectiva de 
los sentimientos, está abierta a la prospección intuitiva de un futuro pro-
gresivamente más liberador o emancipador de la condición humana.
Tal razón práctica de cuño utópico se erige a modo de una “pros-
pectiva personalista” del sujeto humano inmerso en la historia. 
Consecuentemente, la política asume el papel de instrumento privi-
legiado de esa prospectiva hacia la satisfacción de mayores cuotas de 
libertad y justicia para toda la humanidad.
En séptimo y último lugar, en atención a una de las reﬂ exiones 
rougemontianas más inﬂ uyentes en la historia reciente, la meditación 
sobre Europa, cabe señalar la interrelación entre dos conceptos clave: el 
de europeidad cultural y el de europeísmo político. Ya en 1945, a penas 
ﬁ nalizada la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Denis de Rougemont insistiría 
en su centralidad al adherirse a los postulados del político demócrata 
cristiano francés Robert Schuman, quien se refería a la posibilidad 
de construcción política del continente europeo sobre el cimiento de 
una unidad cultural de base, compartida por todos los ciudadanos de 
los distintos paises europeos. Evidentemente, esta óptica distaba de la 
meramente economicista y dominante apadrinada por Jean Monnet.
Tanto es así que, en opinión del pensador suizo, el núcleo identitario 
más genuino de la europeidad, conformado por la suma histórica de 
inﬁ nitud de esfuerzos personales y comunitarios, se contiene en esos 
dos valores objetivos que deﬁ nen por ellos mismos la herencia cultural 
de Europa: de una banda, el hombre de la contradicción, esto es, el 
hombre relacional, que se formula mediante una antropología ﬁ losóﬁ ca 
de matriz humanista y muy pluralista, y de otra banda, el diálogo entre 
lo uno y lo diverso, entre la necesidad de unión y de pluralidad. De esta 
forma, la idea rougemontiana de Europa se acoge al modelo clásico de 
la tradición humanista proveniente del Renacimiento, pues para él las 
fuentes grecorromanas y judeocristianas son fundamentales. Aunque, 
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integrando además la sensibilidad existencial contemporánea –a tra-
vés de la ﬁ losofía personalista–, renueva el perﬁ l de una Europa que 
queda abierta a la contradicción interna, al diálogo constante con otros 
espacios de civilización y, a la postre, a la creación renovadora fruto de 
las inacabables y sucesivas tensiones. En resumen, para Rougemont, la 
orientación histórica de la cultura europea tiende hacia la articulación 
de un cosmopolitismo pluralista y arraigado en la realidad concreta.
Asimismo, la europeidad, como memoria cultural y fuente de 
valores teleológicos para proyectar el futuro, requiere, según él, un 
correlativo europeísmo político de inspiración federalista. Este último 
aparece a modo de culminación y garantía de la cultura europea que lo 
ha modelado en su nacimiento. Inevitablemente, dentro de tal perspec-
tiva, el referente helvético está presente en contra de una indeseable 
balcanización. En ese sentido, el ﬁ lósofo alemán Karl Jaspers apoyaría 
esta visión rougemontiana durante los primeros años de la segunda 
posguerra, identiﬁ cándose así con la deﬁ nición de una Europa cir-
cunscrita no por criterios geográﬁ cos o políticos, sino culturales y 
espirituales. En la más inmediata actualidad, intelectuales inﬂ uyentes 
en el proceso de construcción europea, como el francés Edgar Morin y 
el polaco Bronislaw Geremek, reivindican también el inﬂ ujo vigoroso de 
Rougemont sobre sus respectivas visiones del hecho europeo [Morin, 
1989 y Geremek, 2007].
En todo caso, para evitar cualquier acusación de eurocentrismo, 
al hilo de lo que decimos, el  pensador suizo remarca la vocación uni-
versal y universalizante de la cultura europea y del federalismo que 
le es propio. Actitud que, opuesta al unilateralismo actual de la teoría 
realista neoconservadora en relaciones internacionales, se aleja de 
cualquier aspiración neoimperialista. Y, por tanto, responde, más bien, 
a un discurso articulador de la sociedad internacional, no sólo europea 
sino también mundial, buscando fundamentarse en el derecho y en las 
instituciones multilaterales de cooperación, abiertas a una creciente 
red de poderes supranacionales multinivel.
En conclusión, después de analizar de forma resumida el conjunto 
de la ﬁ losofía sociopolítica de Denis de Rougemont, es conveniente 
realizar una reﬂ exión ﬁ nal de carácter general. Así, atendiendo a todo 
lo expuesto con antelación, podemos aseverar que, más allá del cuadro 
de coordenadas históricas en que fueron concebidos los diferentes 
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escritos rougemontianos [de Rougemont, 1934, 1936, 1937, 1939, 1942, 
1977, 1994a, 1994b], en el tiempo presente gozan de un valor aleccio-
nador para fecundar una posmodernidad humanista y resistente 
–antagónica de aquella más popularizada que se suele asociar con un 
pensamiento débil, líquido y nihilista. Y, en ﬁ n, su contemporaneidad, 
parangonable en muchos aspectos a reﬂ exiones coincidentes de Ch. 
Taylor y S. Benhabib –a pesar de las orientaciones epistemológicas 
y de contenido ﬁ losóﬁ co que les diferencian–, es palpable cuando se 
considera la realidad de diversos problemas actuales ya tratados, o al 
menos intuidos de forma prematura, en su corpus ﬁ losóﬁ co, a saber: la 
fundamentación universalista de los derechos humanos como justiﬁ ca-
ción irrenunciable de la democracia; la conformación de unos derechos 
de tercera generación, marcados por el valor de solidaridad humana, 
como salvaguarda de la diferencia cultural y del respeto al medio 
ambiente; el diálogo como instrumento de conciliación entre culturas 
y religiones diversas; la promoción de una democracia participativa 
basada en una sociedad civil activa y responsable que se sustente en 
una mínima ética pública compartida; la crisis del Estado-nación, tanto 
a nivel supranacional como infraestatal, y el consiguiente reto en pro 
de una política de inspiración federalista que garantice la unidad en la 
diversidad entre los distintos niveles de decisión política…
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DEMOCRACY IS NOW ONE OF THE MOST COMMON TERMS USED IN PUBLIC RHETO-
RIC;, however, it seldom serves as an object of philosophical reﬂ ection. 
Democracy could sometimes appear as a ‘worn out’, devaluated notion, 
deprived of any clear sense. The speciﬁ c situation with democracy in 
post-communist countries in fact resembles their recent past – the 
usage of the word ‘democracy’ equals to that of ‘communism’ several 
decades ago: the term is being widely used in ofﬁ cial discourse, but 
nobody takes it for real. As Ukrainian sociologist Iryna Popova explains 
that situation: 
…parading the ‘democracy’ of our society, constant usage of the term 
‘democracy’ in the situation of lawlessness and actual violation of people’s 
rights, considerable spreading of poorness and poverty is a blasphemy, 
because it leads to devaluation of that word, to the commonplace percep-
tion of democracy as a situation where ‘everything goes’, and ‘a plain man’ 
has no protection against that. In other words, against the background 
of our practices that term obtains the sense directly opposite to what a 
researcher means by it [Popova, 2008, p. 19–20]. 
That is, the today’s popular term ‘democracy’ often describes a 
situation quite different from what democracy really (classically and 
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theoretically) is. And the fact that many today’s born democrats in 
Ukraine and other countries of the ex-USSR are former convinced 
communists only strengthens the idea that ‘democracy’ could be 
perceived rather as a keyword that denotes belonging of titular 
‘democrats’ to the self-proclaimed ‘power party’. Indeed, some lead-
ers of the former USSR republics in 1991 have just renamed their 
parties ‘democratic’ instead of ‘communist’, and then they were 
elected presidents. At the same time, authors from both East and 
West, like Alexander Zinovyev or Colin Crouch, tend to describe 
the contemporary social situation as a ‘post-democracy’ [Crouch, 
2004; Zinovyev, 2006].
Nevertheless, we still believe that phenomenon of democracy 
should not be reduced to its ‘Realpolitik’ connotation, providing the 
space for its philosophical comprehension – and its true realization. 
Democracy from the philosophical perspective is not just a given state 
of affairs, a certain way of organizing the political system (featuring 
general elections, parliament, freedom of speech etc. etc.) – it is rather 
an ideal image of harmonious social life, which could indeed be pre-
sented as a process of its development and its implementation in reality 
for every human person. 
Our position here is close to the tradition of participatory democ-
racy and opposes a neo-classical understanding of democracy, that of 
Schumpeter or Sartori, who present democracy as a limited form of élite 
activity. We would like to cite the criticism of that position by Canadian 
theoretician of participatory democracy, C. B. Macpherson: 
The model of democracy that has been raised to orthodoxy in American 
political science… is counter-democratic (by the older concept of democ-
racy) in that it empties out, as being normative, unrealistic, or utopian, 
the egalitarian and developmental moral ideal of the original liberal-
democratic theory, and accepts as an adequate model (and proclaims as 
the only accurate model) of democracy, a competition between two or 
more élite groups for the power to govern the whole society. Democracy 
is held to be consistent with, and even to require, a low level of citizen 
participation: only so, it is said, is the political system likely to stay in 
equilibrium. Democracy is reduced from a humanist aspiration to a 
market equilibrium system. And although the new orthodox theory 
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claims scientiﬁ c neutrality, its value judgment is clear enough: whatever 
works, is right – that is, whatever enables the existing class-stratiﬁ ed 
society to operate without intolerable friction is best [Macpherson, 
1973, p. 78–79]. 
At the same time, striving for representing democracy as a proc-
ess of achieving the ideal without any limitations and reservations is 
not necessarily an unreal enterprise criticized by theoreticians of élite 
democracy for its utopist inclinations. In fact, American champion of 
participatory democracy Benjamin Barber argues that there are already 
two types of democracy present in today’s society: ofﬁ cial democracy 
with its ‘Big politics’, party intrigues, corruption and bureaucracy, – and 
real ‘neighborhood democracy’ with its practice of local self-government 
and grassroots voluntary activities. That’s why, according to Barber, we 
have to expand our understanding of what counts as democratic, rather 
than expanding democracy itself [Barber, 1984, p.XIV]. However we 
think that the philosophical approach to democracy is aimed at limiting 
that understanding rather than expanding it – for every philosophical 
deﬁ nition sets strict limitations to a term in order to differentiate the 
entity it designates out from things unﬁ t for the notion in question. In 
other words, democracy is to be distinguished from other phenomena 
that exist in our society and title themselves as democracy while being 
indeed something very different.
So, how should philosophy understand the term ‘democracy’? 
The most simple and usual one is the understanding of democracy 
as just ‘power of the people’, as the people’s sovereignty, where the 
people are the source, the bearers, and the conductors of power. Such 
a formulation presented an adequate guideline and served as a road-
map for social and political structure during the age of Absolutism, 
for then the usual reality was the dominance of a sole monarch or a 
narrow circle of persons possessing power either by force or by the 
right of birth. Then the ideal of the power for all the people – and 
not one single person or single exclusive estate – was progressive 
and revolutionary. 
But today such an approach to understanding and deﬁ ning 
democracy turns out to be very abstract – that is, not clear enough 
in order to serve as a lodestar in the semidarkness of the political life 
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of our society, which already titles itself as ‘democratic’. As Barber 
states, “The history of democracy itself is contained in the history of 
the word democracy” [Barber, 1984, p. 195]. In our opinion, the his-
tory of democracy is a development of both people (‘δήμος’) and power 
(‘κράτος’), concretizing the phenomena that constitute democracy 
notion. In Ancient times, the democracy of poleis was based on the 
labor of masses of slaves, deprived of any rights, even of the right 
to be considered as a human being. The ‘δήμος’ (the people who 
can be and are subjects of democracy) never meant all the popula-
tion in general. In other words, ‘the people’ here are certainly not 
the demos we often refer to when we talk about true democracy in 
the contemporary meaning of the word. Medieval European cities, 
which also featured some form of democracy, supplied obstacles of 
similar kind as well. Until the end of the 18th c., strict qualiﬁ cations 
based on property or social status prevented many people from 
participating in political life, let alone providing for their ability to 
serve as subjects of power. Gradually, in the course of time, the slaves, 
the serfs, the workers, the poor, women, national minorities, and 
other groups and strata are tending to be included into the notion 
of ‘demos’, into the volume of people formally subject to be bearers 
and conductors of power. 
Thus, ‘national democracy’ discovers that different ethnic groups 
have equal rights for participation in the life of society. Similarly, social 
democracy defends rights of the poor, and stands for equality of all 
human beings irrelevant to their social and economical positions. In 
20th c., we could observe those two ways of comprehending the notion 
of people serving as ideologies under emerged state organizations 
alternative to the older liberal representative democracy that prevailed 
mostly in Western Europe and North America: the USSR and other 
socialist countries preferred a social aspect of democracy, their ‘peo-
ple democracy’ being quite anti-liberal, but with a considerable level 
of social justice achieved; while young democracies of the so called 
‘Third world’ represented mostly colonial and post-colonial countries 
ﬁ ghting for their national freedom and comprehending democracy 
from its national perspective. We prefer to use Greek words denot-
ing different aspects of ‘the people’ notion to accentuate such ways of 
comprehending democracy (See Fig. 1). 
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Fig. 1. Different aspects of ‘the people’ notion and forms of democracy related to them.
Those named forms of democracy, – or, it would be better to say, 
those stages of democracy as a process that augment each other rather than 
oppose each other, – while remaining actual under present-day situation, 
are still abstract in relation to further possible (theoretical) concretization 
of what democracy really is. Thus, the idea of national democracy faces 
irreversible impact of globalization processes; socialist ideas of people’s 
democracy are mostly collapsed as well. Another problem with formal 
empowerment of greater and greater number of people with the right to 
be bearers and conductors of power is that the keyword here is ‘formal’. 
It is of no use to go into length while proving that proclamation of the 
power of the people, let with the most progressive and expanded mean-
ing of the latter notion, is in no way the real ability of each person to act 
as the subject of the life of his or her society. That is, the next stage of 
development would involve a development of universal notion of people 
regardless of their political, social, or national status.
On the other hand, the notion of power is no less complex and subject 
to development. In Greek, as well as in other languages, there are dif-
ferent nuances of the word ‘power’. First, it is the initial term ‘κράτος’, 
power as wraparound dominance and possession, peculiar to the past 
historical forms of total supremacy. Second, it is a more gentile ‘ÜÜÜÜÜ’ – 
power as guidance, management, rule, and administration. Regardless 
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of the two terms since Aristotle’s time being used mostly as synonyms 
(say, both monarchy and aristocracy were described by the philosopher 
as ‘right’ forms of government, while oligarchy and democracy having 
been declared to be ‘deviant’), their etymological distinction is not casu-
istic nor idle philological whimsy. French poet and journalist Charles 
Péguy, one of the few thinkers who stated the substantial difference of 
the two types of power, a hundred years ago used to construct a whole 
conception: power as dominance is the power over somebody, while 
power-governance is the power to do something [Péguy, 1987, p.1803]. 
However, there is a third notion of power not mentioned by Péguy, – it is 
‘εξουσία’ – power-ability, which is more than power-governance entitled 
to be denoted as power to act and to create something. 
By the way, it is the third word that is being used to designate the 
notion of power in the Greek text of the New Testament, in the well-
known words by Apostle Paul: “For there is no power but of God” 
(Rom. 13:1). This expression, especially in the 20th c., has aroused much 
bewilderment of interpreters: does any power really originate in God 
according to the Christian teaching, even that of Hitler or Stalin? Such 
bewilderment is indeed an example of unjustiﬁ ed (both philologically and 
philosophically) mixture of different meanings of ‘power”: it is ÜÜÜÜÜÜÜ 
being used in the original, and neither ‘kratos’ nor ‘archos’, which are 
not to be equaled to ‘eksousia’ – as ability to create anything is beyond 
all doubts given by God, and that’s what the epistle in question states.
Fig. 2. The three types of power and their connotation
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The distinction of the three denoted types of power [Fig. 2, See: 
Tolstoukhov, Parapan, Mielkov, 2008], power as dominance, power as 
administration, and power as ability, can help us to follow the history 
of the becoming of power phenomenon (and that of our understand-
ing of this complex social entity), as well as to ground philosophy 
of democracy as the activity on forming values and goals of human 
social development as well. Following the distinction of notions we 
propose, democracy is literally not ‘people’s power’, but rather ‘people’s 
supremacy’. However, as we already noted, it historically became a 
custom that such usual Greek terms as, for instance, ‘autocracy’ and 
‘monarchy’, are practically identical. Basing on our point of view, that 
is not always the case. Under formal supremacy of the people (in all 
the historical variety of the latter term) the real governance often turns 
to be a monopolized property of one person or several social élite 
groups. In this sense one can even speak of the existence of, so to say, 
‘democracy-monarchy’ or ‘democracy-oligarchy’. In the ﬁ rst case, the 
formal supremacy of the people is realized under ‘the guidance’ of one 
single person (an excellent example of such ‘democratic monarchy’ is 
truly the Soviet Union under Stalin); the second case represents an 
élite-based form of social and state government organization (which, 
by the way, is a much more frequent phenomenon – referring to most 
contemporary representative democracies).
At the same time, since Edmund Burke and Joseph de Maistre, up to 
Nikolai Berdyaev and Pavel Florenskiy – a great number of prominent 
thinkers had lamented that in the course of democratization, as new 
and new senses and population strata were tended to be included into 
‘demos’ entitled with power, – the quantitative side started to dominate 
over the qualitative one. Instead of considering a question on the base of 
its correspondence to the truth, there was a simple voting conducted, 
the issue being approved or rejected by the majority of voices – while 
the opinion of the majority is in no way the most correct, wise, and 
optimal, as many respected authors had stated. In other words, the 
power-ability had never practically been considered as a necessary 
supplement (and a form) of democracy. 
That means that the concretization of the notion of power must 
necessarily follow the formal expansion of the notion of people. Events 
of the 20th c. provide but evidence in support of Vilfredo Pareto’s 
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observation: history is a cemetery of aristocracies. And while sharing 
in many senses the criticism of formal democracy by aristocratically 
(qualitatively) minded thinkers, resolving that contradiction is possible 
only in the direction of further democratization. 
That direction could be designated by Barber’s apt turn of phrase: 
‘An aristocracy of everyone’ [Barber, 1994]. In the preceding historical 
times the development of one person (monarchy) or that of a narrow 
circle of persons (aristocracy/oligarchy) was possible due to slave labor 
and ignorance of peasants and artisans, who were considered by ‘noble 
and educated’ circles ﬁ rst as common and lowdown people, and later as 
depersonalized masses, while opposing them to the intelligent human 
personality. However ‘the revolt of the masses’ of our days does not 
have its goal in the death of personality, quite the opposite: the death of 
historical blind ‘mass’, its own transformation into community of devel-
oped personalities is required here, and that’s what indicates the course 
of future development. Using the proposed terminology set, that idea 
for the future development of democracy could be named ‘democracy-
panarchy’ meaning that each human person should be entitled not just 
with formal status of bearer of power, but with real power-exercising 
ability as well. As Lenin used to explain, any human being, with no 
exception, regardless of personal wealth, occupation and gender, has to 
carry his/her share of burden on governing the state. One could think 
that such a vision is rather utopian, but let us remember ancient poleis 
where every citizen did have similar responsibilities, and members of 
democratic city councils – βουλαί – were chosen by lot annually. In other 
words, any person out of the number of ‘political people’ could govern 
the state, – and the major difference between that historical example 
and the current situation is just the already noted augmentation of 
‘the people’ notion.
That means that the denoted direction of democratic development 
implies the change of the democracy’s subject and scale as well. Until 
today, the major actor of democratic power and the main space for 
democracy’s outer development and expansion was the state – more 
precisely, ‘nation-state’ of the Modern Age, which under globalization 
represents a rather archaic institute on historical arena, not coping with 
its tasks and trying to disguise its helplessness and even uselessness. 
Identiﬁ cation of democracy with structures related to state organization, 
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– like electoral system, division of power, and parliamentarianism, – 
peculiar to some investigators, contradicts both traditions of classical 
understanding of democracy as the power of all the people, and the 
already present real trends of democratization. Democracy is not simply 
the division of power, neither is it a many-party system or elections of 
representatives, – democracy is just means for optimizing social life 
so that it would better suit interests of each person. Democracy is the 
supremacy of interests neither of democrats nor of democracy itself, 
but of those of each human person. 
In our times, under globalization, the humanity faces the becoming 
of the new form, new space of democracy development – the third one, 
after (1) its antique and medieval poleis form, and (2) its nation-state 
Modern form, – the space encompassing humanity as a whole. There is 
a criticism of the nation-state postulating its irrelevance and uselessness 
in our times and appearing both from the left and from the right. We can 
just mention two books with the identical title – “The end of the nation 
state” – published in 1995. According to Japanese business-consultant 
Kenichi Ohmae, such a state lacks any meaning for global economy, it 
hampers the development of the economy with its barriers and borders 
[Ohmae, 1995, p.5]. And French diplomat Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who 
stands for more humanistic positions, thinks that nation-state is still 
too remote from the daily life in order to be able to satisfy the needs of 
concrete persons, and appears increasingly like ‘a straitjacket’ relating 
not only to economical globalization of the world, but to sovereignty, 
defense, and social justice as well [Guéhenno, 1995, p.12-13].
Champions of liberal representative democracy grounded their 
views on sincere beliefs that state power exercised by ‘all the people’ 
is technically impossible, – ‘real (direct) democracy’ was only realiz-
able in poleis or in small tribes [Schumpeter, 1975, p.245]. Should we 
agree with such a position, democracy then must be described as an 
exclusively historical phenomenon, its contemporary embodiment 
having not much in common with its glorious predecessors. Indeed, 
each and every person can never become a ruler of Modern nation 
state – but we believe that indicates not the demise of democracy (nor its 
transformation into post-democracy) under the power of such states, but 
rather a death of a nation state under the development of democracy. Every 
human cannot be a president and govern a state – but every human 
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can be a personality and govern one’s own life, while being able to fol-
low one’s own mind, in Kant’s famous words, and not trying to relieve 
oneself of that burden in favor of some elected representatives and/or 
parties. The cultural development of human personality is the key to 
achieving a democracy in society – as Maxim Gorkiy used to note in 
turbulent times of the Great Russian 1917 revolution, democracy is a 
phenomenon of culture, and not of politics nor of economy [Gorkiy, 1995].
That means that democracy now depends on (and is now to develop) 
inner human qualities rather than external social and political insti-
tutions like those of state government. Indeed, it is representative 
democracy that is found to be less possible under present-day situation. 
Representation is a form of (strictly speaking) democracy-oligarchy 
enabled by a low-level development of personalities represented – so 
that their social and political interests could be quite easily expressed 
and delegated. On the contrary, educated and culturally developed 
human personalities have political interests and preferences so vast 
and complex that they are nearly impossible to be represented by any 
other person different from the one whose interests and preferences 
we are talking about here. Complexity in interests means concretiza-
tion: each speciﬁ c case is unique for each speciﬁ c human person, so 
his or her interests and his/her power as ability to feel, to think and 
to act under concrete situation could no longer be alienated towards 
a – presumably even more competent and/or educated – representative 
as a ‘professional politician’.
Indeed, we believe that the future development of democracy 
under globalization lies not so in the disappearance of politics, as in 
its losing its status of a speciﬁ c profession, – as well as not in the disap-
pearance of nation-states, as in them losing their exclusive quality of 
being the arena and the embodiment of political and social human life. 
State, as predicted by Friedrich Engels more than a hundred years 
ago, is being replaced by Gemeinwesen, that is – by ‘a commonwealth 
of communities’, with each personality participating in activities of 
different self-organized communities, holding ‘power’ authority posi-
tions basing on his or her imminent competence in the relevant practice, 
the dichotomy of private/public sphere obviously losing its relevance. 
The power as the ability to act and to create, as opposed to power as 
dominance, and politics as an activity of exercising the said power, 
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is being decentralized and spread out in all multitudes of spheres of 
human life and activity, from family, workplace, and neighborhood, 
up to the humankind in general.
Thus, we can summarize that today’s democratization processes of 
the world are indeed correlative to philosophical musings on democ-
racy as the process of approaching the optimal social and political 
organization. Democracy process as formal extension of ‘demos’ notion 
entitling all the people with no exception with the right to be subjects 
of power must be followed by concretization of the notion of power, 
providing for the realization of that right in practice, developing from 
dominance – through government and management – to competent 
activity and creativity of self-organized and culturally eminent human 
personalities as new subjects of democracy process. 
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ISTITUTO DI SCIENZE E TECNOLOGIE DELLA COGNIZIONE 
CONSIGLIO NAZIONALE DELLE RICERCHE
TRENTO, ITALIA
THOUSANDS OF TROOPS ARE CURRENTLY BEING DEPLOYED IN ITALIAN CITIES., 
They patrol alongside state and paramilitary police and guard “sensitive 
sites”. Military forces are able to stop, search and identify suspects. With 
the explicit intent to help police ﬁ ght crime, boost security and curb 
illegal immigration, these new measures have been enacted through 
an emergency decree issued in May 2008 by the government and then, 
after two months, converted into the law (July 25, 2008, n.125). Secure 
Streets – that is the name of the “temporary” operation inscribed in 
this legal framework – was renewed on May 2009 and is valid until 
the end of December 2010.
If we add that some of these troops were previously employed in 
war zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia [1], it is difﬁ cult not 
to say that we are now moving a step forward towards a full state of 
exception. As a result it is not a mere accident that nowadays, as it was 
1  Interview with the undersecretary of defense Guido Crosetto, in Brega (2008). In this 
framework it is interesting to notice that the Italian Ministry of Defense is promoting 
several initiatives with the aim of transferring knowledge on counterinsurgency from 
the several international war scenarios in which Italy has been involved into its own 
national borders (La Rosa, 2009; Coticchia, 2009).
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at the beginning of the past century, political theory is still haunted by 
the specter of emergency [2].
Recent literature [3] has pointed out that “the jargon of exception” 
–especially the one adopted by Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben– has, 
as its drawback, the fact of completely erasing the fundamental role of 
societal forces into the modern political arena. Thus, if it seems to be 
unavoidable to use the notion of exception, at the same time the main 
frameworks provided on it appear to be somewhat lacking. To address 
this very difﬁ cult issue a new theoretical analysis is needed.
I will start by considering an apparently unrelated piece of litera-
ture – the one on constitutive rules, developed mainly in analytical 
philosophy. More speciﬁ cally, my investigation, to give a contribution 
to the topic of exception, needs to ﬁ nd an answer to the following ques-
tion: what happens when something goes wrong while following this 
kind of rules, viz. when either a mismatch between rules and facts or 
an internal contradiction among rules causes an impasse?
If it is fairly clear that this may endanger the life of institutions, on 
the other hand, in a lot of other situations, impasses could happen with-
out being fatal to them. To understand this, an analysis of the dynamic 
evolution of impasses in institutional settings will be provided. When a 
state of exception is declared, we face a similar paradoxical situation, 
were law is suspended against itself. But, here, this situation is not an 
unwanted outcome of regulated action, it is something that belongs to 
a strategy of power.  By explaining how this strategy combines with 
the impasse dynamics, I will try to show how it is possible to ﬁ nd room 
for societal forces to come democratically into play.
1     A problem in exceptionalism
“Sovereign is he who decides the exception”. This is the always-quoted 
beginning of Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology. In a state of exception 
2  To this respect, Italy is not, so to speak, an exception in the exception.  International 
military interventions, counter terrorism policies and increasing controls over immigration 
are just few situations in which the notion of emergency is at stake. The literature that 
deals with the problem is huge, for a survey, see for example Sheuerman (2006).
3  Huysmans (2008); Kisner (2007).
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law is suspended by those who are the primary decision makers in 
the State, that is by those who declared the exception. This triggers an 
entire chain of power that allows the creation of new spaces of decision. 
These relevant actors, having more inﬂ uence over decision-making 
than others, are able to take advantage over these others by forcing 
the system in a peculiar manner at the level of the institution and/or at 
the level of its application. That is, because of an emergency situation, 
when a state of exception is declared, what is ordinarily valid by the 
law is not valid anymore. New, and to some extent, arbitrary power is 
given to some ﬁ gures such as police, army and so on. Potentially this 
allows the space of decision to be unlimited:
The precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one 
spell out what may take place in such a case, especially when it is truly 
a matter of an extreme emergency and of how it is to be eliminated. The 
precondition as well as the content of jurisdictional competence in such a 
case must necessarily be unlimited. From the liberal constitutional point 
of view, there would be no jurisdictional competence at all. The most 
guidance the constitution can provide is to indicate who can act in such a 
case.  If such action is not subject to controls, if it is not hampered in some 
way by checks and balances, as is the case in a liberal constitution, then 
it is clear who the sovereign is. He decides whether there is an extreme 
emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it. Although he 
stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs 
to it, for it is he who must decide whether the constitution needs to be 
suspended in its entirety [4].
A State (or, better, some of its decision makers) in order to save itself 
from something that threatens its own existence suspends some of its 
own rules.  But there is no one above the primary decision makers of 
a State. Hence Schmitt conducts his investigation to the disarticula-
tion of the idea that it would be possible to build a way to limit this 
sovereign power, along the lines of “who controls the controllers?”. At 
the same time Schmitt wants to give a legal framework for this power: 
the sovereign who decides on exception is partially subsumed under 
4  Schmitt (1985): pp. 6-7.
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the law. Here Schmitt’s decisionism fully departs from the normative 
approach that characterizes liberalism. Exception is not simply discre-
tion. Even if it lies on the same axis for some of its elements, exception 
has a peculiar relationship with its own limits.
Discretion has been interestingly characterized by Ronald Dworkin 
as the hole in the doughnut, something that “does not exist except as an 
area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction [5] ”. Thus, discretion 
is not outside the law but internal to the law. What it has in common 
with exception is that discretion allows decision-making:
An ofﬁ cial’s discretion means not that he is free to decide without recurse 
to standards of sense and fairness, but only that his decision is not control-
led by a standard furnished by the particular authority we have in mind 
when we raise the question of discretion [6].
But, has we said, what matters in exception is the scope of what 
it is possible to do. Here, during the exception, it is the one who has 
actual power who can go beyond the rules. The striking fact is that 
Schmitt wants to give a legal justiﬁ cation of it and he does it by saying 
that the one who suspends the law “nevertheless belongs to it”. But how 
is it possible to suspend (some or, in principle, all) rules that make an 
institution and at the very same time to be inside the framework of the 
very same rules?  Under this justiﬁ cation of exception – no mystery— 
lies an extremely authoritarian philosophy. This is enough to say that 
in this framework social forces are completely powerless [7], and what 
Schmitt wrote about De Maistre also applies for his own account:
[…]  we can […]  see a reduction of the state to the moment of the decision, 
to a pure decision not based on reason and discussion and not justiﬁ ng 
itself, that is, to an absolute decision created out of nothingness [8].
5  Dworkin (1977): p. 31. I am touching very brieﬂ y this very complex topic. For the sake of 
simplicity I choose to point to Dworkin’s characterization that, in contemporary theory 
of law, is still considered one of the most relevant (see Klatt, 2007).
6  Ibid.: p. 33.
7  For the sake of brevity we will not enter into further details to support this claim, for 
more see Huysmans (2008).
8  Schmitt (1985): pp. 66.
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For Agamben to accept this conception of law and power is to 
give a chance to indeterminacy and arbitrariness and, moreover, he 
correctly emphasizes Schmitt’s account as aporetic:
The speciﬁ c contribution of Schmitt’s theory is precisely to have made 
such an articulation between state of exception and juridical order pos-
sible. It is a paradoxical articulation, for what must be inscribed within 
the law is something that is essentially exterior to it, that is, nothing less 
than the suspension of the juridical order itself (hence the aporetical 
formulation: “In a juridical sense, an order still exists… even if it is not a 
juridical order ”) [9].
Even if one could ﬁ nd a bit strange to say how this aporia could 
be a contribution [10], Agamben point is quite clear: one cannot justify 
as law something that is completely against it. We could say, pushing 
further Dworkin’s metaphor, that here, at the same time, there is and 
there is not a doughnut or, saying it in another way, that the hole in 
the doughnut is the doughnut itself.
To highlight this aporetic “juridicization” of exception is for 
Agamben essential, and it is what marks his conceptual move as 
completely opposite with respect to Schmitt’s one. If for Schmitt this 
aporia is somehow hidden (exception is something that he politically 
endorses), for Agamben exception and its aporetic status culminate 
in an obscene paradigm that characterize the modern way of under-
standing the articulation between law and power. Within a state of 
exception the norm is in force, is in potentia, but it is not applied, is 
not in actus; conversely, acts that do not have the value of law acquire 
the force of law. It is because of this contradictory situation posed by 
the juridicization of exception that for Agamben our times are ultima 
facie governed by ﬁ ction:
The state of exception is an anomic space in which what is a stake is a force 
of law without law (which should therefore be written: force of law). Such 
9  Agamben (2005): p. 33.
10  In fact Agamben in the Italian text uses the word prestazione that points more correctly to 
the less positive semantic ﬁ eld of ‘service’ or ‘performance’, see Agamben (2003): p. 45.
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a “force of law”, in which potentiality and act are radically separated, is 
certainly something like a mystical element, or rather a ﬁ ctio by means of 
which law seeks to annex anomie itself [11].
To emphasize the ﬁ ctitious character of governmentality is not to 
say that the machine of power is not efﬁ cient.  On the contrary, it has 
worked almost without interruption from WWII to Terrorism Act, 
Guantanamo and today’s emergency decrees, passing through fascism 
and Nazi Camps:
[…] the state of exception has today reached its maximum worldwide 
deployment. The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and con-
tradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that – while ignoring 
international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception 
internally— nevertheless still claims to be applying the law [12] .
Intuitively, we can follow Agamben on this [13]: even if we just take 
into consideration the speciﬁ c case of the emergency decrees in Italy, 
we can see this ﬁ ctional, contradictory character of today’s power.  In 
Italy there is a systematic and increasing recourse to the issuing of 
emergency decrees in such an extent that now many jurists call this 
situation, not without complaining, an “ordinary” way of law-making [14]. 
Given such a situation, the span of time between august-september 1999 
becomes something really exceptional. And this is because in those 
two months no decree was in existence.  Something similar happened 
in the ﬁ fties; before the ﬁ fties there was fascism, were the “normal” 
policy was made, again, by emergency decrees. It is difﬁ cult to say how 
this daily and endless emergency could not be a ﬁ ction.
Our problem is with Agamben’s somewhat lacking treatment of 
this notion of ﬁ ction. There is no explanation on how this ﬁ ction exactly 
11  Agamben (2005): p. 38.
12  Ibid.: p. 87.
13  Agamben has developed his notion of exception also in Agamben (1998; 2000). We are 
well aware that a deep study on the merits and appropriateness of analysis of exception 
in Agamben is needed, but this is certainly out of the limits of this essay. For an overview 
of the criticisms against Agamben’s position on exception see Neal (2007).
14  Marazzita (2003); Simoncini (2006).
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works within the social system. I think that this is due to the fact that 
the role of social forces is not enough considered. If the mechanism 
of exception works, it is because this mechanism is accepted or not 
contrasted enough by the actors that are involved into it.  I will later 
try to show how crucial this is in order to ﬁ nd, at least, a theoretical 
move to put again the social forces into play; for the moment let’s stay 
on the problem of depoliticization. As Jef Husmans puts it:
Even if one would argue that Agamben’s framing of the current political 
conditions are valuable for understanding important changes that have 
taken place in the twentieth century and that are continuing in the twenty 
ﬁ rst, they also are to a considerable extent depoliticizing [15].
I believe that the main problem Agamben faces lies in his messianic 
answer to the question of halting the machine of emergency. That is, 
his messianic idea, borrowed from Benjamin, of revolution conceived 
as a moment of real state of emergency.  If the ‘emergency situation’ 
in which we live is the rule, then the point is “to bring about a real 
state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle 
against fascism” [16]. Being this a messianic claim, one can imagine how 
difﬁ cult it is to explain how this state of liberation will be reached. 
Messianism as such prevents the very possibility of thinking about a 
way to change things. If we do not share Benjamin’s and Agamben’s 
messianism, but we share the same need to halt the machine, is there 
any possibility of a rational reconstruction of exceptionalism such as 
to provide a ‘logical space’ for describing bottom-up social processes 
able to bring the real state of exception?
2    An analytical view on rules
In order to provide a reliable solution to this problem, I will recur to a 
completely different ﬁ eld: ‘analytical’ social ontology. One of the pio-
neers and the prominent ﬁ gures in this speciﬁ c debate is certainly John 
15  Huysmans, J. (2008): p. 33.
16  Benjamin (2003): vii, p. 392.
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Searle. The analysis of social reality brought about by Searle has as its 
basis the idea that speaking is acting according to some social rules, 
these rule have not just a regulatory character, they deﬁ ne linguistic 
sentences [17]. Take for example the case of promising, promising is not 
a representation of the intention of doing what someone has promised, 
it is also, in front of other speakers, to undertake the obligation of doing 
so by following the rules of promising. This leaded him to investigate 
what sociality is [18], but his approach is quite different from those of 
Schmitt or Agamben.
According to Searle the classical approach in political philosophy 
usually seeks to investigate “the ideal society, the nature of justice, 
the sources of sovereignty, the origins of political obligation, and the 
requirements for effective political leadership [19]”. The problem with 
this conception is not that it gives the wrong answer to its questions, the 
problem is that this approach lacks a rigorous foundational analysis:
Prior to answering such questions as “What is a just society?” and “What 
is the proper exercise of political power?” it seems to me we should answer 
the more fundamental questions: “What is a society in the ﬁ rst place?” 
and “What sort of power is political power anyhow?” [20].
In his later work he develops a logical analysis of the social realm 
that at its end touches many topics in political theory.  I will not focus 
on this latter part, rather I will brieﬂ y take into consideration two 
of the main building blocks of his huge philosophical building, the 
notion of rule and the notion of collective acceptance and I will try to 
see the merits and demerits of these two notions for a new conceptual 
framework of the exception.
The notion of constitutive rule is quite popular [21], so I will not go 
into this very much. Moreover, what is needed here is to understand 
the basic idea behind constitutive rules, and not to develop a theory of 
them. This basic idea is that constitutive rules create the very conditions 
17  His famous theory on speech acts was developed primarily in Searle (1969, 1979).
18  Searle (1995, 2010).
19  Searle (2008): p. 19.
20  Ibid.: p. 20.
21  On this see, for example, the recent work by Hindrinks (2009).
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of existence of certain social facts.  They are the posed, deﬁ nitional 
part in a social system [22].
Searle distinguishes between what he calls regulative rules and 
constitutive rules. The former are rules like “drive on the right side of 
the road” or “do not feed the monkeys” and they regulate an already 
existing behavior: driving or feeding the monkeys can exist regardless 
of the rules that apply to them. Constitutive rules instead create new 
behaviors, to say it a bit more correctly, they specify a new meaning 
associated to a certain behavior and their fundamental structure is 
the famous count as formula:
X count as Y in context C
For example, the bills (X) printed at the mint count as money (Y) in 
a certain State (C). Or, what (X) counts as a particular piece in a game 
of chess (Y), e.g., a king, or a rook, is determined by the rules of chess 
(C). What a certain piece is, it is determined by the constitutive rules 
of chess, which prescribe how that piece can be used in playing chess. 
A single constitutive rule can deﬁ ne what a certain piece is just within 
the broader system of the other constitutive rules, that then play the 
role of the context (C) in the formula. Without the system of constitutive 
rules of money those bills in our wallet are just paper and it would be 
impossible to understand a checkmate without the constitutive rules 
of chess. In this sense these rules are deﬁ nitional and creative: because 
of them new, institutional facts come into existence, that is a status 
(Y) is imposed to a certain entity. This imposition is a speech act, a 
declarative. To be Prime Minister, a citizen or an illegal immigrant in 
a certain country such as Italy, USA or France is a matter also of status 
functions and declarations. Without an explicit codiﬁ cation no one of 
this status can validly be applied.
But how is this status imposed on those entities?  Social and insti-
tutional facts come into existence through collective intentionality. 
Pieces of paper function as money because we intend them to do so. 
22  See Searle (1969, 1995). This is neither the only account on constitutive rules nor the 
ﬁ rst, but it is one of the most discussed in literature. For an historical account on such 
topic see Conte (1988).
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Whenever two or more agents share a belief, desire, intention or other 
intentional state, and when they are aware of such sharing, the agents 
in question have collective intentionality. Collective acceptance is that 
part of collective intentionality that allows the social object to have a 
function within a certain social system. Therefore social facts exist 
through collective acceptance of a speech act that imposes the status 
Y over the element X in the count as formula.
In this framework power is essentially a question of collective 
acceptance of imposition of status functions.  Whenever –in the proper 
context– we impose a status as ‘President of United States of America’ 
on someone, this person has now new rights, duties, obligation, and, 
conversely, this holds for people who interact with this very person in 
his or her role. These are deontic powers that exist because we accept 
this status assignment.
This approach that I have very brutally sketched out, has, among 
the others, the advantage of being quite compact and intuitive, but it has 
also its deﬁ ciencies [23]. For example Searle is not that much interested 
in coping with ‘negative’ cases in his philosophy of society.  But these 
cases are quite frequent in the social realm and they acquire much more 
signiﬁ cance in the context of our study, that is when we deal with excep-
tion. Wolfgang Balzer, for instance, claims that “the account provides 
a too harmonious and thoroughly positive view of, and approach to, 
social institutions [24]”, as he does not take into account that the subjects 
involved in the mechanism of collective acceptance are not peers, but 
social subjects that experience inequality conditions.
In reality, the creation of some central social facts, the assignment of 
certain powers is made by a small set of people almost regardless of the 
will of others. This consideration should at least lead to a more neutral 
notion of collective acceptance. We could then consider acceptance as 
a term that can sum up in itself a positive vision, as the searlian one, 
alongside with a negative one, such as that of Jean-Paul Sartre [25] , where 
acceptance could be also endurance, that is a kind of internalization 
23  As we already noticed in Bottazzi and Ferrario (2010).
24  Balzer (2002): p. 198.
25  Sartre (1982).
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of the impossibility of resisting to a certain authority [26].  Said that, for 
collective acceptance the question of rules is still open.  What happens 
if something goes wrong with the rules that we established? This leads 
me to discuss my account of the notion of impasse [27].
3    Impasse Dynamics
Intuitively, an impasse is an undesired situation that goes against 
the rules, which actors who follow the rules may end up in. In a true 
impasse situation we cannot go on following the rules. Because of 
an internal or an external problem in the rules we cannot say which 
further step is the one we should do without going against them. An 
analysis of this notion can be seen as an effort to analyze what Ludwig 
Wittgenstein called the civic status of contradiction:
[...] we lay down rules, a technique, for playing a game, and that then, 
when we follow the rules, things don’t turn out as we had assumed. So 
that we are, as it were, entangled in our own rules.
This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand: that is, 
to survey.
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those cases, 
things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what 
we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: “That’s not the way 
I meant it.”
The civic status of a contradiction, or its status in civic life – that is the 
philosophical problem [28].
Here we do not want to enter into the meaning of the notion of 
contradiction –in this case many approaches would be viable in an 
enormous range that goes from paraconsistent logic to marxism– but 
26  A similar criticism has been developed by Jennifer Hudin (2007). Recently, Searle 
himself recognized the existence of this problem, and remarked that his position (2010), 
is actually more neutral than the one appeared in Searle (1995), but according to Hudin 
(2010) the question is far from being resolved.
27  Introduced in Bottazzi and Ferrario (2009); Bottazzi (2010).
28  Wittgenstein (1953): sect. 125.
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to see its effect within a social domain. What strikes the most is the 
fact that this phenomenon, although being so central in Wittgenstein’s 
words, seems almost ignored, at least in literature of analytical heritage 
that deals with social ontology.
The strategy adopted is ﬁ rstly to isolate two main kinds of impasses 
depending on the fact that they are caused by a mismatch between rules 
and facts or by an internal contradiction among rules.  Then, given the 
deﬁ nitional character of constitutive rules, one could say that they set 
a new ‘logical space’ for action, and that impasses push the action out 
of such space, thus threatening the identity of the regulated interaction 
and coordination. I will show then –by illustrating what I called the 
dynamics or propagation of impasses– how we can accommodate this 
intuition with the opposite one that in a lot of situations similar issues 
can arise in systems of constitutive rules that are not fatal to them.
We can isolate then the two main kinds of impasses:
Nomic impasse1. . (gr. νό μος, “law”). It occurs even in cases where rules 
of a certain institution are perfectly followed. It is thus due to a lack 
in the design of the rules; there is an ‘internal’ incoherence such that, 
even in a perfect execution of institutional activities in accordance 
with the rules, the result would nevertheless be an impasse situa-
tion; it is deﬁ nitionally necessary. This means that the necessity of 
the impasse depends on what the rules prescribe, on the fact that 
they are entangled.
Anti-nomic impasse2. . (gr. ἀντι, “against” and νό μος, “law”). It can be due 
to a bad execution of the regulated activities or to an execution that 
goes against the rules of the institution (nothing to do with Kantian 
antinomy). The lack at its basis is a lack of capability of foreseeing 
all the possible ways the agents have at their disposal to go against 
the rules. In this sense we could say that it is the result of a sort of 
“external” incoherence.
I will characterize better these two kinds by enriching them with 
examples: I will describe the case of cheating and the case of rule 
entanglement in voting, linked respectively with the notions of anti-
nomic and nomic impasse and we will see, at the same time, their 
dynamical character.
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Cheating.  An interesting account of cheating has been given by 
Stuart Green [29], were cheating is deﬁ ned as a violation of a certain 
rule with the intent to obtain an advantage over a party with whom 
we are in a cooperative, rule-bound relationship. Green considers 
a huge spectrum of phenomena labeled as cheating. I will not enter 
into details about this [30], for the purpose of this paper, I would like to 
restrict the case of cheating were constitutive rules are involved and 
to emphasize that:
cheating involves rule breaking;• 
cheating is often (if not always, when it involves constitutive rules) a • 
practice that needs a kind of covertness.
Let’s take into consideration the ﬁ rst part of the problem. Cheating 
involves rule breaking. When we cheat we break something we previ-
ously agreed upon, e.g. a rule, in this case a constitutive one –we drive, 
antinomically, the system to a strange situation. On one hand, it seems 
that breaking a constitutive rule implies going outside the logical 
space of the considered activity: moving a pawn of three positions is 
not playing chess badly, it is not playing chess at all: “omitting to do 
something which one has formally acknowledged as required of one 
is rather like contradicting oneself [31]”. On the other hand, we have an 
opposite intuition. Michael Sean Quinn, in his paper Practice-Deﬁ ning 
Rules, says :
I think that we should allow that (at least) some people who cheats in 
games are nevertheless playing the game. Otherwise, whenever we say of 
a person that he plays but cheats every chance he gets, we are contradict-
ing ourselves (unless what we mean is that he is playing whenever he is 
ostensibly playing and not cheating) [32].
We are thus faced with a dilemma: if constitutive rules create the 
meaning of an institution, how is it possible that many institutions 
29  Green (2004).
30  For more about impasse dynamics and cheating see Bottazzi and Ferrario (2010).
31  Cameron (1972): p. 319.
32  Quinn (1975): p. 78.
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survive even though experiencing violations of their constitutive rules? 
To have some understanding of this situation we should go a bit deeper 
into the covertness of cheating.
Let’s consider ﬁ rstly the case of effective cheating. Everything it’s 
ﬁ ne –surely for me, the cheater, not at all for my opponent and ambigu-
ously for the game– if no one spots me. The destiny of my strategy in 
the game is somehow linked to an epistemic feature.  But not just of 
my strategy. As we saw in the case of Searle’s collective acceptance, 
a social fact holds if, collectively, it is accepted as valid.  If they don’t 
spot me, even if I’m doing something that is outside the logical space of 
the game, the game is still valid, even from an ontological standpoint, 
because it is accepted as valid. It is true, at the same time, that from 
the standpoint of the rules of the game, by deﬁ nition, the game is in a 
sort of impasse. No other move is allowed and we do not have a clear 
way to overcome the deadlock.
Let’s try to ﬁ t a cheating situation into a scheme, provided in table 
1, where it is shown a dynamical view on impasse. First of all it must 
be said that that the passage from one phase to another, numbered in 
the table from 1 to 5, is not strictly necessary, but it explains a relevant 
mechanism in the dynamics of institutions, thus the symbol “Ü”, that 
has no formal meaning here, should be read as “may lead to”. It indi-
cates the direction of a path that leads from an initial impasse (1) to its 
institutional effects (5).
1. Deﬁ nitional impasse
↓
2. Epistemic recognition
↓
3. Impasse declaration
↓
4. Collective acceptance
↓
5. Institutional impasse
Table 1: Impasse propagation
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At the deﬁ nitional level (1), what could happen is that, with respect 
to how the institution is designed and constituted, this very activity is 
logically stuck in a deadlock. If it happens, then this holds by deﬁ nition, 
independently from the minds of the actors involved.  Therefore, in 
this restricted sense, we can say that here there is an actual impasse. 
Whenever we establish the rules, if something wrong occurs to them, 
this harms the meaning of the regulated activity and it does it by 
deﬁ nition. This may lead to the recognition (2), by one of the actors 
involved, of what is happening as an impasse. To make this step is 
something epistemic, because it depends on the cognitive capabilities 
of the actors.  Now, the one who recognizes the impasse situation has 
to choose whether to declare (3) or not the deﬁ nitional impasse. This 
step is not necessary at all, it could be done, but it could equally well 
not be done. Depending, maybe, on the strategic interests of the actor, 
we can imagine that she could have some advantage in declaring (or 
not) that an impasse occurred. If this declaration occurs now it is up to 
the other actor(s) to collectively accept (4) that this was actually the case. 
Obviously this level presupposes that each actor involved recognizes 
the impasse or trusts the declarer. Moreover it can involve also addi-
tional declaration(s). Again, also at this level strategic considerations 
may occur. In any case if deﬁ nitional impasse is collectively accepted 
this leads to the institutional impasse. This is the effective deadlock in 
interaction that can lead either to the death of the institutional activity 
or to a transformation of the system by changing its rules [33].
Now let’s consider the simple and often used example of the game of 
chess. Suppose I move, to take advantage, a tower as if it were a bishop, 
thus I break the rules: by deﬁ nition, I am not playing chess anymore, 
there is no possible further move. But I am smart or lucky enough: no 
one spots me, neither my opponent, nor the referee.  If no one sees me, 
it seems likely that no one would say anything to protest against my 
move. This means that they (implicitly) accept it. Actually, they don’t 
accept my move as irregular. I made them believe that this was regular. 
This is the covertness of cheating: the move appears regular, but it is 
not. Then the game goes on, there is no impasse at the institutional 
33  By introducing what we called (in Bottazzi and Ferrario, 2009) rules with an arbitral 
function, viz. rules that preserve the institution from its own destruction.
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level. And this level is the level that counts. Therefore, the game is 
deﬁ nitionally invalid but institutionally valid.
If cheating is ineffective these two logical levels coincide, in a sense. 
Again, I break the rules.  I move, to take advantage, a tower as if it 
were a bishop:  by deﬁ nition, I am not playing chess anymore, there 
is no possible further move. But now I am neither smart nor lucky 
enough: they spot me. Because of this, someone protests against the 
move I made.  This convinces the other players and/or the referee not 
to accept the move. I was a bit rough here, because we should say that 
we have two steps in one: recognition of the invalid move by the other 
participants, and their collective acceptance of the fact that the move 
is invalid.  This phase opens the possibility of “protesting” the game, 
it offers good reasons to declare the impossibility of acting further and 
opposing a part or the whole institution. At the ﬁ nal step, the game 
faces the impasse. The deﬁ nitional impasse has propagated its effects 
to the institutional layer: depending on its rules, it can be halted, it can 
lead to a penalty, and so on. The complete deadlock happens when 
there are no rules to manage this situation: we could call this a strict 
institutional impasse.
Rule entanglement in voting.  An interesting case of nomic 
impasse is discursive dilemma. This dilemma –ﬁ rstly proposed and 
analyzed by Philip Petitt [34]– is relative to a decision that has to be taken 
on the basis of the opinions of a number of agents who have to express 
a majority voting on a certain set of problems, which are logically con-
nected. Petitt has mathematically shown [35] that it is always possible 
that, though each agent gives her own vote coherently, an incoherent 
majority is nonetheless generated.
Let’s suppose to have a group composed by three agents A, B, and 
C that should express their opinions on each of the following points:
First Premise• : “increase expenses for defense”;
Second Premise• : “increase other expenses”;
Conclusion• : “increase taxes”
34  Pettit (2001).
35  List and Pettit (2002, 2004).
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Let’s further suppose that it is not possible to increase all expenses 
(by voting “Yes” to both premises) without also increasing taxes 
(without also voting “Yes” to the conclusion). Votes that are indi-
vidually coherent generate a contradiction. It is not possible to vote 
“Yes” to both premises and “No” to the conclusion; even though 
voters respect such a rule, the result of the majority voting is not 
to increase taxes (“No” to the conclusion) and, at the same time, 
increase expenses for defense (“Yes” to the ﬁ rst premise) and the 
other expenses (“Yes” to the second premise). But this, as already 
noted, ends up in a contradiction.
The problem is that every method for voting which treats equally 
every point and every voter has been shown to suffer from this contra-
diction. There is a form of democratic voting that, for its very nature, 
brings to a situation of impasse. We have to emphasize this: it was dis-
covered that it is impossible to escape from these situations in majority 
voting. This means that even in this case we have an impasse dynamics. 
At the deﬁ nitional level the system is ﬂ awed.  We can have an actual 
voting that encounters this incoherence. At the epistemic level this can 
be recognized or not.  If it is not recognized –because people in charge 
of checking the voting are far away or stupid– this leads to consider-
ing institutionally valid a completely crazy result.  Which effect does 
this produce on the institutional situation at stake? We can imagine 
that this incoherent voting could affect other decisions, a sort of chain 
effect that makes them deﬁ nitionally invalid but institutionally valid 
too. Everything appears to be valid, but is ﬂ awed in its fundaments, 
nonetheless it is accepted.
4    Conclusion: the Dynamics of Exception.
Let’s now come back to the main issue of this paper: how to save the 
intuitions we have on Agamben’s account on exceptionalism and to 
ﬁ nd room, at the same time, for the essential bottom-up social proc-
esses that make up a society.
First of all we must come back to Agamben’s treatment of the 
aporetic character of today’s exceptionalism. Before introducing the 
dynamic characterization of impasse I supported Agamben in his 
Democracy Today.indb   251 11-08-2012   20:06:01
252
DEMOCRACY TODAY
 
claim [36]. But now, after introducing my approach, I urge to make more 
precise the level of agreement I have with him. I do agree on the fact 
that the concept of exception is suspicious from a logical point of view. 
My disagreement shows up in some essential details.  If we go into it 
and try to solve some of the hidden issues, we will see that a different 
framework for exception emerges.
In his account the state of exception is an anomic space. There is 
no clear explanation of what Agamben exactly means for anomie. 
Here we fully support Searle’s need for a foundational analysis of the 
basic elements in political philosophy. Given this, we can just rely on 
etymology. The word ‘anomie’ comes from Greek, namely the alpha 
privativum ‘α’ that could be interpreted here as ‘without’ and the word 
νό μος that can be interpreted as ‘law’. Therefore we could say that, 
for Agamben, exception produces normlessness. If this is Agamben’s 
intended meaning of anomie I have to disagree with him on this point. 
On the contrary, to me the state of exception puts a social system into a 
nomic and an antinomic impasse.
Nomic impasse caused by the state of exception.  A legal system 
that provides the possibility of exception is ﬂ awed at its fundaments. 
For example, take article 77 of the Italian constitution that provides 
some limitation to exception [37]. By giving limitation to emergency, 
exception was put inside the very core of the Italian law. It is interest-
ing to notice that those limitations –that in many respects are quite 
similar to those posed during fascism [38] – where put with the intent 
to “prevent and sanction abuses” as was said by one of the ratiﬁ ers at 
the constitutional convention in 1946. But even if limited, it was already 
36  Sect. 1, p. 3.
37  “(1) The government may not issue decrees with the force of law unless empowered 
by a proper delegation of the chambers. (2) As an exception by necessity and urgency, 
government may issue provisional measures with the force of law and submits them on 
the same day to the chambers for conﬁ rmation; if the chambers are not in session, they 
have to be summoned for that purpose within ﬁ ve days. (3) Legal decrees lose effect at the 
date of issue if they are not conﬁ rmed within sixty days of their publication. However, 
chambers may sanction rights and obligations arising out of decrees are not conﬁ rmed”. 
Italian Const. Art. 77 (1-3), translated in A. Tschentscher (ed.), International Constitutional 
Law (last modiﬁ ed May 23th, 2003) (F.R.G.).
38  As pointed out by many, beside Agamben (2003): for more on this, see Marazzita 
(2003); Simoncini (2006).
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stated that it is impossible to really give some limits if we are still in 
the paradigm of exception “by necessity and urgency”. Also jurists 
cannot guarantee that such an article can avoid the suspension of law 
in its entirety [39].
Likewise, to allow for a piece of law to range on the entirety of a 
normative system creates a logical impossibility: that is, a collapse of 
the meta-level (a rule that states the possibility of emergency) and the 
object level (the law). A logically impossible system is much worse than 
an anomic one. Being without law is anarchy, being under a logically 
impossible law is being under the heel of complete arbitrariness. And 
it is worse than simple contradiction, as it is in the voting paradox we 
cited in the previous section, where in some of the possible patterns of 
voting we have, at the deﬁ nitional level, a contradiction. The discursive 
dilemma says that in all systems with majority voting on interconnected 
issues there will be at least one contradictory outcome. This means that 
there are also some outcomes free from contradiction. On the contrary, 
in a system that embeds exception, we have a logical impossibility that 
automatically produces an impasse at the deﬁ nitional level.
Antinomic impasse caused by the state of exception.  Now let’s 
consider the second impasse created by exception, the antinomic one. 
When we talked about cheating we saw it as a way of taking advantage 
from deception. There is a behavior that goes against the system in 
such a way that at the deﬁ nitional level the system is in an impasse; 
in order to take advantage, the cheater acts at the level of recognition 
to avoid his or her irregular move to be spotted. In exception some 
relevant actors, having more inﬂ uence over decision-making than 
others, are able to take an advantage over these others by forcing the 
system in a peculiar manner at the level of the institution and/or at 
the level of its application.
This antinomic impasse starts at the declarative level.  A state of 
exception is justiﬁ ed by emergency, that is by something that endanger 
the system. A speciﬁ c disposition is enacted arbitrarily because excep-
tion is declared, and this happens in order to save the commonwealth. In 
a sense exception would be the remedy to avoid impasse. But here we see 
a sort of distortion with respect to the schema of impasse propagation 
39  Marazzita (2003).
Democracy Today.indb   253 11-08-2012   20:06:01
254
DEMOCRACY TODAY
 
proposed in the previous section. Here there is not an actual impasse 
by deﬁ nition, there is a perception of risk of impasse, something that is 
at the level of recognition and exception is declared because of it. This 
leads to the fact that it is necessary for the one who declared it, to act 
at the level of recognition of the other actors involved –e.g. by using 
propaganda and so on– to convince them that the commonwealth is 
on the verge of a catastrophe and that the exception was needed, ask-
ing ultimately for acceptance. But the state of exception is, as we saw, 
intrinsically a state of impasse. This means that, paradoxically, we have 
at this point a real, actual impasse that has been expressly caused to avoid a 
possible one. The ones in control enact an impasse on the void of pure 
possibility that destroys the meaning of the institution. Then, here it 
goes the further ﬁ ction, that is the attempt to maintain an apparent 
coherence of the system in front of this complete failure.
If a system is pervasively in a situation of impasse this obviously 
means that it is weak.  How would this be possible?  How this machine 
is not in a state of institutional impasse? Because of the level of accept-
ance. Actual political systems are strongly based on consensus. An 
institutional system that embeds exception needs ﬁ ction, we can show 
now how the ﬁ ction works by showing what needs to be hidden, that is 
that the system is ﬂ awed both at declarative and at deﬁ nitional level.
Acceptance and power.  Now there is room –at the level of rec-
ognition and acceptance– for societal forces to be in the framework 
of a philosophy of exception. Ultimately, if, though the system is so 
deeply ﬂ awed but yet not collapsed, this is because at its bottom it is 
somehow accepted.
In the last ﬁ fty years there has been a strong emphasis on study-
ing the level of recognition and ideology, by for example trying to 
‘deconstruct’ the strategies of propaganda; the problem that we face 
now is that it is necessary to work deeper on other levels: that is, the 
level of collective acceptance and that of declaration. This latter level 
may be seen as the level of political action, where we do things with 
words. I don’t want to say anything about it, because it is far beyond 
the scope of this paper, I just want to emphasize how crucial this level 
is. At this level the ﬁ rst move that should be done is going further in 
translating what has been done in the description of the dynamics of 
exception in terms of who exerts more controls on others in a social 
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system. Whenever the majority of social forces are not able to have the 
control on the coherence of the social system which they are part of 
and, moreover, to intervene in it by taking decisions, whenever they 
just exert their power by mere pressure or passive acceptance, it is 
impossible to halt the machine of exception. To create a new strategy 
to make this possible is a hard task that political philosophy should 
not abdicate to.
Less ambitiously, I would like to conclude with a remark on accept-
ance.  Acceptance is what brings exception into being.  Therefore, we 
came back to one of the main themes of analytical social ontology, that 
is, collective intentionality. It is by some form of collective acceptance 
that we give some functions to some individuals. It is also true, as we 
stated about Searle, that it is not possible to consider social acceptance 
as such, as something positive. If revolution is not a cocktail party, it 
is also true that governmentality is not a tennis match between noble 
and a bit decadent peers, where fair play is the basis for a tranquil 
acceptance of each action.
That is the reason why I tried to introduce a more general notion 
of acceptance as something very neutral that can comprehend each 
degree of disposition in the phenomenon of being subject to a chain of 
power.  We should call this kind of acceptance “acceptance*”, with the 
“*” symbol that indicates the fact that this notion is the general, neutral 
one that includes phenomena that span from enthusiastic approval to 
mere endurance. In this sense we all accept* the impossible system we 
live in: at the end of the day “one man is king only because other men 
stand in the relation of subjects to him. They, on the contrary, imagine 
that they are subjects because he is king” [40].
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As sociedades actuais confrontam diversos desaﬁ os de ordem 
social, cultural e política, desaﬁ os estes que nos impelem para 
uma reavaliação do nosso sistema de práticas, assim como 
do próprio sistema discursivo. Nas sociedades democráticas 
pluralistas de hoje, podemos identiﬁ car um abismo crescente entre 
os cidadãos e a esfera política formal. As abordagens avançadas 
por uma política do reconhecimento ou de redistribuição, 
habituadas a traduzir reivindicações na esfera pública, parecem 
hoje ser insuﬁ cientes perante este novo paradigma trazido por um 
mundo globalizado e uma política transnacional. Neste sentido, 
o sentido que geralmente atribuímos ao conceito de democracia 
deve ser revisto e, em última análise, redeﬁ nido. Partindo deste 
pressuposto, procuramos neste livro realizar duas tarefas em 
simultâneo: por um lado, dar conta da multiplicidade de sentidos 
de ‘democracia’ e das nuances conceptuais. Aqui exploraremos 
os conceitos e relações entre democracia, representação, 
participação, deliberação, igualdade e liberdade. Por outro 
lado, pretendemos dar conta das diferentes instanciações de 
‘democracia’ e das práticas que lhe são inerentes, olhando para 
contextos especíﬁ cos.
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